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Law and Inequality
Introduction
There can be no assumption that today's majority is 'right' and
the Amish and others like them are 'wrong.' A way of life
that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no rights or in-
terests of others is not to be condemned because it is
different. 1
The Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups iden-
tifies more than 100 minorities and 170 surviving Indian tribes in
the United States.2 The social, economic, political, and legal inter-
actions of these immigrant and nonimmigrant ethnic groups have
helped to shape the history, values, and legitimacy of the United
States.
The question of how a political system accommodates various
ethnic and racial groups constitutes a principal concern of political
and legal philosophy. Two basic models exist: assimilation and cul-
tural pluralism.3 The United States' approach to minority accom-
modation is basically assimilationist. The United States' juridical
tradition which emphasizes individual rights, equality of opportu-
nity, and protection against discrimination promotes and supports
the assimilationist process.
The alternative route, and one that prevails in many other
nations, is to implement a system of cultural pluralism. While the
extent of cultural pluralism can vary widely, such arrangements
do, at a minimum, recognize minority groups as having an identifi-
able status with their own legal claims to special powers and
rights. But cultural pluralism is an anathema in the melting pot,
1. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 223-24 (1972).
2. Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups vi (1980). More than
20,000 immigrants from 110 countries live in the Elmhurst section of Queens, New
York. Minorities, Community and Identity 248 (C. Fried ed. 1983) [hereinafter
Fried]. By the year 1990, it is estimated that 56% of California public school chil-
dren in grades K-12 will be Black, Hispanic, or Asian. Ronald Takaki, Reflections
on Racial Patterns in America: An Historical Perspective, in 1 Ethnicity and Public
Policy 1 (Winston A. Van Horne ed. 1982).
There is virtually no state in the world without minorities. Among the more
homogeneous nations are Ireland, Korea, Denmark, Japan, and Germany. It is esti-
mated that in 1967, 892 ethnic groups were living within the borders of the more
than 160 nations. George P. Murdoch, Ethnographic Atlas 7 (1967). See also Jay A.
Sigler, Minority Rights: A Comparative Analysis 205-13 (1983).
3. Milton Gordon has defined cultural pluralism within the United States as
"[t]he preservation of the communal life and significant portions of the culture of
the later immigrant groups within the context of American citizenship and political
and economic integration into American society." Milton Gordon, Assimilation in
American Life 85 (1964). According to Thomas Hoult, cultural pluralism is the
"doctrine that a society benefits when it is made up of a number of interdependent
ethnic groups each of which maintains a degree of autonomy." Thomas Ford Hoult,
Dictionary of Modern Sociology 239 (1969).
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virtually an insult to the United States's rich immigrant heritage
and an assault on a concept of justice valuing individual equality.
United States history is not solely a history of immigration.
It is also a history of expansion and conquest. The Indian, the
Hawaiian, and the Mexican-American, 4 did not immigrate. They
gave no "consent of the governed." 5 Rather, they were dispos-
sessed, without their consent, of their lands and resources.6 By
and large, these groups have not assimilated. Indians, Hawaiians,
and Chicanos cling tenaciously to their identities and their cul-
tures. Seeking to maintain their group identity and cultural rights,
these nonimmigrant groups fear the death of their cultural iden-
tity in a system that recognizes only the individual and enforces
only nondiscrimination.
This article considers the extent to which the United States
exhibits characteristics of a pluralistic state despite its general as-
similationist stance. That is, to what extent has the federal (and
state) government recognized, and how has it protected, the cul-
tural rights of these nonimmigrant groups? Section I gives a gen-
4. The term "Chicano," derived from "mejicano," was first used as a nickname
for the refugees of the Mexican Revolution after 1910. The term re-emerged in the
1960s used by militants such as Rudolfo "Corky" Gonzales to "announce a distinct
people, once suppressed but now reclaiming their integrity." Womack, The Chica-
nos, N.Y. Review of Books, Aug. 31, 1972, at 12, 14.
The term Chicano will be used interchangeably with Mexican American. The
term "Hispanic" generally refers to a wide category of Spanish-speaking groups, in-
cluding Cubans, Puerto Ricans, and other Latin Americans, as well as Chicanos.
The Chicano population is obviously a mixture of people descended from the
large region conquered from Mexico and individuals who have immigrated from
Mexico, especially since the turn of the century.
The American Indian, Native Hawaiian, and Chicano are not the only nonim-
migrant people who have come under United States jurisdiction. The United States
conquered the Puerto Ricans and the Chamorros of Guam during the Spanish.
American War. The Virgin Islands were purchased from Denmark in 1917. Ameri-
can Samoan native leaders ceded their sovereignty to the United States at the turn
of the century. In addition, the United States has recently negotiated four separate
status agreements with the people of the Trust Territories of the Pacific to define
their legal relationship with the United States. Arnold Leibowitz, Colonial Emanci-
pation in the Pacific and Caribbean: A Legal and Political Analysis 77-104 (1976); A.
John Armstrong, The Emergence of the Micronesians into the International Com-
munity: A Study of the Creation of a New International Entity, 5 Brooklyn J. Int'l
L. 207 (1979).
5. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
6. Interestingly, the United States did employ various concepts of group iden-
tity to legitimize the exclusion of some of these nonimmigrant groups from the ben-
efits and rights of the political system. The Indians belonged to alien tribes and lay
outside the federal system. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832); Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884). For the first ten years after Puerto Rico's
annexation to the United States, the islanders had their own identity as "the people
of Puerto Rico." Foraker Act, ch. 191, § 7, 31 Stat. 77 (1900) (codified as amended
48 U.S.C. §§ 731-916 (1982)). Even in the case of Blacks, slaves were characterized
as property and therefore legally excluded from the system. See infra note 78.
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eral overview of cultural pluralism, including a discussion of the
historical development of pluralistic societies. The section reports
on minority rights under international law, outlines the status of
cultural rights recognition and implementation in other nations,
and reviews twentieth century scholarship related to pluralistic
thought. Sections II, 11, and IV examine the historical back-
grounds of the American Indian, the Native Hawaiian, and the
Chicano, respectively, and analyze how successful they have been
in protecting their cultural heritage using existing constitutional
provisions.
I. Historical Development of Minority Rights
Cultural freedom is no less a spiritual possession of civi-
lized mankind than religious freedom. This principle shall be
acknowledged as an ethical tenet for the relations between
peoples. 7
The term ethnic derives from ethnos, the Greek word for na-
tion.8 Implied is a notion both of unity among all members and of
separateness from others. Ethnic, frequently referred to as minor-
ity, groups are commonly distinguished by language, territory,
common cultural values or symbols, and religions.9 Ethnic ten-
sions are powerful realities, as Woodrow Wilson recognized by his
7. Jacob Robinson, Oscar Karvach, Max Laserson, Neremiah Robinson &
Marc Vichniak, Were the Minorities Treaties a Failure? 255 (1st ed. 1943) (citing
the First Congress of European Nationalities in 1925, describing the importance of
cultural protection) [hereinafter Minorities].
8. Otto Klinberg, The Study of Multinational Societies, in The Multinational
Society: Papers of the Ljubljana Seminar 12 (William F. Mackey & Albert
Verdoodt eds. 1975) [hereinafter Mackey & Verdoodt]. Milton Gordon defines
ethnicity simply as "a sense of peoplehood." Philip Gleason, American Identity
and Americanization, in Dimensions of Ethnicity 137 (Stephen Thernstrom ed.
1982).
For a number of definitions of ethnic or minority group, see F. Heckman, To-
wards the Development of a Typology of Minorities, in Fried, supra note 2, at 10-11;
Sigler, supra note 2, at 4-10; Chester L. Hunt & Lewis Walker, Ethnic Dynamics:
Patterns of Intergroup Relations in Various Societies 3 (1974).
9. The United Nations, as of yet, has no official definition of the term "minor-
ity group." Special Rapporteur Francesco Capotorti of the UN Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities proposed the following
working definition of "minority" to apply to Article 27 of the International Conve-
nant on Civil and Political Rights:
A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State,
in a non-dominant position, whose members-being nationals of the
State-possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing
from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a
sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, tradi-
tions, religion or language.
Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Mi-
norities at 96, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.78.XIV.1 (1979)
[hereinafter Capotorti Study).
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comment that "[n]othing, I venture to say, is more likely to disturb
the peace of the world than the treatment ... meted out to minori-
ties."10 Ethnic tensions have precipitated innumerable local and
regional wars, and contributed to two world wars.
As more and more states become independent, and as popula-
tions shift, minority problems have multiplied. Today, the
Basques, Tamils, Sikhs, Kurds, Ibos, Turks of Cyprus, Corsicans,
Nagas, and Bulgarians of Turkey, to name only a few, seek recog-
nition and protection of their rights as a people." Solutions to mi-
nority problems have taken many forms-including Hitler's
ultimate solution. Other policies include genocide,12 expulsion,13
subjugation,14 partition,15 toleration,16 assimilation,17 and cultural
pluralism.' 8 The latter has been the policy of most nations.
Historical Examples of Pluralistic Arrangements
Pluralistic political arrangements are as ancient and varied as
society itself. The Roman Empire, with its city-state form of gov-
10. 5 A History of the Peace Conference of Paris 130 (H.M.V. Temperley ed.
1969) (quoting Wilson's speech delivered at the League of Nations, May 31, 1919).
11. The Minority Rights Group, based in London, England, is dedicated to the
promotion of minority rights worldwide and has issued numerous short reports on
various groups, including a general survey of the problem. See 1-2 World Minorities
(Georgina Ashworth ed. 1977-78).
12. For a history of the use of genocide, see Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its Political
Use in the Twentieth Century (1981).
13. Examples of forced expulsion abound: Arabs from Israel; East Indians from
several nations of Africa, such as Uganda, following their independence in the early
1970s; and more recently alien workers from Ghana. See generally Michael Twad-
dle, Expulsion of a Minority: Essay on Ugandan Asians (1975).
14. Any conquest of one people over another could be considered subjugation,
including the Nigerian state over the Ibos in their unsuccessful fight for indepen-
dence, the Soviet annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and the entire colo-
nial system of the western world from the late 1800s to the 1960s and 1970s. See
generally William Tomingas, The Soviet Colonization of Estonia (1973).
15. Pakistan's separation from India and Bangladesh's independence from Paki-
stan are examples of partition. See generally Thomas Walter Wallbank, The Parti-
tion of India: Causes and Responsibilities (1966).
16. For the most part, guest workers from Turkey, Yugoslavia, and northern
Africa are tolerated in Western Europe. See generally Ray C. Rist, Guestworkers in
Germany: The Prospects for Pluralism (1978).
17. The United States and Australia are considered to be the most assimilation-
ist-oriented nations in the world. See generally Milton Gordon, Assimilation in
American Life: The Role of Race, Religion and National Origins (1964).
18. For a definition of cultural pluralism, see supra note 3. Certainly not all
pluralistic arrangements have been successful. Politicians have yet to devise suc-
cessful arrangements for the war-torn nations of Lebanon, Cyprus, and Northern
Ireland. It is clear, however, that some form of pluralistic system will have to be
implemented in these nations. The South African bantustan policies and corporat-
ism represent perversions of group theory rights. For a discussion of corporatism,
see Sigler, supra note 2, at 22-23.
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ernment, was a prime example of a pluralistic society. Recognizing
that the Empire's stability required only a minimum of enforced
conversion to Roman ways, the Romans permitted their conquered
areas to retain their own forms of government, religion, language,
and tradition, especially in the far-flung regions.' 9 In the mid-
1400s, the Ottoman Turks instituted a similar arrangement, known
as the millet (meaning nation) system.20 It allowed for autono-
mous self-government by the various religious groups-Jewish,
Christian, and Greek Orthodox-under the control of the Sultan.
Each millet was left free to establish its own educational, religious,
judicial, and social institutions.21
Though different in political and social structure, the Euro-
pean medieval world also recognized the primacy of groups-the
church, the monarchs, the guilds, the nobles, and the military,
among others. An individual's membership in various groups gave
that individual status and identity in society. Individuals owed cer-
tain obligations to each of their groups and from each group they
derived certain privileges.22
The European Enlightenment advocated an end to this corpo-
rate pluralistic system by reshaping its concept of society from one
of interaction between well-defined groups to one defined by the
individual's relationship to the state.23 Contract theorists rational-
ized this relationship in terms of individuals entering into a social
contract, eventually to form states, which derived their authority
from popular consent. Philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke and
Rousseau predicated their theories on a society that was legally
and politically homogeneous. 24 The state needed to destroy the
power of such groups as the nobility, the clergy, and the guilds in
order to free and equalize the status of persons within society. 25
Ironically, the Enlightenment concept that political sover-
19. See Heinz Kahler, The Art of Rome and Her Empire 13 (1962).
20. See Stanford Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey 151
(1976), cited in Sigler, supra note 2, at 70-71; J.A. LaPonce, The Protection of Mi-
norities 84-85 (1960).
21. LaPonce, supra note 20, at 84-85 (1960).
22. See generally Otto van Gierke, Associations and Law (1977); John Neville
Figgis, Churches in the Modern State (2d ed. 1914).
23. See Paul Hazard, European Thought in the Eighteenth Century 172-88, 325-
34 (1963). See also Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment 234-74
(1955).
24. See generally Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1974); John Locke, Two Treatises
of Government (1960); Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (1947).
25. See Sigler, supra note 2, at 36. The Preamble to the French Constitution of
1791 illustrates the basis of the new order:
The National Assembly . . . abolishes irrevocably the institutions
which were injurious to liberty and equality of rights ....
Neither privileges nor exception to the law common to all
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eignty emanated from the people sowed the seeds of what later be-
came nationalism and a burgeoning of newfound cultural pride
and identity distinguishable from the medieval corporate plural-
ism. By the early nineteenth century, theorists such as the Ger-
man philosopher Gottfried von Herder were writing passionately
of the importance of one's native language and culture in human
development,2 6 thus fueling the demand by linguistic, cultural and
religious groups for a recognition of their rights by the dominant
society.
International Protection of Group Rights
As the philosophy of the Enlightenment sought to dissolve
the role and importance of internal national groups, nations nego-
tiated instruments on the international level to recognize the
rights of such groups. 27 The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia aimed to
resolve conflicts in the German states by guaranteeing certain
rights to religious minorities.28 Subsequent bilateral and multilat-
Frenchmen any longer exists for any part of the nation or for any indi-
vidual.
Neither jurandes nor corporations of professions, arts, and crafts
any longer exist.
[Fr. Const.] Preamble (French 1791), quoted in Sigler, supra note 2, at 36.
John Stuart Mill, one of the leading proponents of this view, wrote in his ma-
jor work:
Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of differ-
ent nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if
they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion,
necessary to the working of representative government, cannot exist.
John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government 230 (Currin V.
Shields ed. 1958), quoted in Sigler, supra note 2, at 21.
26. See Sir Isaiah Berlin, Vico and Herder 206-16 (1976).
27. The protection of minority rights under international law has generated
considerable literature. See, e.g., Pablo de Azca'rate y. Florez, League of Nations
and National Minorities: An Empowerment (1945); Pablo de Azca'rate y. Florez,
Protection of National Minorities (1967); Macartney, League of Nations' Protection
of Minorities, in The International Protection of Human Rights (Luard ed. 1967);
Inis L. Claude Jr., National Minorities (1955); Green, The Protection of Minorities
in the League of Nations and the United Nations, Canadian Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs (1970); Joseph B. Kelly, National Minorities in International Law, 3
Den. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 253-73 (1973).
28. According to the terms of the Treaty, Catholics and Protestants living in
one state predominantly comprised of the opposite faith were granted the right to
freely practice their religion, to educate their children in conformity with their
faith, and to freely emigrate. Peace of Westphalia: Treaty of Peace Between Swe-
den and the (Holy Roman) Empire, and Treaty of Peace Between France and the
(Holy Roman) Empire, Oct. 14-Oct. 24, 1648, 1 Parry's T.S. No. 119, 271. See
Adolphus W. Ward, The Peace of Westphalia, 4 Cambridge Modern History 411-412
(1911); Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 Am. J. Int'l L. 20 (1948).
Even earlier examples of internationally guaranteed minority religious rights
may be found in the 1250 promise by St. Louis of France to the Maronite commu-
nity pledging to protect them as if they were French subjects. Patrick Thornberry,
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eral treaties, including those negotiated at the Congress of Vienna
in 181529 and the Congress of Berlin in 1878,30 extended protection
to ethnic as well as religious minorities.
Protecting minority rights assumed major importance after
World War I. Despite the formation of new European states, the
restructuring of national boundaries, and the relocation of mass
populations, some twenty million people fell into the category of
minorities within their homelands.31 Fearful that old hostilities
might be renewed by irredentist and separatist movements, the Al-
lied powers established a minority system under the supervision of
the League of Nations. Sixteen states, either through unilateral
declarations or by multilateral treaties, guaranteed minorities an
equitable share of public funds to maintain their own schools and
religious and social institutions.32 These states also committed
Is There a Phoenix in the Ashes?-International Law and Minority Rights, 15 Tex.
Int'l L.J. 421, 426 n.19 (1981).
29. The Final Act of the Congress of Vienna offered special protections for the
Belgians, Savoyards, and Poles. By acceding to the desires of some national minori-
ties, but not others, however, the Congress of Vienna was important both for its
role in promoting minority rights and in sowing the seeds of ethnic dissent for the
next two hundred years. See J. A. Laponce, The Protection of Minorities 25-28
(1960); McCartney, supra note 27, at 160; Thornberry, supra note 28, at 426.
As Walker Conner points out in The Political Significance of Ethnonational-
ism Within Western Europe, in Ethnicity in an International Context 110-33 (Ab-
dul Said & Luiz Simmons eds. 1976) [hereinafter Said & Simmons], ethno-
nationalism has been one of the most important political forces in Europe since the
Vienna Congress of 1815.
30. See generally William N. Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After
(1963).
31. Estimates indicate that the minority population problem was cut in half,
from 50 to 20 million, by the redrawing of national boundaries. Thornberry, supra
note 28, at 431.
32. According to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the function of
the Minority Treaties was to:
secure for certain elements incorporated in a State, the population of
which differs from them in race, language or religion, the possibility of
living peacefully alongside that population and co-operating amicably
with it, while at the same time preserving the characteristics which
distinguish them from the majority, and satisfying the ensuing special
needs.
In order to attain this objective, two things were regarded as par-
ticularly necessary ....
The first is to ensure that nationals belonging to racial, religious
or linguistic minorities shall be placed in every respect on a footing of
perfect equality with the other nationals of the State.
The second is to ensure for the minority elements suitable means
for the preservation of their racial peculiarities, their traditions and
their national characteristics.
These two requirements are indeed closely interlocked, for there
would be no true equality between a majority and a minority if the lat-
ter were deprived of its own institutions, and were consequently com-
pelled to renounce that which constitutes the very essence of its being
as a minority.
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themselves to such positive steps as establishing separate minority
language schools and court systems, and providing funds to pre-
serve minority cultural activities. Furthermore, states authorized
the League to review and investigate petitions from individuals
who alleged violations of their rights as minority members.33 Un-
fortunately, the minority system was not properly designed to en-
sure its success, nor was it ever given adequate support.34
Twenty-five years later, in the aftermath of the Holocaust
and World War II, the world community again created an interna-
tional organization to promote peace and cooperation. The United
Nations Charter specifies as one of its four primary goals the pro-
tection of human rights and fundamental freedoms without regard
to race, sex, language, or religion.35 Neither the Charter nor the
United Nations Declaration of Human Rights,36 which specifies
the basic rights and freedoms alluded to in the Charter, contains
specific mention of minority groups' rights.37
Minority Schools in Albania, (Alb. v. Greece), 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B), No. 64, (Apr.
6) at 484, 496 (Hudson, 3 World Court Reports 496).
33. Inis L. Claude, Jr., National Minorities 23-24 (1955). The League received
585 petitions, admitted 338, and examined 298. See Minorities, supra note 7, at 128,
for a table of the petitions. The cases covered a wide spectrum of issues including
suppression of private schools, use of biased historical textbooks, restrictions on mi-
nority languages, discriminatory policies in job placements, denial of citizenship,
and acts of violence and repression. Thornberry, supra note 28, at 435.
For a discussion of the petition procedure, see Minorities, supra note 7, at 85-
109; Capotorti Study, supra note 9, at 20-22.
34. Only weaker states were obligated to recognize and protect minority rights,
a fact that, to them, smacked of imperialistic intervention in their internal affairs
by the great powers. Perhaps the system would have prevailed if Woodrow Wilson
had succeeded in inserting the following article in the Covenant of the League of
Nations to protect the rights of minorities in all new states:
The League of Nations shall require all new States to bind them-
selves as a condition precedent to their recognition as independent or
autonomous States, to accord to all racial or national minorities within
their several jurisdictions exactly the same treatment and security,
both in law and in fact, that is accorded the racial or national majority
of their people.
Wilson's Second Draft or First Paris Draft, January 10, 1919, with Comments and
Suggestions by D.H.M., in 2 David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant 65,
91 (1928).
In addition, there were moves by some States, notably Germany, to gain or
regain territory by stirring up agitation and dissent among minority groups in
neighboring states. Ultimately, the minority system failed because the League
failed-a failure caused in part by: (1) the refusal of the United States to partici-
pate, (2) the provisions of the Versailles treaty, and (3) the interactions of the Euro-
pean states. Claude, supra note 33, at 31-50.
35. U.N. Charter preamble, art. 1, para. 3.
36. Declaration of Human Rights, 3 Y.B. Int'l Comm'n 535-37, U.N. Sales No.
1950.1.11 (1949).
37. A number of post-war bilateral treaties deal with the issue of minority pro-
tection, including Section XII of the Potsdam Protocol, 1946 Agreement between
Austria and Italy, 1950 Agreement Between India and Pakistan, London Memoran-
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The United States was largely responsible for this shift from
group to individual rights guarantees. An early draft of the UN
Declaration on Human Rights, prepared by the Division on Human
Rights, included a strong recognition and guarantee of minority
rights. 38 The Soviet Union supported this draft, portraying itself
as the leading proponent of minority rights protection, while the
United States strongly fought it. 3 9 After considerable debate, all
special provisions favoring minorities were rejected by a vote of
ten to six. 4 0 The same ideological conflict plagued the work of the
dum of 1959, Final Settlement of the Problem of Cyprus, 1957 Agreement Between
the United Kingdom and Singapore, the London Treaty of 1954 Concerning Trieste
and 1955 Declaration of Denmark and the Federal Republic of Germany. See Pro-
tection of Minorities 48, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/221/Rev. 1, U.N. Sales No. 67.xiv.3
(1967) [hereinafter Protection of Minorities].
38. In countries inhabited by an appreciable number of individuals be-
longing to a race, language, or religion other than that of the majority
of the inhabitants, individuals belonging to these ethnic, linguistic, or
religious minorities shall have the right . .. to establish and maintain
their schools and religious and cultural institutions out of an equitable
proportion of any public funds available for the purpose, as well as the
use of their language in the courts and other state institutions, as well
as the press and in public assemblies.
UN Doc. E/CN.4/AC./1/3/Add. 1 at 409, cited in Mackey & Verdoodt, supra note 8,
at 3-4.
39. Claude, supra note 33, at 158-59. Although it was President Woodrow Wil-
son who first championed the notion of self-determination for minorities, the
United States has had a longstanding official international policy of non-acceptance
of minority rights. In 1938, the United States voted in favor of resolution XXVII at
the Pan-American conference in Lima which declared that the League's system of
minority protection was not applicable to the Western Hemisphere. Heinz Kloss,
The American Bilingual Tradition 297 (1977) [hereinafter Kloss]. Four years later,
U.S. Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles explained the United States expecta-
tion for the UN human rights policy:
Finally, in the kind of world for which we fight, there must cease to
exist any need for that accursed term, "racial or religious minority." If
the peoples of the earth are fighting and dying to preserve and to se-
cure the liberty of the individual under law, is it conceivable that the
peoples of the UN can consent to the reestablishment of any system
where human beings will still be regarded as belonging to such
minorities.
Sumner Welles, American Under Secretary of State, 31 May 1943, cited in Claude,
supra note 33, at 75. In 1952, United Nations Representative Eleanor Roosevelt de-
manded that the concept of self-determination not be extended to minorities. The
United States also succeeded in maintaining the vagueness of Articles Two and Five
concerning minority rights of the UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in
Education. Kloss, supra, at 58.
40. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.62. The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide is the only United Nations document from the
formative years that approaches a concern for minority groups protection. Under
Article Two of this convention genocide is defined as "acts committed with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group." 3
Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 959-60, U.N. Sales No. 1950.1.11 (1949).
The original Genocide Convention draft contained a provision outlawing cul-
tural genocide:
[G]enocide also means any deliberate act committed with the intent to
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Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Pro-
tection of Minorities, established under the Human Rights Com-
mission. Although the Subcommission was originally authorized
as two bodies, the United States successfully lobbied for its estab-
lishment as one body with two concerns. Until recently, the Sub-
commission has ignored minorities and has directed its primary
attention to the problem of discrimination.41
The United Nation's orientation toward minority rights began
to change in the mid-1960s.4 2 In 1965, the UN Secretary-General
destroy the language, religion, or culture of a national, racial or reli-
gious group on grounds of the national or racial origin or religious be-
lief of its members such as:
1. Prohibiting the use of the language of the group in daily inter-
course or in schools, or the printing and circulation of publications in
the language of the group.
2. Destroying or preventing the use of libraries, museums, schools,
historical monuments, places of worship or other cultural institutions
and objects of the group.
7 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 6) at 6, U.N. Doc. E1794 (1948).
The western powers successfully defeated this provision as well. Kuper, supra
note 12, at 30-31. For a discussion of the decision not to include this article, see also
Study of the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
31 U.N. ESCOR (Agenda Item 17) at 121-28, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/416 (1978).
See also Leo Kuper, International Action Against Genocide (Minority Rights Group
Report No. 53, 1982).
41. The United Nations Study on the Main Causes and Types of Discrimination
explained the differences in methods and objectives for protecting against discrimi-
nation versus minorities protection:
Discrimination implies any act or conduct which denies to certain
individuals equality of treatment with other individuals because they
belong to particular social groups . . . The aim is to prevent any act
which might imply inequality of treatment on grounds of race, color,
social origin, property, birth or other status. Thus the prevention of
discrimination means the suppression or prevention of any conduct
which denies or restricts a person's right to equality.
The protection of minorities, on the other hand, similarly inspired
by the principle of equality of treatment of all peoples, requires posi-
tive action: concrete service is rendered to the minority group, such as
the establishment of schools in which education is given in the native
tongue of the members of the group ....
Thus it may be seen that the ultimate goal of the protection of the
minorities differs from that of the prevention of discrimination. For
this reason, the two questions must be dealt with in different
ways .... One requires the elimination of any distinction imposed, and
the other requires safeguards to preserve certain distinctions volunta-
rily maintained.
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.1/384/Rev.1 (1979). See John P. Humphrey, The United Na-
tions Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of
Minorities, 62 Am. J. Int'l L. 869 (1968).
42. In 1948, the General Assembly adopted a resolution to conduct a study of
the problems of minorities. See Capotorti Study, supra note 9, at 139. Two years
later, the Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection
of Minorities [hereinafter Subcommission] submitted a study on the definition and
classification of minorities and measures for their protection. The full commission
rejected the report and canceled the Subcommission's 1951 meeting. Mackey &
Law and Inequality
agreed to sponsor a Seminar on Minority Societies in Ljubljana,
Yugoslavia. In 1966, UNESCO introduced for adoption two con-
ventions containing articles promoting minority rights: the Con-
vention Against Discrimination in Education and the Declaration
of the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation.43 During
the same year, the General Assembly approved for ratification two
legally binding international human rights instruments containing
minority provisions: the Covenant for the International Protection
of Civil and Political Rights and the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.44 Article
27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ar-
ticulates the strongest United Nations guarantee of minority rights
to date.
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minori-
ties exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be de-
nied the right, in community with the other members of their
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their
own religion, or to use their own language.45
Verdoot, supra note 8, at 6. The following year the General Assembly adopted Res-
olution 532B (VI), "the prevention of discrimination and the protection of minori-
ties are two of the most important tasks of the UN." Capotorti Study, supra note 9,
at 138.
In 1959, the Subcommission succeeded in having two of its studies on minorities
published. Protection of Minorities, supra note 37. Mackey & Verdoodt, supra
note 8, at 6-7.
43. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1 (1979), at 34.
44. Part One, Article 1(4) of the 1966 International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination states the need for "special measures
taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain racial or
ethnic groups." Basic Documents in International Law 305-06 (Ian Brownlie ed.
1983).
45. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21
U.N. GAOR Supp., (No. 16) at 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), reprinted in Human
Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments 8, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/1/Rev.1,
U.N. Sales No. E.78.XIV.2 (1978) [hereinafter Human Rights Instruments].
Since the promulgation of Article 27 of the International Government on Civil
and Political Rights, the UN has commissioned a number of studies pertaining to
minority rights. In 1974, the Commission on Human Rights approved a resolution
for a study on the application of Article 27. Mackey & Verdoot, supra note 8, at 7.
This study was followed by a number of others, including a study initiated in 1969
on the protection of minorities, see Capotorti Study, supra note 9, at annex 1, and a
study commissioned in 1971 on the protection of indigenous populations. In 1978,
Yugoslavia presented a draft of the Declaration of the General Assembly of the
United Nations on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious
and Linguisitic Minorities. Article 3 of the draft stated:
For the purpose of realizing the conditions of full equality and com-
plete development, of minorities as collectivities and of their individ-
ual members, it is essential to take measures which will enable them
freely to express their characteristics, to develop their culture, educa-
tion, language, traditions and customs and to participate on an equita-
ble basis in the cultural, social, economic and political life of the
country in which they live.
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The issue of minority rights has also received renewed atten-
tion from within the European communities,46 and has been the
major subject of the Helsinki Accords, a document signed by the
United States, the Soviet Union, and thirty-three other nations. 47
Leading National Examples of Group Rights Protection
Modem Western constitutional efforts to protect minority
rights first appeared approximately 200 years ago, making national
efforts a more recent phenomenon than the previously discussed
international attempts. 48 Today, examples of pluralistic systems
are increasing as states devise processes and methods to accommo-
date the needs and demands of all segments of their societies.49
U.N. Doc. CN.4/L.1367/Rev. 1 (1978).
46. Outside of the UN system, Article 14 of the European Convention on the
Protection of Fundamental Freedoms guarantees "that the enjoyment of the rights
and freedoms... shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as...
association with national minority." Brownlie, supra note 44, at 326.
Groups, including national or linguisitic minorities, are recognized to have
standing before the European Human Rights Court. In two cases thus far, the Eu-
ropean Court has dealt with linguistic minorities in Belgium and the Roman Catho-
lic minority in Northern Ireland.
In October 1977, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted
a number of recommendations on modern languages in Europe. Included in the
recommendations were the following:
2. Being of the opinion that cultural diversity is an irreplaceable as-
set, and that this justifies the active maintenance of language minori-
ties in Europe; and...
9. Recommends that the Committee of Ministers:
a) Call on the governments of the member states of the Coun-
cil of Europe to develop the teaching of modern languages, tak-
ing account of:
(iii) the cultural advantages of maintaining language mi-
norities in Europe.
The Future of Cultural Minorities 98-99 (Anthony E. Alcock, Brian K. Taylor &
John M. Welton eds. 1979) [hereinafter Alcock, Taylor, & Welton].
47. The Helsinki Accords, signed in 1975, are the first major declaration of sup-
port for minority populations acceded to by both the United States and the Soviet
Union. According to Basket One:
The participating States on whose territory national minorities exist
will respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to equal-
ity before the law, will afford them the full opportunity for the actual
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and will, in
this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere.
Helsinki Accords, August 1, 1975, Basket One, a, Clause VII. Conference on Secur-
ity and Cooperation in Europe, Final Act, cited in 14 International Legal Materials
1292, 1295 (Sept. 1975).
48. In 1815 the "Principles of the Constitution of the Polish Kingdom" became
the first modern Western political document to recognize and guarantee minority
population rights. See Sigler, supra note 2, at 69.
49. As Sigler concluded in his recent book, "it can be said that recognition of
minority rights claims in constitutions is a growing and significant trend that shows
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Pluralistic arrangements include group recognition 50 in granting
language5l and education rights,52 special land and/or resource
protections, 53 and proportional political representation 54 and quo-
tas in civil service. Switzerland, Belgium, and Yugoslavia are
among the most successful pluralistic nations in implementing
these systems.5 5
a reversal of 'the tendency of classical democracy to affirm the individual but to
deny the group.'" Sigler, supra note 2, at 175.
50. Nations such as Czechoslovakia, Malaysia, Singapore, Yugoslavia, Switzer-
land, and Belgium accord official recognition to ethnic groups. Fiji, New Zealand,
and Panama, among others, recognize racial ethnic groups as possessing specific
rights. Sigler, supra note 2, at 194.
One maneuver used by states to avoid dealing with minority problems is to de-
clare that minorities do not exist. Several Latin American nations, for example,
maintain that minorities and minority problems do not exist on the South Ameri-
can continent. See Draft Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Report of the
Third Committee, 3(1) UN GAOR (180th-183rd plen. mtgs.) at 852-934, UN Doc. A/
777 (1948), statements by Mexico, (181st plen. mtg.) at 885-86, statements by Para-
guay, (182nd plen. mtg.) at 901-02, statements by Cuba, (181st plen. mtg.) at 876-77,
statements by Ecuador, (183rd plen. mtg.) at 918-21, statements by Bolivia, (182nd
plen. mtg.) at 900-01. The first clause of Article 27 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights reflects this national attitude: "[i]n those States in
which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist ...." Report of the Ninth Ses-
sion of the Commission on Human Rights: Proposals and Amendments Relating to
the Draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Voting Thereon, 16 UN ES-
COR Supp. (No. 8, Annex III A) 55, para. 16, U.N. Doc. E/2447 (April 16, 1953). E/
CN.4/689 (June 6, 1953) (made at the suggestion of the Chilean delegate).
Brazil, voicing the opinion of all Latin American nations, declared that, as an
immigrant nation it possessed no minorities within its society. 16 UN GAOR, Third
Comm. 213-14 (1961).
In 1971, Turkey declared that it was ethnically homogeneous: "We accept no
other nation as living in Turkey, only the Turks. As we see it, there is only one
nation in Turkey: the Turkish nation. All citizens living in different parts of the
country are content to be Turkish." Robert Wirsing, Protection of Ethnic Minori-
ties: Comparative Perspectives 6 (1981).
51. Several states have extended either official or national language recognition
to minority languages. In 1975, Spain recognized that "the regional languages are a
cultural heritage of the Spanish nation and all are regarded as national languages.
Their knowledge and use will be assisted and protected by the action of the state
and other public bodies." Alcock, Taylor & Welton, supra note 46, at 36. The
Welsh Language Act of 1967 similarly advocates its use in the "conduct of other of-
ficial or public business." Id. at 34.
52. See Vernon Van Dyke, The Individual, the State and Ethnic Communities
in Political Theory, 29 World Politics 343, 352 (1977) [hereinafter Van Dyke, World
Politics].
53. Only the Swedish-speaking inhabitants of the Finnish Aaland islands may
own property. In Fiji, a Native Land Trust Board administers five-sixths of the
land for the Fijian population. Id. at 353.
54. Proportional representation is used in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Mau-
ritius. In Fiji, where the population is comprised of approximately 50% Indian, 42%
Fijian, and 8% European and others, voters register according to race with each ra-
cial group apportioned a quota of seats in the two legislative houses. New Zealand
sets aside four seats for the Maoris, Zimbabwe reserves seats for whites, and India
provides 15% for scheduled tribes and castes. Id.
55. Canada can also be said to have devised a pluralistic system for its two
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The experiences of such pluralist countries refute the criti-
cism that cultural pluralism is outdated, represents a step back-
ward to romantic nationalism, threatens national unity and
stability, and is too expensive for many of the poorer and newly
independent states.56 Supporters of the assimilationist model fre-
quently point to the political difficulties experienced by Belgium,
Yugoslavia, and Canada as prime examples of the problems inher-
ent in a pluralistic system.57 What critics overlook, however, is
that these states have been quite viable through time. As Walker
Conner, one of the growing number of twentieth-century scholars
examining the issues of ethnicity and group rights, has empha-
sized, accommodation of ethnicity is one of the "ultimate standards
of political legitimacy."58 Pluralistic states are more likely to win
rather than alienate ethnic loyalties.
Twentieth-Century Pluralist Thought
The twentieth century has witnessed a burgeoning of litera-
ture concerning various forms of political, social, and economic
pluralism, and the related topics of nationalism, national integra-
tion, and race relations. A number of prominent English thinkers,
such as F.W. Maitland,5 9 John Figgis,60 Harold Laski, 61 G.D.H.
Cole,62 and Bertrand Russell,63 along with the German Otto
Gierke,64 influenced the perception of minority rights early in this
founding nations-the English and the French. The Soviet Union, operating under
the slogan, "national in form, socialist in content," recognizes over 110 nationalities
and nations. Thirty-five of these have political representation in federal or autono-
mous republics. See Ernst Rossi & Barbara McCrea, The European Political Dic-
tionary 318 (1985).
56. See UNESCO, Final Report of the Intergovernmental Conference on Insti-
tutional, Administrative and Financial Aspects of Cultural Policies: Venice, Aug.
24-Sept. 2, 1970, at 11-13, U.N. Doc. SHC/MD/13 (1970).
57. See Nikolaos A. Stavrou, Ethnicity in Yugoslavia: Roots and Impact, in Said
& Simmons, supra note 29, at 134-49.
58. Conner, supra note 29, at 112.
59. See generally Frederick W. Maitland, Collected Papers (1914).
60. See generally John N. Figgis, Churches in the Modern State (1914).
61. See generally Harold Laski, Authority in the Modern State (1919); Harold
Laski, The Pluralist State, 28 The Philosophical Review 571 (1919); Harold Laski,
Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty (1917); Harold Laski, A Grammar of Politics
(1925); Harold Laski, Introduction to Contemporary Politics (1939).
62. See generally George Douglas Ward Cole, Labour in the Commonwealth
(1918); George Douglas Ward Cole, Social Theory (1920); George Douglas Ward
Cole, Chaos and Order in Industry (1920); George Douglas Ward Cole, Guild Social-
ism Re-Stated (1920); George Douglas Ward Cole, Self-Government in Industry
(1919).
63. See generally Bertrand Russell, Democracy and Direct Action (1919); Ber-
trand Russell, Political Ideals (1917); Bertrand Russell, Principles of Social Recon-
struction (1916).
64. See generally Otto Gierke, The Development of Political Theory (Bernard
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century.65 Figgis, for example, defined a state as composed of
groups rather than individuals.66 The state's role was primarily to
regulate and provide for the orderly interaction of the comprising
groups.67
Building upon the insights and theories of these writers, a
number of recent legal scholars and political scientists-Arend
Lijphart, Owen Fiss, Vernon Van Dyke, Albert Blaustein,68 and
Yoram Dinstein, 69 among others-have begun to re-examine the
rights and proper means of accommodating minority groups.
Lijphart talks of consociational democracy-conscious cooperation
among leaders of different communities to avert destabilizing eth-
nic competition. 70 In the mid-1970s, Vernon Van Dyke wrote a
number of influential articles which raised the question of human
rights for cultural groups.71 Owen Fiss has argued that the equal
Freyd trans. 1939); Otto Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of Society, 1500 to
1800 (Ernest Barker trans. 1934); Otto Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age
(Frederic W. Maitland trans. 1900); Otto Gierke, Associations and Law: The Classi-
cal and Early Christian Stages (George Heiman trans. 1977).
65. According to David Nicholls, pluralist theorists predicate their theories on
three basic concepts: "a denial of state sovereignty, a belief that liberty is best pre-
served by a dispersion of power," and a belief that groups possess an identifiable
personality with just claims. David Nicholls, The Pluralist State 75 (1975).
Many of these writers were influenced by the philosophy of Hegel who be-
lieved that society was composed of groups which bound individuals together into a
society. Hegel emphasized that "dissimilarity in culture and manners," is a neces-
sary product condition of the stability of modern states. Id. at 77.
66. See Figgis, supra note 60, at 70.
67. Pluralist thought permeated a number of the social science fields. The so-
cial theorists are represented by such scholars as John Sydenham Furnivall,
Michael Garfield Smith, Leo Kuper, and P.L. van den Berghe. John Sydenham
Furnivall, an economist and colonial administrator, is credited with describing a
form of economic pluralism which exists in colonial societies. A plural society, ac-
cording to Furnivall, was comprised of "two or more elements or social orders
which live side by side, yet without mingling, in one political unit." John
Sydenham Furnivall, Netherlands' India 446 (1939). Smith, Kuper, and van den
Berghe, as sociologists, focus on the cultural cleavages in pluralist nations. Cultural
pluralism exists, according to Smith, when two or more different cultural traditions
exist in a nation, each possessing their own distinct institutions such as marriage,
family life, religion, and property, among others. Michael Garfield Smith, The Plu-
ral Society in the British West Indies xii-xiii (1965).
68. Albert Blaustein, The New Nationalism, 30 Am. J. Comp. L. 377 (1982
Supp.); Albert Blaustein, The Growing Significance of Group Rights, Bull. Int'l A.
Jewish Law. & Jurists (1980). See also infra notes 70, 71 & 72.
69. Yoram Dinstein, Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities, 25
Int'l & Comp. L.Q. (1976); Yoram Dinstein, Models of Autonomy (1981).
70. See Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (1977). See also Consoci-
ational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies (Kenneth Mc-
Rae ed. 1974).
71. Vernon Van Dyke, The Cultural Rights of Peoples, 1 Universal Hum. Rts.
(1980); Vernon Van Dyke, World Politics, supra note 52; Vernon Van Dyke, Justice
as Fairness: for Groups? 67 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 607 (1975); Vernon Van Dyke,
Human Rights and the Rights of Groups, 18 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 725 (1974); Vernon Van
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protection clause of the United States Constitution could and
should be interpreted to include groups as well as individuals.7 2
The United States and the Rights of Minorities
America is God's Crucible, the great Melting Pot where all the
races of Europe are melting and reforming! . . . [Hlere you
stand in your fifty groups with your fifty languages and histo-
ries, and your fifty blood hatreds and rivalries, but you won't
be long like that .... God is making the American. 73
The notion that the intense and unprecedented mixture of eth-
nic and religious groups in American life was soon to blend
into a homogeneous end product has outlived its usefulness,
and also its credibility.74
United States society has strong roots in the Enlighten-
ment.75 In theory, individualism exists as the foundation of the
United States ethic. Accordingly, government exists to protect the
exercise of individual rights,76 which include, among others, free-
dom of religion, speech, and association, equal representation, fair
trial, and protection of proper ty. Individuals should be equally
protected in their access to these rights without distinction as to
race, color, sex, religion, or national origin.
The United States prides itself on the development of a philo-
sophical foundation which preaches equality for all; yet United
States history is replete with testimony of institutionalized preju-
dice against Catholics, Jews, Italians, and Irish, exclusion of
Orientals,77 enslavement of Blacks,7 8 near extermination of the
Dyke, One Man One Vote and Majority Rule as Human Rights, 3 Hum. Rts. 447
(1973).
72. Owen Fiss, in a much cited article, argues that Blacks are a disadvantaged
group and that "[wihat the Equal Protection Clause protects is specially disadvan-
taged groups, not just blacks." Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection C7ause,
in Philosophy and Public Affairs 107, 155 (1976).
73. Nathan Glazer & Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot 289
(1963) (quoting Israel Sangwill, The Melting Pot 37-38 (1909)). The term "melting
pot" was first used in Sangwill's play, The Melting Pot. See id.
74. See Israel Sangwill, The Melting Pot 37-38 (1909).
75. See Louis Hartz, Liberal Tradition in America 7 (1955).
76. "The protection of [the faculties of men from which the rights of property
originate] is the first object of Government." The Federalist No. 10, James Madison,
The Federalist Papers 54 (Jacob Coulee ed. 1961)
77. By 1880, the importation of Chinese laborers into the United States had in-
creased fifteen-fold, to 105,465, in 30 short years. Demands by California to limit
the influx of Oriental laborers, which constituted 25% of the labor force, resulted in
the passage of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, which prohibited the further immi-
gration of Chinese into the United States. Takaki, supra note 2, at 5. As one advo-
cate of the legislation testified before Congress, "they can never assimilate with us;
... they are a perpetual, unchanging, and unchangeable alien element that can
never become homogeneous;... their civilization is demoralizing and degrading to
our people; . . . they degrade and dishonor labor; . . . they can never become citi-
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American Indian, and conquest of the Chicano, Hawaiian, 79 and
Puerto Rican,8O among others.
This contradiction between philosophy and practice is a prod-
uct of the initial orientation of the primary immigrant nation, the
English. The English considered themselves founders, not immi-
grants.8 1 Their willingness to share their new land favored those
immigrants from the Protestant countries of western Europe. The
zens." Leonard Dinnerstein & David Reimers, Ethnic Americans: A History of Im-
migration and Assimilation 57-58 (1975).
By the turn of the century, the anti-Chinese sentiments had widened to include
the Japanese, an immigrant group noted for its economic success. In 1906, the San
Francisco Board of Education ordered the segregation of all Oriental students. Ja-
pan protested, leading to federal pressure on the school board to rescind the order.
In return, Japan, in the Gentleman's Agreement of 1907, agreed to restrict exit
visas for laborers bound to the United States. States such as California, Washing-
ton, Arizona, Oregon, Idaho, Nebraska, Texas, Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, New
Mexico, Minnesota, and Missouri excluded Asian immigrants from owning prop-
erty. Takaki, supra note 2, at 6.
This racial discrimination against Asians continued until after World War II.
Approximately 120,000 Japanese people, 70,000 born in the United States, were sub-
jected to forced relocation and internment. Neither the Italian-Americans nor Ger-
man-Americans faced similar treatment. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S.
81 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
78. When the Declaration of Independence was written, Black slaves numbered
more than 500,000, or 20% of the population. James S. Olson, The Ethnic Dimen-
sion in American History 44 (1979).
In Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), the Supreme Court
considered the question whether a "negro whose ancestors were imported into this
country and sold as slaves [can become] a member of the political community
formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States." Id. at
403.
[T]he legislation and histories of the times, and the language used in
the Declaration of Independence, show that neither the class of per-
sons who had been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether
they had become free or not, were then acknowledged as a part of the
people ....
[A] negro of the African race was regarded by them as an article
of property ....
The only two provisions which point to them and include them,
treat them as property, and make it a duty of the government to pro-
tect it; no other power, in relation to this race, is to be found in the
Constitution ....
Id. at 403.
In discussing the Declaration, Justice Taney wrote: "But it is too clear for dis-
pute, that the enslaved African race were not intended to be included, and formed
no part of the people who framed and adopted this declaration .... Id. at 410.
79. See infra notes 236-358 and accompanying text.
80. The United States obtained Guam, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Cuba
as spoils of the Spanish-American War. Basis for Establishment of Peace Treaty
Between the United States and Spain, August 12, 1898, T.S. No. 343 1/2, 30 Stat.
1742. See also supra note 4.
81. "Providence [had] been pleased to give this one connected country to one
united people-a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same lan-
guage, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government,
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other immigrants who were different in language, religion, or skin
color, frequently experienced prejudice and discrimination.
The Germans were among the first immigrants to evoke hos-
tilities, especially regarding the retention of their language.8 2 The
intolerance they met, however, was minor compared to the direct
hostilities suffered by the Irish Catholic immigrants of the 1840s.8 3
This intolerance found political expression in the creation of the
American or "Know-Nothing" Party in the 1850s.8 4 By advocating
the exclusion of Catholics from immigration and extending the
naturalization period to twenty-one years, this party achieved mod-
erate political success.8 5
The arrival of Italian and eastern European immigrants after
1890 further plunged the United States into an era of increasing
exclusivism. In 1894, the Immigration Restriction League was
founded to work against the admittance of all but those of Anglo-
Saxon heritage.8 6 A 1910 U.S. Immigration Commission Study es-
sentially asserted that immigrants entering the United States were
inferior and unassimilable.8 7 Eventually, however, each new group
very similar in their manners and customs .... John Jay, The Federalist No. 2,
The Federalist Papers 38 (Jacob Cooke ed. 1961).
Some 46 million people have emigrated to the United States since the establish-
ment of the settlement at Plymouth Rock. Dinnerstein & Reimers, supra note 77,
at xiii.
82. In 1751, Benjamin Franklin remarked:
Why should the Palatine boors be suffered to swarm into our settle-
ments, and, by herding together, establish their language and man-
ners, to the exclusion of ours? Why should Pennsylvania, founded by
the English, become a colony of aliens, who will shortly be so numer-
ous as to Germanize us, instead of our Anglifying them ... ?
Stephen Steinberg, The Ethnic Myth: Race, Ethnicity and Class in America 11
(1981).
Early in the nation's history, the government refused to accommodate groups
who wished to organize ethnic enclaves. In 1818, the federal government denied
the Irish societies of New York and Philadelphia a request to purchase acreage in
the west for the relocation of their charity cases. Nathan Glazer, Affirmative Dis-
crimination 24-25 (1978). In 1874 Congress similarly refused a request from 40,000
to 50,000 Russian Mennonites that they be allowed to settle in compact areas in the
prairie states. After the bill's failure, the group immigrated to Canada where the
government was more amenable to their plight. Kloss, supra note 39, at 33.
83. In 1790, the Catholic population numbered only 30,000. By 1830, their num-
bers had increased ten-fold; by 1860 Catholics had reached 3.1 million. Gleason,
supra note 8, at 69. Anti-Catholicism led to the burning of a convent in Massachu-
setts in 1834 and riots and church burnings in Philadelphia in 1844, leaving a dozen
dead.
84. Stephan Thernstrom, Ethnic Groups in American History, in Ethnic Rela-
tions in America 7-8 (Lance Liebman ed. 1982) [hereinafter Liebman].
85. Dinnerstein & Reimers, supra note 77 at 32. The "Know-Nothing" Party
controlled six states in 1855 and had sent 75 representatives to Congress. Gleason,
supra note 8, at 71.
86. Liebman, supra note 84, at 14.
87. Oscar Handlin, Race and Nationality in American Life 97 (1957). See also
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of European immigrants successfully assimilated into the melting
pot, fulfilling the everyday image of the motto "E pluribus
unum." Many families take great pride in their ancestors' adven-
turism and abilities to overcome prejudice and make their place in
United States society.
Non-white minorities88-Blacks, American Indians, Orientals,
Native Hawaiians, and Mexican-Americans--endured the fiercest
discrimination and prejudice. The struggle for equality of treat-
ment and opportunity by these groups has been long and arduous.
It is a struggle that has forced United States society to examine its
philosophy, commitments and prejudices. In response to this ex-
amination, the nation has implemented a series of anti-discrimina-
tion laws and has promoted equal access to benefits.
Several of the more beleaguered groups, the American In-
dian, the Native Hawaiian, and the Chicano have won major bat-
tles against racial discrimination. Other objectives, such as the
maintenance of their identity and cultural heritage, remain unat-
tained. Given America's long history of racism and its prevailing
ideology of assimilation, there is intense resistance on the part of
the United States populace to grant these groups a right to be
different.8 9
Conversely, those non-immigrant groups who did not will-
ingly consent to be members of the United States polity, find it
equally difficult to accept the United States' refusal to recognize
and to protect their cultural rights and heritage. In the final analy-
sis, the problem arises from conflicting definitions of equality and
human rights.
John Highan, Toward Racism: The History of an Idea, in Majority and Minority
207-22 (Norman Yetman & C. Hoy Steele eds. 1975); Dinnerstein & Reimers, supra
note 77, at 56-72, (a historical discussion of United States racism and xenophobia).
88. The Naturalization Law of 1790 defined only "free white" immigrants as eli-
gible for naturalized citizenship. Naturalization Act, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (1790) (re-
pealed 1795). A racial determination of United States citizenship remained in place
for 162 years until the passage of the 1952 Walter-McCarran Act. This Act provided
that "the right of a person to become a naturalized citizen of the United States
shall not be denied or abridged because of race." Immigration and Nationality
(Walter-McCarran) Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163, 239 (1952).
89. Discrimination on the basis of race and a recognition of positive legal rights
on the basis of culture are two very different, and frequently confused, issues. Race
may be one of many variable characteristics which differentiate groups. As one au-
thor has pointed out, ethnic differences frequently remain after racial differences
have disappeared. See Takaki, supra note 2, at 1-20, for a discussion of the frequent
confusion and inability of government officials and academics to separate the ques-
tion of race from ethnicity. See also supra notes 369-415 and accompanying text.
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Available Constitutional Mechanisms
United States jurisprudence does not, for the most part, rec-
ognize group rights or confer positive benefits to ensure distinc-
tiveness. Despite these limitations, non-immigrant groups have
tried, with varying degrees of success, to protect their cultural
rights through traditional United States constitutional doctrines.
These doctrines include first amendment guarantees to freedom of
religion, equal protection (including equal representation) and the
right of parents to educate and raise their children.
Three well-known cases involving educational and parental
rights illustrate how the individualistic-oriented United States
Constitution can be construed to implicitly protect cultural rights.
In Meyer v. Nebraska,90 the Supreme Court overturned the convic-
tion of a school teacher who violated a state law prohibiting the
teaching of any modern language other than English to students
who had not passed the eighth grade. The Court ruled that this
state statute interfered with the constitutional rights of the
teacher to teach and that the rights of the parents to provide for
their children's education. "The protection of the Constitution,"
the Court emphasized, "extends to all, to those who speak other
languages as well as to those born with English on the tongue." 91
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,92 the Court declared that the state
statute requiring parents to send their children to a public school,
as opposed to a private school of their choice, violated the liberty
of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,93 the
Supreme Court overturned the conviction of three Amish parents
found to be in violation of Wisconsin's compulsory school attend-
ance law. The parents argued that the Amish religion was based
on a fundamental belief that "salvation requires life in a church
community separate and apart from the world and worldly influ-
ence." 94 Upholding the parents' argument that the statute violated
their first and fourteenth amendment rights, the Court ruled that
to compel an Amish child to attend school until age sixteen might
ultimately result in the extinction of the Old Order Amish Church
90. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
91. Id. at 401.
92. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). For the legal history of Pierce see Oregon School Cases:
Complete Record (1925).
93. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
94. Id. at 210. "Amish society emphasizes informal learning-through-doing; a
life of 'goodness,' rather than a life of intellect; wisdom, rather than technical
knowledge; community welfare, rather than competition; and separation from,
rather than integration with, contemporary worldly society." Id. at 211.
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community as it exists today.95
A comparison between Yoder and the related Deerfield Hut-
terian Association v. Ipswich Board of Education 96 case brings
into sharp focus the distinction between the legal system's deeply
held willingness to protect against interference in the exercise of
individual rights (in this instance religious rights) and its unwill-
ingness to actively promote diversity and to protect the capacity of
a group to exercise its rights.
The courts have long held that while the right to believe is
absolutely protected,9 7 the right of practice may be circumscribed,
especially in the face of overriding state interests.9 8 In the Yoder
case, the Court agreed that the Amish way of life was fully inte-
grated and indistinguishable from religious doctrine. 99 To compel
an Amish child to attend school until age sixteen, the Supreme
Court ruled, "carries with it a very real threat of undermining the
Amish community and religious practice as they exist today; they
must either abandon belief and be assimilated into society at large,
or be forced to migrate to some other and more tolerant re-
gion."100 In dicta, the Court noted the necessity to protect those
who are different: "There can be no assumption that today's ma-
jority is 'right' and the Amish and others like them are 'wrong.' A
way of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no rights
or interests of others is not to be condemned because it is
different."0l
Like the Amish, the Hutterites believe that educating their
children beyond the eighth grade exposes them to worldly values,
attitudes, and practices that are dangerous to their religious ten-
95. Id. at 223-24.
96. 468 F. Supp. 1219 (D. S.D. 1979).
97. "Man's relation to his God was made no concern of the State. He was
granted the right to worship as he pleased and to answer to no man for the verity
of his religious views." United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944).
98. "Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was
left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of
good order." Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
99. "Old Order Amish religion ... pervades and determines virtually their en-
tire way of life." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972).
[T]he Amish in this case have convincingly demonstrated the sincerity
of their religious beliefs, the interrelationship of belief with their
mode of life, the vital role that belief and daily conduct play in the
continued survival of Old Order Amish communities and their reli-
gious organization, and the hazards presented by the State's enforce-
ment of a statute generally valid as to others.
Id. at 235.
100. Id. at 218. The Court further held that an otherwise neutral regulation may
be unconstitutional if "it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion." Id. at 220
(citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
101. Id. at 223-24.
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ets.' 02 To protect their religious values, the Hutterites requested
the local school board to construct an educational facility in their
community to prevent their children from being bussed to a public
school where they would come into contact with "worldly values"
rejected by the Hutterite people. The school board refused, offer-
ing instead to bus the children to a public school where they would
be provided with a special bilingual educational program. The
Hutterite colony charged the board of education with "perpetrat-
ing religious and national origin discrimination"103 against the
plaintiffs. The Hutterites supported their claims on the Court's
ruling in Wisconsin v. Yoder.i04
Although recognizing the similarities between the two com-
munities, 05 the court rejected the Hutterites' request. The Yoder
case, according to the court, involved protection from an impermis-
sible state intervention which interfered with the free exercise of
their religion. The problem was resolved by exempting the Amish
from the state compulsory school law. "The Yoder case does not
stand for the proposition that if a religious group feels strongly
about its religious tenets and wishes its children segregated from
the world, it can force the state to set up and pay for a separate
school for the children."' 06
According to the court,
The Hutterites are not being forced to violate their religious
beliefs. They can, if they wish, educate their children at the
colony at their own expense .... The state may not discrimi-
nate against any group or individual on an arbitrary or unrea-
sonable basis . . . . The state does not [however] have an
obligation to educate every group or individual according to
the whims or desires of that individual or group, even if the
desires are based on religious beliefs.' 0 7
It has proved difficult, especially for nonimmigrant minori-
ties, to protect a life and culture that are different in a society ori-
ented only towards the protection of individual rights. The
Hutterite case points out the inadequacy of relying on statutes
against discrimination to effect a positive right, especially for non-
racial groups. Unless a fundamental right or suspect class is in-
102. Deerfield Hutterian Ass'n v. Ipswich Bd. of Educ., 468 F. Supp. 1219 (D. S.D.
1979).
103. Id. at 1221.
104. Id. at 1223.
105. The religious practices and culture of the Amish are very similar to the
Hutterites. Both societies attempt to insulate their children from worldly attitudes,
practices, and values. Both societies are highly concerned with impermissible influ-
ences affecting their children. Id. at 1228.
106. Id. (emphasis in original).
107. Id at 1229 (emphasis in original).
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volved, the courts apply a rational basis test in analyzing equal
protection cases. This test is a particularly difficult one with
which to prove discrimination since it begins with the assumption
that the statute or practice represents a legitimate state interest.
In this instance, the court found that the legitimate state interest
was based on allowing maximum discretion to locally autonomous
governmental boards-a process for local control or populism. The
problem for culturally diverse groups is that populism is synony-
mous with the interests and values of the dominant population.
II. American Indians' 08
In a mass society, which presses at every point toward con-
formity, the protection of a self-expression, however unique, of
the individual and the group becomes ever more important.
The varying currents of the subcultures that flow into the
mainstream of our national life give it depth and beauty. We
preserved a greater value than ancient tradition when we pro-
tected the rights of the Indians using peyote in religious cere-
monies one night at a meeting in a desert hogan near Needles,
California.' 09
Historical Background and Assimilation Efforts
When the tribes of North America discovered the strange
white people on their shores and in their forests, Indian people
were estimated to number more than one and a half million.110 By
1850 their numbers in the United States had decreased to
250,000.111 But for several decades in the 1600s and 1700s, the
tribes successfully wielded military and political power over their
territory." 2 Unable to conquer the tribes, the early colonists nego-
tiated with the Indians and bargained for land, peace, and military
alliances through treaties." 3
The United States, as the colonists' successor state, adopted
108. For the purposes of this article, Native American and American Indian will
be used interchangeably. The term Native Americans more correctly refers to all
indigenous Indians in the Americas, including Hawaiians and Aleuts.
109. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 727, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 78, 394 P.2d 813, 821
(1964).
110. Arrell Morgan Gibson, The American Indian 62 (1980).
111. Id. at 515.
112. For a review of Indian history during the early years of colonization, see
Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Policy in the Formative Years (1962). For
an overview of Indian history, see Gibson, supra note 110; Angie Debo, A History of
the Indians of the United States (1970).
113. Great Britain concluded more than 500 treaties with the tribes. For a list of
treaties between various Indian nations and Great Britain, see Henry DePuy, A
Bibliography of the English Colonial Treaties with the American Indians, Including
a Synopsis of Each Treaty (1917).
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the practice of treaty-making with the Indian nations,1 14 conclud-
ing its first treaty with the Delaware Nation in 1776.115 In all, the
United States ratified more than 370 treaties that remain in force
today.116
Before the War of 1812, the Indian nations played a pivotal
political and military role in the competition between the Euro-
pean nations and the United States for domination of the conti-
nent."17 Their importance as a power broker was a tribute to their
political and military sophistication, not to their numbers. Ulti-
mately, the sheer numbers of their enemies began to overwhelm
the Indian nations and to threaten their existence. By the 1820s,
the eastern region of the country had filled with settlers. Andrew
Jackson, who ran for President on a platform to remove all east-
ern tribes to lands west of the Mississippi River, lobbied the 1830
Removal Billll8 through Congress with one vote to spare. Over
the next eight years, the United States Army forcibly removed
thousands of Indians to Kansas, Oklahoma, and other areas. These
tribes left behind their farms, schools, council chambers, sacred
sites, and ancestors' graves. One-fourth of the Cherokee died
along the way to relocation.119 In return for removal, the 1830 Re-
moval Bill promised that "the United States will forever secure
and guaranty to them, their heirs or successors, the country so ex-
changed with them .... ,,120
Congress passed the Removal Bill despite a series of Supreme
Court cases which, although diminishing the tribes' status and title
to their lands, had also emphasized Indians' powers and rights.
The first of these decisions was Johnson v. McIntosh.121 In John-
son, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote that although the United
States held title to Indian lands by virtue of discovery and effective
114. In one of his first acts as President of the United States, George Washington
requested that the Senate advise him as to the proper procedure for handling In-
dian relations. After studying the question, the Senate responded that relations
should be handled through the treaty process. "This practice has been adopted by
the United States respecting their treaties with European powers, and I am inclined
to think it would be advisable to observe it in the conduct of our treaties with the
Indians." The Debate and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States 83
(1790).
115. Treaty with Delaware Nation, 7 Stat. 13, Sept. 17, 1778.
116. The original copies of all United States/Indian treaties are retained by the
Department of State and filed by date of ratification with other foreign treaties
signed by the United States. For a listing of American Indian treaties, see Charles
Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, Vols. 1-5 (n.d.).
117. Wilcomb Washburn, The Indian in America 146-50 (1975).
118. Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411.
119. Debo, supra note 112, at 124.
120. Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411.
121. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
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occupation, the tribes retained a right to use and occupy the
land.122 In two later decisions, Justice Marshall emphasized that
this right to occupy the land was "as sacred as the fee simple of
the whites"123 and could not be taken away without the Indians'
consent.124
Marshall's decisions notwithstanding, Congress quickly
sought ways to circumvent the tribes' independence and to acquire
title to Indian lands. The growing nation's desire for land was in-
satiable. Each new mile of the transcontinental railroad en-
couraged further migration westward.' 25 Within twenty-five years,
Congress had forgotten the Removal Bill's guarantees. The prom-
ise of a large "Unorganized Indian Territory" was never realized,
and tribes were forced to cede their lands and to retreat to reser-
vations. 126 The tribes, especially those of the Plains-the Lakota,
Kiowa, Cheyenne, Comanche, and Apache-fought fiercely to pro-
tect their lands and way of life.' 27
In 1867, Congress authorized a Peace Commission128 to inves-
tigate the causes and to propose solutions to the open warfare in
the West. The Commission discovered, not surprisingly, that the
hostilities stemmed directly from the government's refusal to
honor previous treaty commitments and its perpetual demands on
tribes for further land cessions.129 The government's reaction was
pragmatic in the extreme. If treaties were the problem, then the
122. Id. at 586.
123. Mitchell v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835).
124. "[T]he Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and heretofore
unquestioned, right to the lands they occupy, until that right shall be extinguished
by a voluntary cession to our government .... " Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). Marshall's brilliance in creating a new form of property
right in Johnson v. McIntosh (use and occupancy) was repeated in Cherokee Nation
and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 556 (1832) which established a new legal
status for tribes. In Cherokee Nation, Marshall concluded that tribes were not for-
eign nations within the context of the Constitution but rather "domestic dependent
nations." 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16. In Worcester, Marshall elaborated by explaining
that tribes were "distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries
within which their authority is exclusive and having a right to all the lands within
their boundaries." 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 557. Marshall further emphasized that the
terms "treaty" and "nation" were applied to Indian nations as they were to all
other nations. Id. at 559-60. The protection received by the tribes "was that of a
nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more powerful: not that of indi-
viduals abandoning their national character, and submitting to the laws of a
master." Id. at 542.
125. Delos Sacket Otis, The Dawes Act and the Allotment of Indian Lands 13
(1973).
126. S. Lyman Tyler, A History of Indian Policy 70-75 (1973).
127. See Gibson, supra note 110, at 407-23.
128. Act of March 3, 1865, 13 Stat. 572.
129. Arthur Mattingly, The Great Plains Peace Commission of 1867, at 23, 34
(1976).
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government would dispense with their use and resort to other
measures to obtain Indian lands.
The new land acquisition technique was assimilation.130 Indi-
ans were to be "urged," at times ruthlessly, to cooperate in the
government's efforts to assimilate them. The government first ne-
gated the treaty process'31 by legislating that "hereafter no Indian
nation... shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent
nation . . . with whom the United States may contract by treaty
.... "132 In the future, Indian affairs would be handled through
legislation, not treaties.
Assimilationist legislation followed rapidly. In 1874, Congress
passed a bill requiring tribal members to perform "useful labor" in
return for their annuities (annuities which represented payment
for ceded lands). 13 3 Four years later, Congress instituted the rudi-
ments of an Indian education system by establishing the Carlisle
Indian School. The school's director testified before Congress as to
the school's ultimate goal: "[W]e accept the watchword. There is
no good Indian but a dead Indian. Let us by education and patient
effort kill the Idian in him and save the man."134 The churches
and their mission schools played a prominent role in this education
process and an even more pivotal one in the attempted destruction
of traditional religions, the basis of tribal cultures.135 The federal
government assisted in this objective by outlawing the practice of
Indian religions.136 The Seven Major Crimes Act of 1885137 gave
the federal courts jurisdiction over major crimes on the reserva-
130. Congressional testimony urging the end of treaty-making illustrates the
pervasive view among many United States whites concerning the preservaton of tri-
bal identity.
We see nothing about Indian nationality or Indian civilization which
should make its preservation a matter of so much anxiety to the Con-
gress or the people of the United States .... If the Indian cannot learn
to forego such of his habits as are peculiar to savage life, and such of
his political opinions and sentiments as are not in harmony with the
general policy of our Government, then he cannot, beyond a limited
period, exist among us, either as a nation or as an individual.
S. Rep. No. 336, 41st Cong., 3rd Sess. 10-11 (1871).
131. The treaty process was an obvious barrier to assimilation given its recogni-
tion of tribal nations as groups with legal personalities and rights.
132. Act of March 3, 1871, 16 Stat. 544, 566 § 2079, (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71,
(1871)).
133. Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 389, 18 Stat. 146, 176.
134. Quoted in Edward Ward, Minority Rights and American Indians, 51 N.D.L.
Rev. 157, 164 (1974).
135. See Gibson, supra note 110, at 434-36.
136. Until 1921 it was against federal regulations for Indians to practice their
traditional rituals and ceremonies. Violators faced jail terms, fines, and/or loss of
rations. See K. Philip, Collier's Crusade for Indian Reform 1920-1954, at 56-57
(1977), cited in Felix Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 141 (1982).
137. Act of March 3, 1885, 23 Stat. 385 (1885) (codified at 39 U.S.C. § 128 (1885)).
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tion, thereby undermining traditional tribal judicial systems. The
establishment of the Indian police forces and Indian Courts of Ap-
peals,138 administered by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), fur-
ther destroyed the tribes' governing systems.
Tribes, particularly the Plains, had little choice but to submit
to these assimilationist policies given their desperate situation.
The government had implemented an official policy of exterminat-
ing the buffalo, thereby starving Indian tribes into submission.139
Within thirty years, fifteen million buffalo were killed.140 During
many of these years the Plains area was a sea of stinking unused
carcasses. The strategy was effective. After some years of near
starvation, tribes were more malleable. The Lakota reluctantly
ceded more than half of their reservation lands.141
In 1887, Congress passed the Dawes Act,142 the most destruc-
tive and assimilationist piece of legislation to date. Heralded by
President Theodore Roosevelt as "a mighty pulverizing engine to
break up the tribal mass,"143 the Dawes Act directed that commu-
nal reservation lands be allotted to tribal members individually,
with each member receiving up to 160 acres. Land remaining after
the allotment process was deemed surplus on most reservations
and sold to white settlers. The Dawes Act was rhetorically justi-
fied as a program to make farmers out of hunters. In reality, the
Indians were given little if any agricultural instruction, equipment
or seeds. Additionally, due to soil and climatic conditions, almost
all allotted lands were grossly unsuited to agriculture.144
In the Merriam Report, a 1928 study of Indian administration
and conditions commissioned by Congress, the Government Re-
search Institute (today the Brookings Institution) revealed that liv-
ing conditions among Indians were filled with poverty, disease,
suffering, and despair.1 45 Between 1887 and 1934, reservation land
holdings had decreased from 138 million to 47 million acres as a
result of the allotment process.1 46 The general mortality rate
138. See Report of the NAICJA Long Range Planning Project, Indian Courts of
the Future 8-10 (1978).
139. Gibson, supra note 110, at 415.
140. Debo, supra note 112, at 213-14.
141. Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., Concise History of United States-Sioux Relations, in
The Great Sioux Nation 19-28 (Roxanne Dunbar Ortiz, ed. 1977).
142. General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1887).
143. XV Messages and Papers of the President, 6672 (1901).
144. See Debo, supra note 112, at 299-331.
145. See generally Brookings Institution, The Problem of Indian Administration
(Johnson Reprint 1971) [hereinafter Indian Administration].
146. Debo, supra note 112, at 331.
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among Indians was 26 per 1000, twice the Anglo-American rate.147
The median per capita income for Indians in the late 1920s was ap-
proximately $100,148 compared to a national average of $1,350.149
In response to the Merriam Report, Congress passed the In-
dian Reorganization Act in 1934.150 Praised by many and scorned
by others, the Act attempted to return power to the tribes by rees-
tablishing and strengthening tribal governments. The tribal gov-
ernments envisioned by the Act, however, were not the traditional
ones, but newly constructed governments modeled after the Amer-
ican system.151
By the 1950s, the federal government had decided on a new
solution to the Indian problem: abolish the tribes by nullifying the
federal government's recognition and protection of their sover-
eignty and resources. Hence began the termination era in federal-
Indian affairs. House Resolution 108 paved the way for the termi-
nation of 109 tribes and bands in the late 1950s and 1960s.152 In ad-
dition, Congress passed Public Law No. 280 which allowed various
states to assume jurisdiction over certain criminal and civil matters
occurring on reservations.153
By the late 1960s, the federal government had to concede that
termination was a dismal failure.154 Acknowledging a "strong ex-
pression of the Indian people for self-determination"155 and admit-
ting that the "federal domination of Indian service programs had
served to retard rather than enhance the progress of Indian peo-
147. Gibson, supra note 110, at 536. The Indian infant mortality rate was 191 per
1000 compared to 71 per 1000 for white infants. Id.
148. Indian Administration, supra note 145, at chart on 447.
149. Gibson, supra note 110, at 536.
150. Indian Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 383, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 461 (1934)).
151. Tribes did not draft their own constitutions, but were provided with "boiler-
plate" constitutions drafted by the BIA. Tribes were allowed to vote against the In-
dian Reorganization Act (IRA). Tribes not holding elections (often from lack of
interest) automatically came under the terms of the IRA. Cohen, supra note 136,
at 84.
On the Hopi reservation, the traditionalists, who composed the majority of tri-
bal members, were vehemently opposed to the proposed forms of government. Ar-
guing that voting violated their religious beliefs, they boycotted the election.
Although very few people voted, the Bureau refused to recognize the mass absten-
tions and declared a victory. In all, 70% of all tribal members (not tribes) voted
against the Act. David Getches, Daniel Rosenfelt & Charles Wilkinson, Federal In-
dian Law, Cases and Materials 83-86 (1979) [hereinafter Federal Indian Law].
152. 99 Cong. Rec. 9968 (1953).
153. 18 U.S.C. § 1162; 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1985).
154. See Charles Wilkinson & Eric Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Pol-
icy, 5 Am. Indian L. Rev. 139 (1977).
155. Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-
638, § 3(a), 88 Stat. 2203, 2204 (1975).
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ple,"156 Congress passed the Indian Self-Determination and Educa-
tional Assistance Act in 1975.157 The Act provides all tribes with
an opportunity to assume a portion of services formerly provided
by the BIA, such as housing, education, community development,
and law enforcement. Once the BIA approved the tribe's plans for
the assumption of these services, the BIA provided technical sup-
port and advice.
Cultural Protection
The Bureau of Indian Affairs currently recognizes more than
500 Indian tribes.158 Congress acknowledges that these tribes pos-
sess an inherent authority to structure and administer their own
governments, define their own membership, administer their own
justice systems, levy taxes, provide social services, and manage
their own property and resources. 159
Government recognition of inherent tribal sovereignty is in-
dispensable if a tribe is to protect its tribal cultural practices, espe-
cially in such areas as marriage, child custody, and tribal
membership. In Kobogum v. Jackson Iron Co.,160 the Supreme
Court of Michigan in 1889 considered the validity of a Chippewa
man's marriage to two women according to tribal custom. In af-
firming the legality of the polygamous marriage the court wrote:
We must either hold that there can be no valid Indian mar-
riages, or we must hold that all marriages are valid which by
Indian usage are so regarded. [The tribes] did not occupy their
territory by our grace and permission, but by a right beyond
our control. They were placed by the constitution of the
United States beyond our jurisdiction, and we had no more
right to control their domestic usages than those of Turkey or
India . . . [I]t is a principle of universal law that marriages
valid by the law governing both parties when made must be
treated as valid everywhere. 161
156. Id. at § 2(a)(1), 88 Stat. at 2203 (1975).
157. Id.
158. Federal Indian Law, supra note 151, at 5. For a brief description of the vari-
ous reservations, see U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Federal and State Indian Reserva-
tions and Trust Areas (1974).
159. Federal Indian Law, supra note 151, at 253-54. As the Supreme Court has
pointed out several times, this is a political and not a racial relationship. See Mor-
ton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974).
160. 76 Mich. 498, 43 N.W. 602 (1889).
161. Id. at 508, 43 N.W. at 605. Congress has never passed legislation concerning
Indian marriages. Compare Kobogum with the Supreme Court's ruling in Reynolds
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), which ruled that the first amendment freedom
of religion clause did not invalidate a law prohibiting polygamous marriages among
the Mormons:
Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but
was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties
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The courts have long acknowledged the principle that parents
have a right to educate and raise their children in accordance with
the parents' religious and cultural beliefs.162 A 1977 report study-
ing the placement of Indian children by state welfare agencies
found that the government had failed to apply this principle to In-
dian parents and tribes. According to the report, state agencies
had removed approximately one-third of all Indian children from
their families, tribes, and culture and placed them in white foster
and adoptive homes.163 Subsequent tribal efforts to improve this
situation have been generally successful. In 1978 Congress passed
the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)164 which gives tribes exclu-
sive jurisdiction over custody proceedings involving children resid-
ing within the reservation and provides for the transfer of state
proceedings to tribal courts. 16 5
or subversive of good order .... Polygamy has always been treated as
an offence against society .... In the face of all this evidence, it is im-
possible to believe that the constitutional guaranty of religious free-
dom was intended to prohibit legislation in respect to this most
important feature of social life .... Laws are made for the govern-
ment of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious
belief and opinions, they may with practices.
Id. at 164-66. See also Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76 (1906); Carney v.
Chapman, 247 U.S. 102 (1918); Red Fox v. Red Fox, 23 Or. App. 393, 398, 542 P.2d
918, 920 (1975).
"[T]he quasi-sovereign nature of the tribe does suggest that judgements ren-
dered by tribal courts are entitled to the same deference shown decisions of foreign
nations as a matter of comity." Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 149 (1878).
162. "[T]he values of parental direction of the religious upbringing and education
of their children in their early and formative years have a high place in our soci-
ety." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972) (referring to Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)). "The history and culture of Western civilization re-
flect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their
children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is
now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition." Id. at 232-33
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
The Court in Pierce wrote: "The child is not the mere creature of the State;
those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." Pierce, 268 U.S. at
535.
163. Task Force Report on Federal, State and Tribal Jurisdiction, Final Report
to the American Indian Policy Review Commission (1976). See e.g., In re Adoption
of Doe, 89 N.M. 606, 55 P.2d 906 (1976), where the court, while recognizing that
Navajo custom and tradition conferred custody of grandchildren to the grandpar-
ents, nonetheless awarded custody of the child to a non-white off-reservation
couple who had been given custody of the child by an off-reservation adoption
agency.
164. Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1982)).
165. The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) ensured that tribal child custody
rights would be respected. (The Act also appropriated funds to assist tribes in the
establishment of child care facilities.) Before the passage of the ICWA, the
Supreme Court affirmed: "The exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribal Court (over child
custody proceedings) does not derive from the race of the plaintiff but rather from
the quasi-sovereign status of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe under federal law."
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The federal government has also affirmed tribes' rights to de-
termine their own membership based on cultural practices, even
when these practices clearly conflict with the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. In Santa C7ara Pueblo v.
Martinez,166 respondent Julia Martinez, argued that a "tribal ordi-
nance denying membership in the tribe to children of female
members who marry outside the tribe, while extending member-
ship to children of male members who marry outside the tribe,"
violated the fourteenth amendment.167 Justice Thurgood Marshall
wrote,
"Tribes remain quasi-sovereign nations which, by government
structure, culture, and source of sovereignty are in many ways
foreign to the constitutional institutions of the Federal and
State Governments .... [E]fforts by the federal judiciary to
apply the statutory prohibitions of § 1302 in a civil context may
substantially interfere with a tribe's ability to maintain itself
as a culturally and politically distinct entity." 168
Freedom of Religion
Indian religion lies at the heart of Indian culture. A more ac-
curate measure of the government's willingness to protect Indian
culture is therefore revealed by the federal commitment to protect
Indian religion through statutory and case law. In 1978, recogniz-
ing that "the religious practices of the American Indian (as well as
Native Alaskan and Hawaiian) are an integral part of their cul-
Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390 (1976). A Maryland court emphasized
that "[I]f tribal sovereignty is to have any meaning at all at this juncture of history,
it must necessarily include the right, within its own boundaries and membership, to
provide for the care and upbringing of its young, a sine qua non to the preservation
of its identity." Wakefield v. Little Light, 276 Md. 333, 347 A.2d 228, 236 (Ct. App.
1975) (citing Wisconsin Potowatomies, Etc. v. Houston, 393 F. Supp. 719, 730 (W.D.
Mich., 1973)).
166. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
167. Id. at 51.
168. Id. at 71-72. The Court also cited "with approval" the findings of the lower
court:
[M]embership rules were no more or less than a mechanism of social
... self-definition, and as such were basic to the tribe's survival as a
cultural and economic entity .... [T]he equal protection guarantee of
the Indian Civil Rights Act should not be construed in a manner
which would require or authorize this Court to determine which tradi-
tional values will promote cultural survival and should therefore be
preserved .... Such a determination should be made by the people of
Santa Clara; not only because they can best decide what values are im-
portant .... To abrogate tribal decisions, particularly in the delicate
area of membership, for whatever 'good' reasons, is to destroy cultural
identity under the guise of saving it.
Id. at 54 (citing Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5, 18-19 (1975)). See
also Roff v. Burney, 165 U.S. 218 (1897); Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76
(1906).
[Vol. 5:267
1987] CULTURAL RIGHTS: A CONFLICT OF VALUES 299
ture, tradition and heritage ... (and) are indispensable and irre-
placeable . . ", Congress passed the Indian Religious Freedom
Act.169 The Act commits the federal government "to protect and
preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to
believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions."' 70 Specifi-
cally, the Act directs federal agencies to evaluate policies and pro-
cedures that deprive Indians of access to sacred sites on federal
lands or that prevent the performance of traditional ceremonies
and the possession of sacred objects.171. A review of Indian reli-
gious freedom cases reveals that tribes have had mixed success,
both before and after the Act, in protecting their religious freedom
rights.
In 1964, the Supreme Court of California in People v.
Woody 172 considered the convictions of Native American Church
members for illegal possession of peyote. The defendants argued
that laws prohibiting the use of peyote violated their first amend-
ment rights to the free exercise of religion.173 In reaching its deci-
sion, the Woody court employed the two-step test devised by the
United States Supreme Court in the 1962 Sherbert v. Verner case:
whether the state statute imposes a burden upon the free exercise
of the defendant's religion; and whether the infringement on reli-
gious rights is backed by a compelling state interest.1 7 4 Regarding
the first step, the Woody court ruled that by prohibiting peyote
use the state "seriously infringes upon the observance of the reli-
gion."175 As the court noted, peyote was central to the practice of
the Native American Church and was in itself an object of worship
and viewed as a "teacher" and "protector."1 76 In applying the sec-
169. Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1978)).
See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
170. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1978).
171. The Indian Religious Freedom Act is an important statement of the govern-
ment's position and commitment to refrain from interfering with Indian religious
practices. The Act, however, is little more than a declaration. It only directs fed-
eral agencies to review their policies for possible interference with Indian religious
practices. The Act does not mandate that these policies be altered if found to be
obstructionist; it contains no enforcement section, and most importantly, the Act
has no application to states. See Sharon O'Brien, Federal Indian Policies and the
International Protection of Human Rights, in American Indian Policy in the Twen-
tieth Century 55 (Vine Deloria, Jr. ed. 1985).
172. 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 61 Cal. 2d 716 (1964).
173. The first amendment states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. " U.S. Const.
amend. I.
174. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1962). The Sherbert case is discussed in
somewhat greater detail at the end of this section.
175. 394 P.2d at 816, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 72, 61 Cal. 2d at 720.
176. "To forbid the use of peyote is to remove the theological heart of Peyotism."
Id. at 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74, 61 Cal. 2d at 722. For a discussion of the Native
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ond step-whether the infringement is backed by a compelling
state interest-the court rejected the state's arguments that the
prohibition of all peyote use was necessary. 177 In what is perhaps
the most elegant and insightful affirmation of cultural rights, the
court declared:
In a society that presses at every point toward conformity, the
protection of a self-expression, however unique, of the individ-
ual and the group becomes ever more important. We preserve
a value greater than an ancient tradition when we protect the
rights of the Indians who simply practiced an old religion one
night in a desert hogan near Needles, California. 178
In 1983 a New York federal district court affirmed the
Woody ruling. In Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Smith,179 the
court held that to exempt only Native American Church members
from state drug laws but not others who also profess a belief in pe-
yote as a central sacrament did not violate the rights of a non-
profit religious organization.s 0 The court, citing the American In-
dian Religious Freedom Act,lsl distinguished between the two sit-
uations: "[R]eligion is an integral part of the Indian culture and...
the use of such items as peyote are necessary to the survival of In-
dian religion and culture."82 In addressing the argument that
such special treatment constituted individual racial discrimination,
the Peyote court emphasized that the United States government
maintains a special political relationship with the tribes,1S3 and
that Congress has a "power or duty . . .to . . .people who have a
distinctive culture .... Congress has the power or duty to preserve
our Native American Indians (also our Eskimo & Aleuts) as a co-
hesive culture until such time, if ever, all of them are assimilated
American Church, see Hazel Hertzberg, The Search for an American Identity:
Modern Pan-Indian Movements 259-84 (1971).
177. "We know of no doctrine that the state, in its asserted conscience, should
undertake to deny to defendants the observance of their religion in order to free
them from the suppositious 'shackles' of their 'unenlightened' and 'primitive condi-
tion.' " Woody, 394 P. 2d at 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74, 61 Cal. 2d at 723 (1964). The
state had based much of its case on the Supreme Court's decision in Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). The court distinguished the Reynolds decision on
two points. The use of peyote is central to the practice of Peyotism; polygamy was
not essential to the practice of Mormonism. Furthermore, the degree of danger
presented by polygamy "far exceeded that in the instant case." Woody, 394 P.2d at
820, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 76, 61 Cal. 2d at 724-25.
178. Woody, 394 P.2d at 821-22, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78, 61 Cal. 2d at 728-29.
179. 556 F. Supp. 632 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
180. But see Native American Church of New York v. United States, 468 F.
Supp. 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), finding that the use of peyote for sacramental purposes
was not restricted solely to the Native American Church, a religious organization of
Indians.
181. Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1978)).
182. Peyote Way Church of God, 556 F. Supp. at 637.
183. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1973).
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in the main stream of American culture."18 4
The government's obligation to protect tribal culture was also
specifically stated in Frank v. Alaska. 8 5 In Frank, the Supreme
Court of Alaska overturned the conviction of Carlos Frank for un-
lawfully transporting a moose killed out of season. Frank, an
Athabascan Indian, argued that state game regulations violated his
freedom of religion. Applying the Sherbert test, the court rea-
soned that a protected religious belief was involved. The plaintiff
had served the moose at a funeral potlatch, a ceremony conceded
by the lower court to be an "integral part of the cultural religious
belief of the central Alaska Athabascan Indian" and the "most im-
portant institution in Athabascan life ... [T]he funeral potlatch is
distinguished by its fundamentally sacred aspect . . .with food as
the cornerstone of the ritual."186 Citing an expert witness, the
lower court had characterized moose meat as the "sacramental
equivalent to the wine and wafer in Christianity . . . and is the
equivalent of sacred symbols in other religions." 8 7
In analyzing the competing state interest, the Supreme Court
first noted that "subsistence hunting is at the core of the cultural
tradition of many (Athabascans)."18 8 The state's contention that a
ruling for the defendant would produce a "downward spiral into
anarchy" accompanied by "poaching and creek robbing" was un-
persuasive.'8 9 In response to the argument that granting an ex-
emption would contravene the establishment clause of the first
amendment, the court replied that "[t]he purpose of such an ac-
commodation is merely to permit the observation of the ancient
traditions of the Athabascans."'190 The court stated that "as such,
the exemption reflects nothing more than the governmental obli-
gation of neutrality in the face of religious differences, and does
not represent that involvement of religious with secular
institutions .. "191
The courts have also protected Indian religious rights by rec-
184. Peyote Way Church of God, 556 F. Supp. at 639.
185. 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
186. Id. at 1069-71.
187. Id. at 1072-73.
188. Id. at 1073.
189. Id. at 1074.
190. Id. at 1075 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 n.22 (1972)).
191. Id. at 1075. The court further referred to both 16 U.S.C.A. § 668a (West
Supp. 1979) which authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to allow eagles to be
taken "for the religious purposes of Indian tribes..." and a Wisconsin statute (Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 29.106 (West Supp. 1978-1979)) permitting the taking of deer by Winne-
bago Indians for religious ceremonies as examples of religious accomodations by
governments.
The Eighth Circuit has recently upheld the treaty rights of Yankton Sioux to
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ognizing the importance of culture in the administration of justice.
In two cases, the federal courts ruled that prison regulations re-
quiring short hair192 and prohibiting the wearing of headbands 193
violated the rights of Indian inmates to freely practice their reli-
gion. In another case, Native American Council of Tribes v. So-
lem,194 the court held that prison regulations prohibiting families
of Indian inmates to attend traditional religious services, while al-
lowing families of Christian inmates to attend Christian services,
violated the inmates' freedom of religion.
In at least one instance, the courts have also recognized the
importance of culture as a necessary component in determining a
fair jury trial. The Alaska State Supreme Court in Alvardo v.
State 19 5 ruled that the state had deprived an Aleut Indian of a fair
trial because the choice of jurors, drawn from a fifteen mile radius
of Anchorage, had precluded the participation of residents from
native villages. The court concluded that the profound cultural
differences between native village life and urban life meant that
the defendant had not been judged by a jury of his peers.196
In freedom of religion cases, courts generally have stressed
the impermissibility of assessing the accuracy of the religious view
in question. In United States v. Ballard,19 7 for example, the
Supreme Court wrote: "The Fathers of the Constitution . . . fash-
ioned a charter of government which envisaged the widest possible
toleration of conflicting views. Man's relation to his God was made
no concern of the state. He was granted the right to worship as he
pleased and to answer to no man for the verity of his religious
views."198
Beyond Ballard, the relationship between religious beliefs
and religious practices presents difficulties. In a number of contro-
versial cases the courts have ruled against constitutional protection
of certain Indian practices issuing from beliefs. In New Rider v.
Board of Education,199 Pawnee parents and their children chal-
hunt eagles for traditional use on their reservation. See United States v. Dion, 752
F.2d 1261 (8th Cir. 1985).
192. Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975).
193. Reinert v. Haas, 585 F. Supp. 477 (S.D. Iowa 1984).
194. 691 F.2d 382 (8th Cir. 1982).
195. 486 P.2d 891 (Alaska 1971).
196. Id. at 899. See infra notes 401-05 and accompanying text for a comparison
of the Court's ruling in this particular instance with the law regarding minority
representation on juries of minority defendants.
197. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
198. Id. at 87. "Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion,
but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subver-
sive of good order." Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
199. 480 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1097 (1973).
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lenged a school policy requiring short hair as violating their sons'
right to wear their hair in long braids according to Pawnee tradi-
tion. The court held that the hair length regulation did not in-
fringe upon their free exercise of religion. In apparent self-
contradiction, the court first acknowledged that "[tihe Pawnees
are near-pantheists, their every act having religious significance in
their basic desire to live in harmony with the Universe," 20 0 but
then proceeded to find that "[h]air styles . . .have traditional but
variable significance .... Their [the Pawnees'] present contention
of religious oppression rises no higher under this record than a de-
sire to express pride in their heritage .... Their desire so to do is
understandable but not a constitutionally protected right." 20
The Sixth Circuit made a similar distinction between cultural
practices and religious beliefs in Sequoyah v. TVA.202 In 1980, two
years after the passage of the American Indian Religious Freedom
Act, two bands of the Cherokee Nation sought an injunction
against the completion of the Tellico Dam in Tennessee. The res-
ervoir created by the dam would flood forever the site of Chota,
the tribes' sacred birthplace and ancestral burial grounds. The
court ruled that the Cherokees had failed to demonstrate "that
worship at the particular geographic location in question is insepa-
rable from their way of life (Yoder), the cornerstone of their reli-
gious observance (Frank), or plays a central role in their religious
ceremonies and practices (Woody)."203
The court instead characterized the plaintiffs as expressing a
"personal preference." 204 Although the importance of Chota as
the birthplace of the Cherokees is not unlike the importance Beth-
lehem holds for Christians as the birthplace of Jesus, the Se-
quoyah court stated that the plaintiffs' concern was with the
"historical beginnings of the Cherokees and their cultural develop-
ment [rather than religious practices]. It is damage to tribal and
family folklore and traditions more than particular religious ob-
servances which appears to be at stake."2 05 The court concluded:
"Though cultural history and traditions are vitally important to
any group of people, these are not interests protected by the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment."2 06
200. Id. at 700.
201. Id. at 700-01 (Lewis, J., concurring). But see Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357
(8th Cir. 1975).
202. 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
203. Id. at 1164.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1165.
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In Baldoni v. Higginson,207 decided the same year, Navajo
religious leaders sued government officials charging that federal
management of the Rainbow Bridge National Monument and Glen
Canyon Dam and Reservoir violated their first amendment free
exercise rights. The plaintiffs argued that the newly formed Lake
Powell desecrated the area's sacred nature and denied the reli-
gious leaders and their followers access to the holy site. The plain-
tiffs believed that if the earth is altered, their "prayers [would] not
be heard by the gods and their ceremonies [would] be ineffective to
prevent evil and disease."2 08 As remedies, the plaintiffs sought a
prohibition on drinking at the Monument and asked that the Mon-
ument be closed periodically to visitors so that sacred ceremonies
could be conducted in private.
While acknowledging that Rainbow Bridge was of "central
importance to the Navajo people living in that area,"209 the court
ruled that a successful free exercise claim required a showing that
the disputed actions "compel citizens to violate tenets of their reli-
gion."210 Although "mindful of the difficulties facing plaintiffs in
performing solemn religious ceremonies in an area frequented by
tourists," 2 11 the court further ruled that the plaintiffs' request to
exclude tourists for short periods and to control their behavior
would violate the first amendment establishment clause.212 "Exer-
cise of First Amendment freedom may not be asserted to deprive
the public of its normal use of the area."213 Citing Justice Learned
Hand, the court stated: "We must accommodate our idiosyncrasies,
religious as well as secular, to the compromises necessary in com-
munal life."214 Plaintiffs' reliance on the American Indian Reli-
gious Freedom Act was dismissed with the statement that "we do
not have before us the constitutionality of those laws or regula-
207. 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
208. Id. at 177.
209. Id. These shrines are regarded as the incarnate forms of Navajo gods, pro-
viding protection and rain-giving functions. Generations of Navajo singers have
performed ceremonies near the Bridge. Id.
210. Id. at 178.
211. Id.
212. That the lands the tribes were seeking to effect policy changes upon did not
belong to them but to the federal government, was not a determining factor in the
case. Id. at 176.
213. Id. at 179.
214. Id. (citing Otten v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 205 F. 2d. 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1933)
(Learned Hand, J.)). Justice Learned Hand's quote in this instance is ironic given it
would easily support the argument that the majority must compromise to preserve
the religious freedoms of the minority. Secular idosyncracies such as a tourist's
right to drink beer at all times could certainly be found to give way to religious
practices in our communal life.
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tions ."215
Religious leaders from the Lakota and Tsistsistas Nations
were equally unsuccessful in their attempt to halt the develop-
ment of additional tourist facilities at Bear Butte in the Black
Hills.216 The court acknowledged the plaintiffs' contention that
Bear Butte was the "most powerful ceremonial site for the reli-
gious practices of the Lakota and Tsistsistas people,"2 17 but again
found that the plaintiffs' arguments failed to meet the free exer-
cise test that governmental actions forced the tribal members to
violate their religious tenets.218 Furthermore, the court held that
restricting public access and development of the site would violate
the establishment clause of the first amendment.219
Navajo and Hopi religious leaders fared no better in their at-
tempt to stop the expansion of a ski area on the San Francisco
Peaks, their sacred mountains. 220 As the religious leaders ex-
plained in their suit, commercial development of the Peaks was "a
profane act and an affront to the deities and . . . (one that will
cause the Peaks,) to lose their healing powers." 22 1 Moreover, the
development would inhibit their ability to gather sacred plants and
animals necessary for religious ceremonies. Once again the court
sided with the government and ruled the development to be in the
public interest. The court acknowledged that the development
"would cause the plaintiffs' spiritual disquiet,"22 2 but found it
would not interfere with the plaintiffs freedom to believe. In re-
sponse to the directives of the American Indian Religious Freedom
Act, the court stated that it was not the government's intention "to
provide Indian religions with a more favorable status than other
religions, only to insure that the U.S. Government treats them
equally."22 3
The only successful land usage case to date and one now
215. Id. at 180.
216. Crow v. Gillet, 541 F. Supp. 783, 785 (D. Kan. 1982).
217. Id. at 787.
218. Id. at 791. The plaintiffs argued that the construction of roads desecrated
the sacred area and that the tourists disrupted and interfered with religious
ceremonies.
219. Id.
220. Navajo Medicinemen's Ass'n & Hopi Tribe v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C Cir.
1983).
221. Id. at 740.
222. Id. at 742.
223. Id at 746. See also The Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope v. United
States, 548 F. Supp. 182 (D. Alaska 1982). The Inupiat unsuccessfully argued that
the development of an off-shore area of land would interfere with their religiously
centered hunting and fishing practices. Although the development of the oil in this
area threatened to severely reduce the animal life in the region, the court ruled
that the development would not "create a serious obstacle to the plaintiff's reli-
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pending before the Supreme Court is Northwest Indian Cemetery
v. Peterson.224 In Peterson, members of the Yurok, Karok, and
Tolowa tribes sought to halt road construction and logging in a sa-
cred area used for religious rites and for the training of medicinal
and spiritual practitioners.
Ruling in the tribes' favor, the court accepted that the neces-
sity to conduct ceremonies without interference was vital to the
tribes exercise of their religious rights. Furthermore, the court
stressed such an accomodation did not violate the establishment
clause. "The Constitution encourages accomodation, not merely
tolerance, of all religions and forbids hostility toward any." 2 2 5
In these cases the courts have misconceived what constitutes
Indian religious belief and practices and their integral role in In-
dian culture and have given higher priority to other values. The
courts quite willingly rule in favor of tribes when presented with
an issue that fits within or can be analogized to their own concep-
tion of religion. In the Woody case, the court analogizes "a beauti-
fully beaded pouch containing one large peyote button" 226 with a
Catholic carrying a medallion. The Reinert court compared the
headband, a symbol of the sacred tribal circle, to a Christian
cross.227 The courts obviously find it much more difficult to con-
ceive of sacred natural sites as analogous to a Christian church or
Jewish synagogue.2 28
As the above cases exemplify, the courts have applied a rigid
interpretation of the Sherbert test.229 Sherbert involved the re-
gion." Id. at 188. The court also stated that the government's interest in developing
the energy of the region outweighed the protection of religious rights. Id. at 189.
224. 552 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Cal. 1982). 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. granted
sub nom, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery, 107 S. Ct. 1971 (No. 86-1013, May 4,
1987).
225. Id. at 694
226. People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813, 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 74, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 723
(1979).
227. Reinert v. Haas, 585 F. Supp. 477, 481 (S.D. Iowa 1984).
228. The Indian concept of nature and the individual's place within it determines
the basis of all aspects of tribal existence. Nature is viewed as God's gift and as the
physical manifestation of God. There exists within all things, animate and inani-
mate, a spirituality and a purpose. Nature is balanced and comprised of interdepen-
dent parts which form a whole. Each element is an integral part, none above the
other. Human beings are part of this wholeness; indivisible from nature. Humbled
by the knowledge of man's total dependence upon nature, no prey is ever killed, no
plant ever eaten, without a prayer of thanksgiving. Not to give thanks for nature's
bounty through appropriate ceremonies or to desecrate nature is to condemn the
tribe to extinction. For a discussion of Indian culture and spirituality, see Vine De-
loria, The Metaphysics of Modern Existence (1979). See also Mercia Eliade, The Sa-
cred and the Profane (1959).
229. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See also supra note 174 and ac-
companying text.
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fusal of the South Carolina Unemployment Office to pay unem-
ployment compensation to a Seventh Day Adventist who was
unable to find work because of her refusal to work on Saturdays,
the Seventh Day Adventist Sabbath. The Court first examined
whether the denial of benefits imposed a burden on the free exer-
cise of religion.230 In ruling that such a burden existed, the Court
stated: "If the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the obser-
vance of one or all religions... that law is constitutionally invalid
even though the burden may be characterized as being only indi-
rect."2 31 In a number of the cases discussed in this section, the
courts acknowledged that the public and private activities tribal
leaders were seeking to end "created difficulty and disquiet," i.e.,
conditions that impeded the tribes' ability to conduct their reli-
gious ceremonies. The courts, however, required tribal religious
leaders to demonstrate that the government's actions forced them
to forgo their religious tenets, a far stricter test than that of the
Sherbert case.232
The second part of the Sherbert test stated that "[o]nly the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for
permissible limitation"233 by state action. It is not clear how re-
quests to reroute roads or to prevent tourists from drinking and in-
terfering with religious ceremonies endanger the public's
"paramount interests." 234 The issue presented in all of the preced-
ing Indian religious land use cases seems clearly to fall within Jus-
tice Douglas' discussion in Sherbert of the government's violation
of the establishment clause: like Sherbert, these are cases "resolva-
230. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961). As Justice Douglas
pointed out in the concurring opinion in Sherbert, "many people hold beliefs alien
to the majority of our society-beliefs that are protected by the First Amendment
but which could easily be trod upon under the guise of 'police' or 'health' regula-
tions reflecting the majority's views." 374 U.S. at 411.
231. Id. at 404 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)) (emphasis
added).
232. Justice Stewart warned in his concurring opinion in Sherbert that unless
the Court faced up to the dilemma posed by the conflict between the Free Exercise
and the Establishment Clause, "the guarantee of true religious freedom in our plu-
ralistic society [will] be uncertain and insecure." Id. at 417. The rulings in all of
the Indian religious land use cases would seem to bear out Justice Stewart's
prediction.
233. Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
234. Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, echoed Douglas's view:
And I think that the guarantee of religious liberty embodied in the
Free Exercise Clause affirmatively requires government to create an
atmosphere of hospitality and accommodation to individual belief or
disbelief .... [O]ur Constitution commands the positive protection by
government of religious freedom-not only for the majority, however
large ... but for each of us.
Id. at 415-16.
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ble not in terms of what an individual can demand of the govern-
ment, but solely in terms of what government may not do to an
individual in violation of his religious scruples."235
In sum, the government, to a degree, has recognized and pro-
tected Indian cultural rights. If cultural rights fall within an as-
pect of inherent tribal sovereignty, the courts have tended to
uphold tribal authority, thereby indirectly protecting the cultural
practice. This is not the case in those instances where a protection
of Indian cultural rights is sought without the protective backdrop
of tribal sovereignty, as in the religious practice cases.
III. Native Hawaiians
[A]s in the survival of biological species, variety rather than
sameness enhances the possibilities for survival .... [A] cul-




The Hawaiian Kingdom was created in 1810 when
Kamehameha I united the eight islands of the Hawaiian chain by
conquest and negotiations. 238 Ten years later New England mis-
sionaries emigrated to the islands. 239 Within a few decades, sev-
eral missionaries had gained considerable influence as advisers to
the Hawaiian monarchy. The missionaries and their families' in-
fluence increased with the development of lucrative sugar planta-
tions.240 By the mid-nineteenth century, these families had
assumed virtual domination of the Hawaiian economy. 241
The traditional Hawaiian system of property did not allow for
fee simple ownership, a fact of great inconvenience to the planta-
235. Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1962).
236. Delegate Adelaide De Soto, speaking in favor of the adoption of Article 12
of the 1978 Hawaiian Constitution. 2 Committee of the Whole on Hawaiian Affairs,
Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1978, at 425 (September 2, 1978).
237. For a general overview of Hawaiian history, see Ralph Kuykendall, The
Hawaiian Kingdom I, 1778-1854 (1938) [hereinafter I Kuykendall]; Ralph
Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom II, 1854-1874 (1953) [hereinafter II
Kuykendall]; Ralph Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom III, 1874-1893 (1967)
[hereinafter III Kuykendall]; Lawrence Fuchs, Hawaii Pono: A Social History
(1961) [hereinafter Fuchs]; Noel Kent, Hawaii: Islands Under the Influence (1983).
238. For a history of this period, see I Kuykendall, supra note 237, at 29-51.
239. Europeans first became aware of the Hawaiian Islands' existence in 1778
when Capt. James Cook landed on the Islands and named them the Sandwich Is-
lands, in honor of his benefactor, the Earl of Sandwich. Kent, supra note 237, at 11.
240. Recognizing Hawaii's rich resources, English traders immediately initiated a
rich trade in sandalwood to China. Id. at 17. By 1830, the sandalwood trees had
been depleted and traders had turned their attention to whaling. Id. at 17, 21.
241. Id. at 37.
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tion owners. Under the traditional land tenure system, the
ali'inui (high chief) possessed divine and absolute power to man-
age the land and the resources as the living trustee for the gods.
The land was divided into administrative districts known as
ahupua'a, which stretched from the mountains to the sea.242 The
ali'inui distributed the land as he pleased to the ali'i and ko-
nohiki, the greater and lesser chiefs. These nobles then distrib-
uted their share of the land to the commoners or makaainana.
The commoners worked their own plots and possessed fishing and
gathering rights to the ahupua'a uncultivated areas.
Possession of the land reverted to the high chief upon the
death of a lower chief, and was his to reallocate as he chose. The
commoners usually stayed with the land, despite a change in ali'i.
Commoners who worked their own plots and also their chief's
land, were free to move if they wished. This led to a far greater
degree of interdependence than existed in the European feudal
system.
In 1825, the Hawaiian government began to transform the
traditional system into a western fee simple system of land tenure.
The missionaries and non-Hawaiian entrepreneurs convinced the
monarch to adopt the western system of inheritance, allowing the
konohikis to keep their lands once the monarch died.243 Eight
years later this powerful group of plantation owners, known in Ha-
waiian history as the "Big Five," persuaded the Hawaiian king to
complete the land tenure transformation to a fee simple system.244
The Great Mahele, or land reform legislation,245 apportioned the
monarch's land as follows: approximately 1,000,000 acres were re-
served as Crown lands for the monarch's private use; and 1,500,000
acres were given by the king to the "government and the peo-
ple."246 The remaining 1,500,000 acres were set aside for the 245
242. By dividing the land, or ahupua'a, from mountain to sea, the people were
assured of access to all the land and water provided. For a discussion of the ancient
Hawaiian land system, see Jon Chinen, The Great Mahele: Hawaii's Land Division
of 1848 (1958); Jean Hobbs, Hawaii Pageant of the Soil (1935); Andrew Lind, An
Island Community 24-39 (1938).
243. Karen Blondin, A Case for Reparations for Native Hawaiians, 16 Haw. B.J.
13 (1981).
244. Id. at 24.
245. In 1840 King Kamehameha III, under the guidance of his white advisers,
proclaimed a constitutional monarchy. A representative body elected by the people
was established and a supreme court created. This proved to be the first of four
constitutions promulgated by the Hawaiian monarchy, each further diminishing the
traditional rights of the monarch and native peoples. I Kuykendall, supra note 237,
at 167.
246. Neil Levy, Native Hawaiian Land Rights, 63 Calif. L. Rev. 848, 855 (1975)
[hereinafter Levy]; I Kuykendall, supra note 237, at 288-89.
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chiefs "reserving the rights of the people."247
Two years later the Kuleana Act allowed the commoners to
apply for title to their own kuleana.248 Due to a variety of restric-
tions,249 fewer than 30,000 acres were allotted to less than 27% of
the adult male population.250 As with the Dawes Act relative to
American Indian land ownership, the Great Mahele proved to be a
system that divested individual Hawaiians of their lands and in-
sured white access to a secure land base.2 51 Within less than forty
years foreigners owned three-fourths of all these lands.252
Dispossessed of their lands, the native inhabitants were
forced to work on their former lands for pittances.253 By 1850,
disease and the effects of cultural dislocation had reduced the Ha-
waiian population from a pre-contact population of 300,000 to
82,035.254 So great was the depopulation that the sugar companies
had to import foreign laborers from China, Japan, and the Philip-
pines to harvest the increasingly large yields of sugar cane and
pineapples.255
247. Levy, supra note 246, at 855; 1 Native Hawaiian Study Commission 262
(June 23, 1983).
248. The land could be taken from either the Crown, the Government, or the re-
maining 1.5 million acres of the kingdom. Native Hawaiian Study Commission, Vol.
I, supra note 247, at 256. In addition, the Kuleana Act withdrew the rights of com-
moners to grow crops and pasture on unoccupied lands, leaving them with only
gathering rights. Act of August 6, 1850, § 7 (1850) (Hawaii Laws 203, in Revised
Laws 1925 at 2142), cited in Levy, supra note 246, at 857.
249. "The new system required personal applications for land deeds, proof of oc-
cupancy and having 'really cultivated' the land ... and a relatively sizeable cash fee
for surveying and registering the land title." Kent, supra note 237, at 32.
250. 1 Native Hawaiian Study Comm'n, supra note 247, at 256.
251. Between 1845-1850, legislation attempted to give native fee simple title to
land. By 1852, however, foreigners had the right of ownership to thousands of
acres. Levy, supra note 246, at 856-57.
252. Theon Wright, The Disenchanted Isles xiii (1972).
253. Id. at 39.
254. At the time of Hawaii's 1850 census, the total population was 84,165. The
remaining 2,130 people were primarily adventurers and entreprenurs from Europe
and America, and laborers from Asia. Andrew Lind, Hawaii's People 6 (2nd ed.
1980).
255. The consequences of the importation of Asian laborers during this time was
to have a great impact on the Islands in the 20th century. For many decades after
their importation, Orientals were subjected to the same discrimination and
prejudices that existed on the mainland. The Organic Act annexing the Islands ex-
cluded all Orientals from citizenship. Id. at 98. Furthermore, the existence of a
large number of Asians delayed Hawaii's admission to statehood for a number of
years. Id. at 8. Hawaii's territorial legislature attempted at least 17 times to secure
Hawaii's admission to the Union, making Hawaii's case the most studied in the his-
tory of the Union. S. Rep. No. 80, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, (1959) 2 U.S. Code Cong.
and Admin. News 1350.
The Asian population, which in 1972 comprised approximately 47% of the pop-
ulation, has taken a leading role in the political and economic development of the
state. See Wright, supra note 252. See also U.S. Census, General Social and Eco-
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With land and labor assured on the Islands, the growers
turned their attention to developing secure markets for their prod-
ucts. The end of the Civil War and the resumption of sugar cane
production in the southern United States had markedly reduced
the demand for large quantities of Hawaiian sugar, plunging the is-
lands into an economic depression. To stabilize sugar markets, the
plantation oligarchy worked for passage of the Treaty of Reciproc-
ity256 between the United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom pro-
viding for the free importation of sugar to the mainland.257
In the mind of the powerful oligarchy, total economic and
political control could only be assured by the Islands' annexation
to the United States.258 The passage of the McKinley Tariff Act in
1891 disrupted the economy of the islands by imposing a tariff on
the importation of Hawaiian sugar to the United States. This ac-
tion further convinced Hawaiian business interests of the need to
annex the islands to the United States. In 1892, the islands' busi-
nomic Characteristics, Hawaii Table 97: "Labor Force Status in 1979 and Income
Characteristics in 1979 by Detailed Race: 1980," 13-68 (June 1983).
256. Treaty with Hawaii on Commercial Reciprocity, Jan. 30, 1875, United
States-Hawaii, 19 Stat. 625, T.S. No. 161. The first treaty signed between the Hawai-
ian Kingdom and the United States in 1826 was never ratified by Congress. Treaty
with Hawaii on Commerce, Dec. 23, 1826, United States-Hawaii, 3 Treaties and
Other International Acts of the United States of America 1776-1949 at 269 (Miller
ed. 1933).
The first official treaty between the two nations was signed in 1849. Treaty
with Hawaii on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Dec. 20, 1849, United States-
Hawaii, 9 Stat. 977, T.S. No.160. In addition, the Hawaiian Nation acceded to the
Convention of July 22, 1854 between the U.S. and Russia, guaranteeing the rights of
neutrals at sea. Declaration of Accession to the Principles of the Convention with
Russia of July 22, 1854, March 26, 1855, United States - Russia, 7 Treaties and Inter-
national Acts of the United States of America 1776-1949 at 121 (Miller ed. 1956)
(not subject to ratification).
257. Faced with Senate resistance to renewing the treaty, in 1883 the oligarchy
skillfully ensured its passage by lobbying the Hawaiian government to grant an at-
tractive concession as a trade-off: giving the United States exclusive entry rights to
the bay at Pearl River. Treaty with Hawaii on Commercial Reciprocity, December
6, 1884. United States - Hawaii, art. II, 25 Stat. 1399, T.S. No. 163. Whereas previous
U.S. interests in Hawaii had been limited to those few U.S. citizens reaping large
fortunes from Hawaiian lands, the Islands' fate was now securely tied to U.S. mili-
tary interests. This fact became increasingly obvious with the outbreak of the
Spanish-American War and Hawaii's convenience as fueling port for U.S. military
vessels going to Guam and the Phillipines. Kent, supra note 237, at 67. It was
through this harbor some dozen years earlier that United States and British
marines had stormed under the pretext of protecting lives of U.S. citizens and prop-
erty threatened by internal rioting. The abortive revolt had been sparked by the
oligarchy's outrageous and successful support, through "bribery, threats, and cajol-
ing," for the selection of its monarchal candidate, Kalakaua. Id. at 45. The riot was
crushed immediately by U.S. and British intervention.
258. During the late 1800s, Hawaii was economically dependent upon the United
States with more than 90% of its trade tied to the United States. Kent, supra note
237, at 59.
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ness interests secretly organized the Annexation Club to achieve
this long sought objective.259 Their objectives coincided with that
of many American political leaders who had aired proposals since
the 1840s to annex Hawaii.2 60
While lobbying Washington for annexation, the "Club" con-
tinued to solidify its hold on the Hawaiian government. In 1887
the oligarchy forced King Kalakaua to accept the "Bayonet Consti-
tution."261 This constitution considerably diluted the monarch's
authority and allowed U.S. citizens to vote in elections while disen-
franchising three out of four natives by strict property ownership
requirements.262
Four years later, Queen Liliuokalani ascended the throne and
promptly moved to revise the previous Hawaiian constitution, re-
storing popular suffrage and the monarchy's traditional powers.
Under the proposed revisions, all foreigners were to be barred
from voting unless married to an Hawaiian.263 In January, 1893,
shortly before the new constitution was to take effect, the United
States Marines overthrew the monarchy.264 Queen Liliuokalani
was tried for treason before a military court, found guilty, and
forced to abdicate. 265 The oligarchy proclaimed the Hawaiian Re-
259. Lorrin A. Thurston, Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution 249-50 (1936),
cited in 1 Native Hawaiian Study Comm'n, supra note 247, at 54.
260. Secretary of State James Blaine, openly supportive of the annexation of Ha-
waii, referred to the Islands as the "outlying district of the State of California." Id.;
2 Native Hawaiian Study Comm'n 55 (June 23, 1983).
261. Evidently King Kalakaua was forced into signing the constitution by threat
of disclosure of certain business dealings with the local oligarchy. Wright, supra
note 252, at 7.
262. The constitution required that voters hold $3,000 worth of land or possess a
$600 annual income, a very large sum for a native population still able primarily to
live off the land. Id. at 23.
263. Id. at 23-24.
264. Id. at 11-12. See 2 Native Hawaiian Study Comm'n, supra note 259, at 54-69
for a detailed chronology of events leading to the overthrow of the Kingdom.
Upon assuming office, President Grover Cleveland sent Col. John Blount to
Hawaii to investigate the overthrow of the monarchy. After reviewing Blount's re-
port, Cleveland stated in a message to Congress:
Thus it appears that Hawaii was taken possession of by the United
States forces without the consent or wish of the Government of the Is-
lands, or of anybody else as far as is shown, except by the United
States Minister [Stevens] .... [At the time of recognition, the provi-
sional government of Hawaii] was neither a government de facto or de
jure.
Wright, supra note 252, at 17.
265. In her abdication announcement, Liliuokalani wrote:
I, Liliuokalani, by the grace of God and under the constitution of the
Hawaiian Kingdom, Queen, do hereby solemnly protest against any
and all acts done against myself and the constitutional government...
That I yield to the superior force of the United States of America,
whose minister plenipotentiary, his excellency John L. Stevens, has
caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and declared
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public and drafted a new constitution which opened Crown lands
(those lands belonging to the monarchy) for sale, denied suffrage
to all except those literate in English and possessing $200 in prop-
erty,266 and precluded trial by jury.267
For the next five years, the Islands existed in a state of limbo
as annexation supporters failed to muster the required two-thirds
Senate majority for passage of the annexation treaty.268 Finally,
annexation supporters introduced a joint resolution in both houses
of Congress. The required simple majority was attained and on
August 25, 1898, in the heat of the Spanish-American War,269 Ha-
waii was officially annexed to the United States.270 Two years
that he would support the provisional government ... I do, under pro-
test and impelled by said force, yield my authority until such time as
the Government of the United States shall, upon the facts being
presented to it, undo the action of its representative reinstate me and
the authority which I claim as the constitutional sovereign of the Ha-
waiian Islands.
Cited in Liliuokalani v. United States, 45 Ct. Cl. 418, 435 (1910).
266. This meant that only one out of 16 native Hawaiians met the necessary vot-
ing requirements to vote for both Nobles and Representatives, the two houses of
the legislature. Patrick Hanifin, Hawaiian Reparations: Nothing Lost, Nothing
Owed, 17 Haw. B.J. 107, 119 (1982) [hereinafter Hawaiian Reparations]. Kent, supra
note 237, at 64. Out of a total population of approximately 90,000 people, less than
5,000 owned land. Robert Horwitz, Public Law Policy in Hawaii: Major Landown-
ers, Legislative Reference Bureau, Rept. No. 3, at 4 (1967).
267. In 1893, caucasians owned more than 80% of all privately held land. Hawai-
ian Reparations, supra note 266, at 109 n. 20 (citing Gauan Daws, Shoal of Time 128
(1968)).
268. The annexation of Hawaii was opposed by many as a serious step toward
imperialism. As Senator Stephen M. White of California, stated, "The annexation
of Hawaii will constitute the entering wedge for an imperialistic policy." Thomas
Osborne, Empire Can Wait: American Opposition to Hawaiian Annexation 1893-
1898 at 34 (1981).
The annexation instrument was not ratified by the Hawaiian electorate as oc-
curred when Texas was admitted to the Union. Only one native Hawaiian signed
the annexation documents. During the debates on annexation, Congress received a
petition from native Hawaiians expressing their opposition to annexation. Annexa-
tion, providing for popular suffrage, resulted in the election of a large number of
native Hawaiians and home rulers to the territorial legislature. Both of these
groups opposed annexation and protested by delaying bills. 1 Native Hawaiian
Study Comm'n, supra note 247, at 307-08.
269. For a discussion of the impact of the military on the annexation of Hawaii,
see Allen Hamilton, Military Strategists and the Annexation of Hawaii, 15 J. West
81 (1976).
270. Newlands Resolution, 30 Stat. 750. Native Hawaiians attempted to restore
the monarchy in 1895, but were arrested and charged with participating in a rebel-
lion. William A. Russ, The Hawaiian Republic (1894-1898) 26-34 (1961) as cited in 2
Native Hawaiian Study Comm'n, supra note 259, at 85. Two years later, native
Hawaiians petitioned Congress for a plebiscite on annexation as had occurred prior
to the annexation of Texas. Id.; 31 Cong. Rec. 6702 (1898).
For a history of this period, see Osborne, supra note 268; III Kuykendall, supra
note 237, at 523-650. For a compilation of documents associated with Hawaii's an-
nexation, see generally Lerria A. Thurston, A Handbook of the Annexation of Ha-
waii (n.d.).
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later, Congress passed an Organic Act establishing a territorial
government for the islands.271 In 1959, after Congress had consid-
ered the issue at least seventeen times, 27 2 Hawaii was admitted as
the forty-ninth state of the Union.273
Cultural Protection
The Hawaiian Kingdom and American Indian nations were
initially recognized and dealt with by the United States through
treaty relations as sovereign independent nations.274 Whereas
Congress continues to allow for tribal sovereignty and an obliga-
tory trust responsibility to tribes,275 the existence of a fiduciary re-
lationship between Hawaiian natives and the federal government
remains in dispute.276
The strongest argument in favor of a trust relationship is
based on Congress' passage of the Hawaiian Homes Commission
Act.277 The purpose of this Act is to ensure the perpetuation of a
secure land base for native Hawaiians. In this sense, Congress has
271. 48 U.S.C. § 491-2 (1952). Act of April 30, 1900, ch. 339, 31 Stat. 41.
272. In twenty four years, a House Committee had only once opposed Statehood.
Roger Bell, Last Among Equals: Hawaiian Statehood and American Politics 272
(1984).
273. 48 U.S.C. prec. § 491 (1986 Supp.) Act of March 18, 1959 (73 Stat. 4). For a
history of Hawaiian statehood, see Wright, supra note 252; Roger Bell, supra note
272 (1984).
274. See supra notes 114-116 and accompanying text.
275. See e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); Santa Clara v. Marti-
nez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975); McClanahan
v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
276. The Hawaiian courts and a number of experts have argued that Congress
possesses a trust responsibility with both Hawaiian natives and Indian tribes. See,
Linda Parker, Federal Management of Native Hawaiians, 15 J. West 92 (1976), for
a discussion of the federal government's relationship with native Hawaiians. For an
interesting discussion of the moral obligation owed to Hawaiian natives by the
United States, see Ramon Lopez-Reyes, The Demise of the Hawaiian Kingdom: A
Psycho-cultural Analysis and Moral Legacy (Something Lost, Something Owed), 18
Haw. B.J. 3 (1983). For a dissenting minority report, see 2 Native Hawaiian Study
Comm'n, supra note 259, at 84-86.
As pointed out in the update of Felix Cohen's book on Federal Indian Law, no
court has considered whether Hawaiians are considered statutorily within the term
"Indian." The courts have held that the term "Indian" includes other aborigines
such as Eskimos. Felix Cohen, Federal Indian Law, Ch. 14, § C2a at note 49 (2d
ed.). See, e.g., Pence v. Kleppe, 529 F.2d 135, 138 n.5 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Native Village of Unalakleet, 411 F.2d 1255, 1256 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
Although the Interior Department does not deal directly with native
Hawaiians, Secretary of Interior James Watt established a Federal-State Task
Force on the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act. See 1 Native Hawaiian Study
Comm'n, supra note 247, at 317-417. The Task Force issued its final report in Au-
gust 1983.
1 Native Hawaiian Study Comm'n, supra note 247, at 26-27 found that the
United States possessed no legal debts to native Hawaiians.
277. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n Act, Publ. L. No. 34, 6201, 42 Stat. 108.
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committed itself to a protection of Hawaiian (and tribal) culture,
for it is around land that the traditional Hawaiian political system,
religion, social customs, and hence culture is centered.2 78
Protection of the Land Base
"To be as one with the land [is] at the very heart of [the] cul-
ture."27 9 The very word for land expressed the people's depen-
dence upon it for their survival. Land, 'aina, "is derived from the
words 'ai, to eat or feed, and na, the act of." The people's interre-
lationship with the land is illustrated by the Kumulipo creation
chants that describe the union of mother earth and father sky. Re-
spect for the land and its bounty was traditionally observed
through "a yearly four-month long Makahiki Festival in honor of
Lono, god of agriculture."28 0
Today native Hawaiians comprise approximately 19% of the
islands' population.281 They are economically among the poorest
people in the state.282 Land is the most precious commodity on the
islands and the subject of greatest controversy within the native
Hawaiian community. 28 3 For the last sixty years, native Hawaiians
have struggled to attain access to lands set aside for their use, to
protect sacred lands held by the federal goverment, and to obtain a
fair share of revenues generated by private and public lands set
aside for their benefit.
In 1920, Congress specifically assumed trust responsibility 28 4
278. As one native Hawaiian emphasized, "When you take the land away from
them, you've cut them away from who they are." Lopez-Reyes, supra note 276, at
11.
279. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, OHA Culture Plan 3 (1982).
280. Id.
281. 1 Native Hawaiian Study Comm'n, supra note 247, at 23.
282. Approximately 30% of all native Hawaiian families live below the poverty
level. 2 Native Hawaiian Study Comm'n, supra note 259, at 151. Native Hawaiians
have the lowest life expectancy in the state, 67 years compared to 74 years, and the
highest infant mortality rate, 14 per 1,000 live births compared to 10 for the state-
wide average. Id. at 149.
283. As indicated by a study conducted by the University of Hawaii, individual
private land ownership remains elusive in Hawaii. The state currently is the larg-
est landowner, possessing almost 39% of the land. The federal government owns
another 10%. Seventy-two private landowners own another 47% of the state's land.
The remaining private landowners possess less than 5% of the state's land. Hor-
witz, supra note 266, at 12. But see Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S.
229 (1984) (state took measures to reduce the disparity of private land ownership).
284. Congress has passed a number of other pieces of legislation designed to im-
prove the lives of native Hawaiians. The Native Hawaiian Education Study, 20
U.S.C. § 1221 (Supp. 1986) established a seven-member Advisory council to recom-
mend to the Secretary of Education how the Department can better serve native
Hawaiians.
Kalaupapa National Historical Park, 16 U.S.C. § 410jj (Supp. 1986), established
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for native Hawaiians with the passage of the Hawaiian Homes
Commission Act.285 The Act established a Hawaiian Homes Com-
mission to distribute 200,000 acres of land to homeless native
Hawaiians. According to the terms of the Act, ninety-nine year
leases were to be granted to natives of at least one-half Hawaiian
blood.286
Upon Hawaii's admission to the Union,28 7 Congress trans-
ferred federal title and administrative powers over the Hawaiian
Homes Commission lands to the state. Inherent within this trans-
fer was a trust obligation to administer the lands for the benefit of
the beneficiaries. 28 8 The Department of Hawaiian Home Lands, as
a national park at Kalaupapa on Molokai. An eleven-member Advisory Commis-
sion, one of whom must be a native Hawaiian, oversees the park's operation. 16
U.S.C. § 410jj (7)(2) (Supp. 1986). The law also states that employment preference
and training positions at the park are to be given to native Hawaiians and former
patients. 16 U.S.C. § 410jj(6) (Supp. 1986).
The Hawaiian Homes Commission Act established a nine-member board to pre-
pare a report on the "culture, needs, and concerns of the Native Hawaiians."
Congress has also included native Hawaiians in a number of general laws
designed to improve the indigenous population of the United States: The Native
American Programs Act of 1974 which provided funding "to promote the goal of
economic and social self-sufficiency for American Indians, Hawaiian Natives and
Alaskan Natives." 42 U.S.C. § 2991(a) (Supp. 1986); The Drug Abuse Prevention,
Treatment and Rehabilitation Act, 21 U.S.C. § 1177(d) (Supp. 1983); and the Com-
prehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholic Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4577(c)(4) (Supp. 1986) specifically target native Hawaiians and
other indigenous peoples of the United States.
Also of considerable potential importance, especially in the protection of tradi-
tional Hawaiian religious practices, is the American Indian Religious Freedom Act,
supra note 169.
285. Fuchs, supra note 237, at 71.
286. Portrayed as liberal legislation to assist homeless native Hawaiians, the bill
was in reality an act to allow continued access to cheap lands by large plantation
owners. Involved were public lands which had been leased to large plantations and
whose leaseholds were expiring. Clauses inserted in the legislation allowed these
lands to be leased for indefinite periods, provided that no land under sugarcane pro-
duction could be leased, and also withdrew the previous limit of 1000 acres which
could be leased for production. Kent, supra note 237, at 76; Fuchs, supra note 237,
at 256-57. Ultimately, more than half the land was leased to corporations and a
fraction turned over to native peoples. Fuchs, supra note 237, at 258.
287. 48 U.S.C. § 491 (Supp. 1986).
288. Any statutory amendment to the program that reduces native rights re-
quires congressional consent, thereby leaving the United States with a residual
trust obligation. See 2 Native Hawaiian Study Commission, supra note 259, at 88.
But see Keaukaha-Panaewa Community Ass'n v. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n,
588 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 826 (1979). The United States
acknowledged its fiduciary responsibilities in its amicus curiae brief filed in
Keaukaha-Panaewa Federal Practice and Procedure III. This case and the brief are
discussed in Edmund Scott, Implying Private Rights of Action in Areas of Individ-
ual Rights, 10 Golden Gate L. Rev. 223, 238-49 (1980).
The Hawaii Supreme Court clearly upheld the Department's obligation to ad-
minister the homelands solely on behalf of native Hawaiians. Ahuna v. Dep't of
Hawaiian Home Lands, 64 Haw. 327, 640 P.2d 1161 (1982). After reviewing the his-
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it is now called within the state bureaucracy, is responsible for ad-
ministering approximately 200,000 acres.28 9 The Hawaiian Homes
Commission is comprised of seven members,290 at least three of
whom shall be descendants of "not less than one-half part of the
blood of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian islands previous to
1778."291
By 1984, the Department had leased out (in ninety-nine year
leases) approximately 2,857 residential lots and 475 ranch and farm
lots. Homesteads and commercial lots could be obtained either
through inheritance or application.292 Currently the number of
applicants is twice that of the number of available homestead
lots.293 For this reason several reports have soundly criticized the
program as unsuccessful. 294 In the mid-1970s, for example, the
tory of the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, the court concluded that the Act rep-
resented a fulfillment of the federal government's trust responsibility to the
indigenous population of Hawaii. Congress delegated this trust responsibility to the
state of Hawaii at the time of its admission to the Union; the state was therefore
required to "adhere to high fiduciary duties normally owed by a trustee to its bene-
ficiaries." 64 Haw. at 338, 640 P.2d at 1168.
The court further emphasized that the federal and state trust obligations to-
ward the native Hawaiians were analogous to the obligations toward American In-
dian and native Alaskan on the mainland.
In our opinion, the extent or nature of the trust obligations of the
appellant [Department of Hawaiian Home Lands] toward beneficiaries
such as the appellee may be determined by examining well-settled
principles enunciated by the federal courts regarding lands set aside by
Congress in trust for the benefit of other native Americans, i.e., Amer-
ican Indians, Eskimos, and Alaskan Natives.
64 Haw. at 339, 640 P.2d at 1168-1169. In Pence v. Kleppe, 529 F.2d 135 (9th Cir.
1976), the circuit court recognized that the word "Indian" is commonly used to
mean "the aborigines of America." 529 F.2d at 138-39 n.5; see also 42 C.J.S. Indians
sec. 1 (1944). Congress recently passed a Religious Freedom Act which specifically
includes native Hawaiians among American Indians. "Essentially we are dealing
with relationships between the government and aboriginal people. Reason thus dic-
tates that we draw the analogy between native Hawaiian homesteaders and other
native Americans." Ahuna, 64 Haw. at 339, 640 P.2d at 1168-69 (1982) (citations
omitted).
289. For a discussion of the Hawaiian Home Lands see Levy, supra note 246, at
876-80.
290. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n Act of 1920, 48 U.S.C. § 491 (Supp. 1986).
291. Id.
292. Hawaii Homes Comm'n Act, Haw. Rev. Stat. § 207 (1982). To be eligible for
a homestead, an individual must meet the economic guidelines and be one-half na-
tive Hawaiian. 7,050 people were on the waiting list for residential lots and 1,453
people were on the waiting list for farming or ranching lots. Department of Hawai-
ian Home Lands, 'Aina Hoopulapula, 1982-1983 Annual Report at 17-19.
293. Forty thousand people were estimated as eligible for the program in 1920.
In the sixty years of the program's existence, the Department has alloted only 3500
awards. 2 Native Hawaiian Study Comm'n, supra note 259, at 15.
294. See Levy, supra note 246 at 877. As reported in 2 Native Hawaiian Study
Comm'n, supra note 259, at 127-28, only 188,000 acres were actually set aside for
homesteading as opposed to the mandated 203,500. Another 30,000 acres were
taken without compensation by territorial governors' proclamations and executive
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Commission had leased only 20% of the land to native
Hawaiians, 295 with the remainder either leased to non-Hawaiians
or in disuse. The situation was due, in part, to an insufficiency of
funds to construct the required infrastructure of drainage, roads,
and water and sewer supplies. The money available for the land's
maintenance was partially generated by the Department's leasing
of its other lands to the highest bidder, usually non-Hawaiians. To
obtain the high return needed for maintenance, the best land is
frequently leased out and hence not available, leaving the Depart-
ment in a difficult and unpopular Catch-22 situation.296
Two other land-related circumstances play an important role
in the maintenance of Hawaiian culture. First, at the time of Ha-
waii's statehood, the United States transferred all remaining public
lands to state control (with the exception of federally held
lands)297 with the proviso that they be held under a public trust.298
The public trust was limited to five purposes, including the "bet-
orders. See id. at 126-132, for a description of various violations in the management
of this trust responsibility. It was not until 1973 that the state or territory contrib-
uted funds of any significance to the Commission. Between 1977 and 1983, the state
provided $42 million in funds in addition to those monies generated by the Commis-
sion. In spite of the recent increase in funding, it is estimated that it will take more
than $600 million and 50 years to meet the needs of the current applicants. Levy,
supra note 246, at 377-78. For a discussion of the Hawaiian Homes Commission
Programs see id. at 371-417.
295. 2 Native Hawaiian Study Comm'n, supra note 259 at 131.
296. In 1887, Congress passed the Dawes Act or Indian Allotment Act. Indian
Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887). Reservation lands were divided
into individual allotments, which could be sold by individuals after a 25-year period.
By 1934, more than two-thirds of all reservation lands had been lost as a result of
the allotment process. See Debo, supra note 112 and accompanying text.
As with Indian allotments, most kuleana were lost after the Great Mahele. See
Kalipi, infra note 310. Those that are still owned by private families possess the
same problem of fractionated ownership as current day Indian allotments. In both
cases, the land is frequently underutilized. As with Indian allotments, underutiliza-
tion can lead to loss through tax forfeiture, adverse possession, or sale. See Levy,
supra note 246, at 867-70.
297. The United States still owns approximately 459,000 acres of land in Hawaii.
Of this, 228,000 acres are administered as national parks, 60,000 acres comprise mili-
tary installations, and approximately 171,000 acres are controlled by the Defense
Department. State of Hawaii Legislative Research Bureau, Report No. 3 Public
Land Policy in Hawaii: Major Landowners 96-111 (1967).
298. As is pointed out in Comment, Hawaii's Ceded Lands, 3 U. Haw. L.Rev. 101
(1981) [hereinafter Hawaii's Ceded Lands], the federal government handled the
public lands of Hawaii in a very different manner from the public lands of previ-
ously admitted states. The Hawaiian Organic Act [an Act to provide a government
for the Territory of Hawaii, Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, § 2] limited
the benefits of the public lands (which were then held in trust by the federal gov-
ernment) to the inhabitants of Hawaii, whereas the public lands of other states are
to benefit the nation as a whole. Id. at 121. A 1979 audit of the Department of Land
and Natural Resources revealed that the Department had failed to properly dispose
of the revenue from these lands. See 2 Native Hawaiian Study Comm'n, supra note
259, at 119.
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terment" of persons of more than 50% native Hawaiian blood.299
Currently 20% of the public trust proceeds is earmarked to admin-
ister the Office of Hawaiian Affairs. 30o Second, Native Hawaiians
have received benefits from the proceeds of several large charita-
ble estates left by members of the Hawaiian royal family whose
wills stipulated that the lands and their proceeds be used for the
benefit of "Hawaiians of pure or part aboriginal blood."301 The
trustees of these estates have not directly provided lands to native
Hawaiians but have generally opted to develop the lands and di-
rect the proceeds of development to various charitable activities.3 0 2
The Bishop Estate, the largest, runs the Kamehameha Schools ed-
ucating 2,600 part-Hawaiian students in academic and vocational
subjects. 303 The Liliuokalani Trust provides for native children
services such as foster care, day care, and community development
programs. 30 4 The Lunalilo Trust provides health care for the
elderly.30 5
Another land issue of considerable importance to native
Hawaiians involves the military's ownership and use of
Kaho'olawe Island, the smallest of the eight major Hawaiian is-
lands. The island is listed on the National Register of Historical
Places and is filled with sacred meaning and history to many na-
tive Hawaiians. 306 Despite this, Kaho'olawe is used as a bombing
299. . . . as a public trust for the support of the public school and other
public educational institutions, for the betterment of the conditions of
native Hawaiians, as defined in the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act,
1920, as amended, for the development of farm and home ownership
on as widespread a basis as possible . . . for the making of public im-
provements, and for the provision of lands for public use.
Admissions Act of March 18, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-3, § 5(f), 73 Stat. 4.§ 5(f).
As in the case of the Hawaiian Homes Commission, the United States also re-
tained the authority to sue the state of Hawaii for breach of trust concerning the
management of these lands and their proceeds. As is pointed out in the above arti-
cle, no federal guidelines were issued as to the priority given to the four stated uses.
Hawaii's Ceded Lands, supra note 298, at 145.
300. In 1978-79, the state received approximately $5.4 million from these public
lands. From this amount, approximately $122,000 was given to the Hawaiian Homes
administration fund. Hawaii's Ceded Lands, supra note 298, at 141. As is discussed
in text accompanying infra note 335, the 1978 constitution reserves a pro rata share
of the public trust fund for the Office of Hawaiian Affairs.
301. In re Bishop Estate, 53 Haw. 604, 609-10, 499 P.2d 670, 674 (1972).
302. See Fuchs, supra note 237 at 17, 445.
303. In the case of the Bishop Estate, a board of trustees selected by the Hawaii
Supreme Court directs the management of these lands. Considerable controversy
has arisen in the past because of the supreme court's appointment of non-
Hawaiians to the position of trustee. See Fuchs, supra note 237, at XV; Wright,
supra note 252, at 257-60.
304. Fuchs, supra note 237, at 245.
305. See III Kuykendall, supra note 237, at 262.
306. As one author analogized, the bombing of Kaho'olawe is like bombing
Stonehenge. Lopez-Reyes, supra note 276, at 12. At a state hearing several
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site by the federal government and by other nations at the federal
government's invitation. 30 7 To date, protests and demonstrations
by native Hawaiians have not yielded results, either for a return of
the island to native control or for a cessation of military maneu-
vers in deference to the island's religious significance.30s
Recognition of Native Hawaiian Customary Law
The significance of traditional Hawaiian culture is reflected
in the importance placed upon customary law by the Hawaiian
courts and constitution.309 Traditional native gathering and access
rights are among the most important of these traditional property
rights. In Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co.,310 the Supreme Court of
Hawaii upheld the right of native Hawaiians to collect specified
plants on fee simple undeveloped land belonging to others. As the
court noted, when the Hawaiian monarch instituted the Great
Mahele 3 ll and altered Hawaiian property rights from a form of
tenancy in common to individual fee simple, the King had insisted
upon the codification of the traditional right of access and gather-
ing on undeveloped lands.312
"kupunas... testified that the island was designed as a depository of the Hawaiian
chain . . ." that in ancient times the island was divided "so that every other major
island in the chain had a central deposit point on Kaho'olawe .... [I]n other words,
Kaho'olawe performed a sacred function .... " Hawaii Legislative Committee on
Kaho'olawe, Kaho'olawi, Aloho No: A Legislative Study of the Island of
Kaho'olawe 246 (1978) as cited in Lopez-Reyes, supra note 276, at 12.
307. As Lopez-Reyes ironically points out, it is probably the only listing on the
National Register of Historical Places that is used as a bombing site. As one wit-
ness stated: "It comes down to a question of priorities: The cost of more expensive
training versus destruction of the remaining remnants of a culture." Lopez - Reyes,
supra note 276, at la. The island has been the site of sit-ins and demonstrations by
young and old Hawaiians alike, but to no avail. See Michael Haas, Politics and Prej-
udice in Contemporary Hawaii 169 (1976).
308. See United States v. Mowat, 582 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 967 (1978); Aluli v. Brown, 437 F. Supp. 602 (D. Haw. 1977), rev'd. 602 F. 2d 876
(9th Cir. 1979).
309. See Michael Anthony Town & William Wai Lim Yuen, Public Access to
Beaches in Hawaii: A Social Necessity? (1973) [hereinafter Public Access to
Beaches in Hawaii].
In In re Ashford, the court ruled that Hawaii's land laws are based on ancient
(Hawaiian) tradition, custom, practice, and usage. 50 Haw. 314, 315, 440 P.2d 76, 77
(1968). It was not until November 25, 1892 that the common law of England was
adopted as the common law of Hawaii. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 1-1 (1968).
310. 66 Haw. 1, 656 P.2d 745 (1982).
311. "In 1948 the ancient order was formally dissolved when, by what has be-
come known as The Great Mahele, the lands of the Kingdom were divided between
the chiefs and King." Id. at 7, 656 P.2d at 749.
312. After the Great Mahele, the 1859 Civil Code enacted a statute to protect the
rights of the native tenants:
Where the landlords have obtained, or may hereafter obtain, allodial
titles to their lands, the people on each of their lands shall not be de-
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The court conceded that this traditional right to enter an-
other's land conflicted with the modern conception of fee simple
protection of the land against trespass. 313 The court declared that
inconsistency with the modern land tenure system was insufficient
to extinguish traditional rights. Furthermore, the court pointed
out, the protection of traditional rights was a part of the Hawaii
State Constitution. 314 The State "shall protect all rights, customa-
rily and traditionally exercised for subsistence, cultural and reli-
gious purposes and possessed by ahupua'a tenants who are
descendants of native Hawaiians who inhabited the Hawaiian Is-
lands prior to 1778, subject to the right of the State to regulate
such rights."3 15
In Palama v. Sheehan,316 the Hawaiian Supreme Court simi-
larly upheld the traditional right-of-way of kuleana owners across
fee simple land. As the court noted, Hawaiian lands, the
ahupua'as, were historically divided from the sea to the mountain.
"Such a division enabled a chief and his people to obtain fish and
seaweed from the ocean, and fuel, canoe timber and mountain
birds, and the right of way to obtain these things." 317 The court
emphasized that the Hawaiian legal system had long recognized
this custom as the common law of the state and had codified as-
pects of the traditional Hawaiian common law.318 Relying on state
statute and judicial precedent, the court found that the custom
prived of the right to take firewood, house-timber, aho cord, thatch, or
ki leaf, from the land on which they live, for their own private use, but
they shall not have a right to take such articles to sell for profit. The
people shall also have a right to drinking water, and running water,
and the right of way. The springs of water, running water, and roads,
shall be free to all, on all lands granted in fee simple; provided that
this shall not be applicable to wells and water courses, which individu-
als have made for their own use.
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 7-1 (1976).
313. Kalipi, 66 Haw. at 4, 656 P.2d at 748.
314. Although the court upheld the traditional right of access and gathering, the
court ruled that the non-resident plaintiff was required to live within the ahupua'a.
Kalipi, 66 Haw. at 8, 656 P.2d at 749.
315. Haw. Const. art. XII, § 7, on "Traditional and Customary Rights."
316. 50 Haw. 298, 440 P.2d 95 (1968).
317. Palama, 50 Haw. at 300, 440 P.2d at 97 (citing In re Boundaries of Pulehun-
nui, 4 Haw. 239 (1879)).
318. The common law of England, as ascertained by English and Ameri-
can decisions, is declared to be the common law of the State of Hawaii
in all cases, except as otherwise expressly provided by the Constitution
or laws of the United States, or by the laws of the State, or fixed by
Hawaiian judicial precedent, or established by Hawaiian usage; pro-
vided that no person shall be subject to criminal proceedings except as
provided by the written laws of the United States or of the State.
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 1-1 (1985). See also In re Ashford, 50 Haw. 314, 440 P.2d 76 (1968).
Statutory law overrules inconsistent customary law. See Haalelea v. Montgomery, 2
Haw. 62, 65 (1858)), but custom can be employed to clarify ambiguous statutes. See,
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still held and that the defendants had a right of ingress and egress
over plaintiffs' land.319
Customary Hawaiian law has also played an extremely im-
portant role in determining state water rights, boundaries, and
property rights. In McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson,320  the
Supreme Court of Hawaii, relying on traditional Hawaiian law,
ruled that the state held the right to all running water in trust for
the Hawaiian public.321 Hence, no private party could acquire the
right to "surplus" water.322
In In re Ashford,323 the Hawaiian Supreme Court ruled that
the lower court had erred in using U.S. Geological Survey informa-
tion to determine the location of a boundary line dividing private
lands from public beaches. The boundary should be determined
using the expert testimony of Kamaaina witnesses324 knowledgea-
ble about traditional Hawaiian custom and usage. Traditional Ha-
waiian law held that the line between public and private property
rights was "the upper reaches of the wash of waves, usually evi-
denced by the edge of vegetation or by the line of debris." 325  The
influence of traditional Hawaiian law in this instance has ensured
a larger beach area to the public than in other states that follow
e.g., In re Estate of Nakuapa, 3 Haw. 342, 347-58 (1872); O'Brien v. Walker, 35 Haw.
104 (1939), aff'd 115 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 707 (1941).
In Rex v. Tin Ah Chin, 3 Haw. 90 (1869), a case in which a murder indictment
was challenged, the court stated, "our practice has leaned in favor of the common
law of England, where the same does not conflict with the laws and customs of this
Kingdom." Id. at 95.
319. 50 Haw. at 298, 440 P.2d. at 95.
320. 504 P.2d 1330, aff'd on rehg, 517 P.2d 26 (Haw. 1973), appeal dismissed sub
nom., McBryde Sugar Co. v. Hawaii, 417 U.S. 962, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
321. The court stated "that the right to water is one of the most important usu-
fruct of lands, and. . . was specifically and definitely reserved for the people of Ha-
waii for the common good in all of the land grants." 504 P.2d at 1338.
322. McBryde Sugar has been termed one of the "most significant decisions
handed down in Hawaii on the question of natural resource allocation." Public Ac-
cess to Beaches in Hawaii, supra note 309, at 15. See also Michael D. Tom, Hawai-
ian Beach Access, A Customary Right, 26 Hastings L.J. 823, 823-826 (1975).
323. 50 Haw. 314, 440 P.2d 76 (1968). For a discussion of this case, see Public Ac-
cess to Beaches in Hawaii, supra note 309.
324. As the court noted, Karnaaina witness were individuals "specially taught
and made repositories of this knowledge." In re Ashford, 50 Haw. at 316, 440 P.2d
at 77. For a further clarification of the Kamaaina witness rule, see State v. Zim-
ring, 52 Haw. 472, 479 P.2d 202 (1970); Palama v. Sheehan, 50 Haw. 298, 301, 440
P.2d 95, 97 (1968).
325. Hawaii's land laws are unique in that they are based on ancient tradition,
custom, practice and usage. Keelikolani v. Robinson, 2 Haw. 514, 519 P.2d 20 (1862).
It is not solely a question for a modern-day surveyor to determine
boundaries in a manner completely oblivious to the knowledge and in-
tention of the king and old-time kamaainas who knew the history and
names of various lands and the monuments thereof.
50 Haw. at 315-316, 440 P.2d at 77.
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the "mean high water mark" rule.326
The state courts also continue to recognize and affirm tradi-
tional Hawaiian law concerning adoption327 and domestic relations.
In Leong v. Takasaki 328 for example, the supreme court, noting
the importance of customary adoption within Hawaiian society and
culture, ruled that the lack of a blood relationship between a
young boy and his adoptive grandmother did not foreclose the
child's recovery for damages when his grandmother had been
struck and killed by an automobile. 329
Office of Hawaiian Affairs
Article 12 of the 1978 Hawaii Constitution specifically guaran-
tees traditional native rights. 330 To protect these guaranteed
rights, the 1978 constitution established the Office of Hawaiian Af-
fairs (OHA).331 Legislative history indicates that the OHA's ulti-
mate purpose is to "provide Hawaiians the right to determine
priorities which [would] effectuate the betterment of their condi-
tion and welfare and promote the protection and preservation of
the Hawaiian race, and that it [would] unite the Hawaiians as a
people."332 Comparing the history of native Hawaiians' status and
326. See Borax, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935).
327. See Peoples and Cultures of Hawaii 12-13 (John F. McDermott, Jr., Wen-
Shing Tseng, & Thomas W. Maretzki, eds., 1980) for a discussion of the importance
of extended families and customs of adoptions.
328. 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974).
329. Id. at 404, 520 P.2d at 766. See also O'Brien v. Walker, 35 Haw. 104, 128-30
(1939) wherein an adopted child, under Hawaiian custom and usage, was considered
lawful issue of adopting parent and thus was entitled to its share in a trust estate.
330. Haw. Const. art. XII.
331. Jon Van Dyke, in his article The Constitutionality of the Office of Hawai-
ian Affairs, 7 U. Haw. L.Rev. 63 (1985), discusses the constitutionality under the
equal protection clause of a state agency staffed by and established for the benefit
of native Hawaiians. The issue has been raised in two recent cases (see Hoohuli v.
Ariyoshi, 741 F.2d 1169 (9th Cir. 1984), remanded, 631 F. Supp. 1153 (D. Haw. 1984).
Trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Hong, Civ. No. 79260 (Haw. 1st Cir.,
Sept. 28, 1983)) and in regard to the constitutionality of a proposed bill to establish
a "live-in" park at Sand Island. The issue was also raised by one of the judges in In
Re Estate of Bishop, 53 Haw. 604, 499 P.2d 670 (1972). As Van Dyke points out,
although the state attorney general has concluded that OHA does not violate the
United States or Hawaii Constitution (Haw. Op. Att'y Gen. 80-8 (July 8, 1980), as
cited in Van Dyke at 64), the implications of such a question are considerable. If
the OHA is found to be unconstitutional, the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act and
a number of federal programs serving native Hawaiians would also be called into
question.
See rebuttal to Van Dyke's analysis by James Dannenberg, The Office of Ha-
waiian Affairs and the Issue of Sovereign Immunity, 7 U. Haw. L.Rev. 95 (1985).
332. Comm. of the Whole Rep. No. 13, 1 Proceedings of the Const. Convention of
Hawaii of 1978 at 1018 (1980) [hereinafter Proceedings] cited in Van Dyke, supra
note 331, at 68.
Lopez-Reyes, supra note 276, points out that prior to the overthrow, native
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rights with those of the American Indian nations on the mainland,
the delegates also emphasized that a primary objective of the Of-
fice was to further "the cause of Hawaiian self-government." 333
The OHA serves as a clearinghouse and coordinating agency
within the state government for native Hawaiian needs and is gov-
erned by a nine member board of trustees elected by native
Hawaiians of at least 50% Hawaiian ancestry.334 The OHA is
funded by 20% of all funds derived from the public lands "trust"
established in the Admissions Act.335
Among OHA's primary responsibilities are the "restoration,
rehabilitation, preservation, and perpetuation of the Hawaiian cul-
ture."336  Recently, OHA issued a CULTURE PLAN,337 which
Hawaiians enjoyed a social and economic status higher than that of Asians. Today
Hawaiians, as an ethnic group, find themselves at the lowest end of the spectrum.
For a summary of the economic, educational, and employment levels of native
Hawaiians, see Levy, supra note 246, at 11-15.
333. Proceedings, supra note 332, at 1019. The purposes of OHA include
1) The betterment of conditions of native Hawaiians; ... (2) The better-
ment of conditions of Hawaiians; (3) Serving as the principal public
agency in [the] State responsible for the performance, development,
and coordination of programs and activities relating to native
Hawaiians and Hawaiians; except that the Hawaiian Homes Commis-
sion Act, 1920, as amended, shall be administered by the Hawaiian
Homes Commission; (4) Assessing the policies and practices of other
agencies impacting on native Hawaiians [50 percent blood quantum]
and Hawaiians, and conducting advocacy efforts for native Hawaiians
and Hawaiians; (5) Applying for, receiving, and disbursing grants and
donations from all sources for native Hawaiian and Hawaiian pro-
grams and services and (6) Serving as a receptacle for reparations.
Id.
334. For the purposes of the OHA (and the HHCA), a "native Hawaiian" is de-
fined as:
any descendant of not less than one-half part of the races inhabiting
the Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778, as defined by the Hawaiian
Homes Commission Act, 1920, as amended; provided that the term
identically refers to the descendants of such blood quantum of such
aboriginal peoples which exercised sovereignty and subsisted in the
Hawaiian Islands in 1778 and which peoples thereafter continued to re-
side in Hawaii.
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 10-2 (1984). See Van Dyke, supra note 331, at 70.
Support for the OHA is evidenced in the voter turnout in the 1980 election.
More than 80% of the registered eligible native Hawaiian voters voted to elect the
nine-member board of trustees of OHA from a slate of more than 100. 1 Native Ha-
waiian Study Comm'n, supra note 247, at 66.
The constitutional delegates, citing the "unique legal status of Hawaiians,"
clearly dismissed the notion that the arrangement was discriminatory, but rather
was based on a valid political system of "the governed in the governing agency." Id.
In Kahalekai v. Doi, 60 Haw. 324, 590 P.2d 543 (1979), the Supreme Court of
Hawaii ruled Article XII defining "Hawaiian" was "not properly presented to the
public for its consideration . . . and was, therefore, not validly ratified." Id. at 555.
335. Admissions Act of March 18, 1959, supra note 299.
336. OHA Culture Plan, supra note 279, at 5.
337. Id.
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specifically listed a number of important objectives in the preser-
vation of Hawaiian culture338 and proposed policies to attain these
objectives. Included are policies designed to maximize and pre-
serve traditional land use;3 3 9 preserve historic and culturally sig-
nificant Hawaiian sites; 340 promote, finance and manage Hawaiian
arts;341 promote and preserve Hawaiian language and literature in
the community and public school systems;342 promote and support
traditional Hawaiian celebrations and sporting events;34 3 preserve
and support research into traditional Hawaiian healing prac-
tices;344 and advocate and support a better understanding of tradi-
tional Hawaiian religious practices and rights.345
As indicated above, one of the basic goals of OHA is preserv-
ing and promoting the Hawaiian language.346 Hawaii is currently
the only state with an official bilingual language policy:347 "Eng-
lish and Hawaiian shall be the official languages of Hawaii... ,"348
Article X further mandates the state to "promote the study of Ha-
338. The Plan defined culture as:
that which a given society knows or believes in order to function in a
manner acceptable to its members. Culture is the summation of a soci-
ety's learning and knowledge, structured in an organized manner, to-
gether with the processes and patterns that are created by the
interaction of people and ideas.
Id.
339. Id. at 6.
340. Id. at 9-11. For a discussion of the federal and state laws in existence en-
acted to preserve sites of historic and cultural importance within Hawaiian culture,
see 1 Native Hawaiian Study Comm'n, supra note 247, at 203-13. As the Study
points out, the State Historic Preservation Plan has not been implemented into law.
Very frequently, an area of cultural or religious significance to native Hawaiians
does not meet the more exacting requirements of state and federal programs. Id. at
212-13.
341. OHA Culture Plan, supra note 279 at 12-14.
342. Id. at 15.
343. Id. at 17.
344. Id. at 19.
345. Id. at 20. "The Hawaiian religion was the first aspect of our culture to be
suppressed. It is today the least understood dimension of the culture. As we shed
light on religious and ceremonial practices, we will choose more freely how we live
our lives." Id. at 21. For a discussion of native Hawaiian religion, see Levy, supra
note 246, at 225-49.
346. For a discussion of the importance of the Hawaiian language to the survival
of the Hawaiian culture, see 1 Native Hawaiian Study Comm'n, supra note 247, at
173-91.
347. The Organic Act incorporating Hawaii into the Union as a Territory made
English the official language and banned the use of Hawaiian in the schools and
administration of government. As Wright reports, supra note 252 at 24, this created
considerable confusion in the operation of the government. The appointed gover-
nor spoke no Hawaiian and most of the elected Home Rulers (those against annexa-
tion to the United States) were native speakers who showed their displeasure at
annexation by refusing to communicate or pass laws in English.
348. Haw. Const. art. XV, § 4. Official notices and transactions are not required
to be published in Hawaiian "except as ... provided by law."
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waiian culture, history and language . . . [and] shall provide for a
Hawaiian education program consisting of language, culture and
history in the public schools." 349 Pursuant to this mandate, the
state established the Hawaiian Studies Program designed to teach
the language, history, culture, and values of the traditional Hawai-
ian culture.350
OHA was also created to serve as a repository for an antici-
pated, but subsequently denied, federal reparation award.35 1 On
June 27, 1974, a bill was introduced into the House of Representa-
tives "to provide for the settlement of historic claims of the Hawai-
349. Haw. Const. art. X, § 4. "The use of community expertise shall be en-
couraged as a suitable and essential means in futherance of the Hawaiian education
program." Id. The state has elaborated upon this trust obligation by passing special
legislation for compensatory education programs "directed primarily to the educa-
tional improvement of the children of lessees." 1 1965 Haw. Sess. Laws, at 6, 8
(amending Haw. Const., Hawaii Homes Comm'n Act, § 213(b)(7)) 1 Haw. Rev. Stat.
(1920).
350. Approximately 30% of the program's efforts have been directed at teaching
elementary school children the Hawaiian language. Teachers are hired among the
native-speaking elders (kupuna). According to the findings of 1 Native Hawaiian
Study Comm'n, supra note 247, at 128, the program has remained stagnant due to
underfunding.
In addition to the Hawaiian Homes Commission and the OHA, the state ad-
ministers a number of special programs for native Hawaiians in the areas of health,
education, housing, employment, among others. See id. at part I.
351. Queen Liliuokalani attempted unsuccessfully to obtain redress in the Court
of Claims in 1910. See Liliuokalani v. United States, 45 Ct. Cl. 418 (1910).
ALOHA (Aboriginal Lands for Hawaiian Ancestry), founded to fight for the
passage of an Hawaiian reparations bill, achieved the introduction of the Hawaiian
Native Claims Settlement Act, H.R. 15666, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). The original
bill proposed that an Hawaiian Native Fund of $1 billion, administered by the Sec-
retary of Interior, be established. An Hawaiian Native Corporation elected by all
full and part-blood Hawaiians would oversee the distribution of funds. Such funds
could be used for the purchase of additional lands for rural and urban homestead
use, community development projects, to finance construction of homes on Hawai-
ian Home Lands, and to resolve the fractionated kuleana problem. The Office of
Hawaiian Affairs has argued that Hawaiians are entitled to the present value of the
former Crown and Government lands of the Hawaiian monarchy-over 1.75 million
acres. Hawaiian Reparations, supra note 266, at 1.
Lopez-Reyes, supra note 276, at 3, points out that the admission of wrong is an
extremely important aspect within Hawaiian culture, i.e., the practice of hoopono-
pono, which means "to make right, to correct, restore, and maintain good relation-
ships among the family." Id. at 19. Until the admission of a wrong, harmony
within the community and the soul cannot be restored. Considered within a cul-
tural context, the admission of wrong is of great importance in restoring to native
Hawaiians the dignity and respect of their cultural heritage. (Unfortunately, the
United States frequently finds it easier to make monetary payments with no admis-
sion of guilt.)
The Office of Hawaiian Affairs, in its study "Towards Reparations/Restitu-
tions", lists as its first priority: "The first step towards reparation should be a clear
acknowledgement of the United States' responsibility for the overthrow of the Ha-
waiian native government in 1893." I&
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ian Natives." 352 Following a number of hearings, Congress created
a Native Hawaiian Study Commission in 1980 with the mandate to
"conduct a study of the culture, needs, and concerns of the Native
Hawaiians; the nature of the wrong committed against, and the ex-
tent of .injuries to, the Native Hawaiians by reason of the actions
set forth in the findings of this bill; and various means to remedy
such wrong. ... "353 The Final Report, issued twenty-one months
later, concluded that the United States possessed no legal or moral
responsibility for the actions of United States officials in the over-
throw of the Hawaiian Kingdom and that native Hawaiians had no
legal rights to reparations.35 4
Congress' failure to provide reparations for native Hawaiians
represents a considerable set-back to the native Hawaiian people
in their struggle to preserve their culture, identity, and lands.
Reparations funds would have provided increased monies for land
purchases, educational and social service programs, and economic
development. Perhaps more importantly, an admission of wrong,
whether of a moral or legal nature, would prove of immeasurable
psychological benefit, infusing Hawaiian natives with a new sense
of spirit and hope.
Despite similarities in their historical relationship with the
United States, native Hawaiians and American Indians currently
have vastly different legal positions and rights. Congressional rec-
ognition of inherent tribal sovereignty and rights of self-govern-
ment provide American Indians with a solid legal foundation from
which to demand protection of their cultural heritage. Native
Hawaiians, on the other hand, are not recognized by Congress as
possessing vestiges of nationhood, a defined federal relationship, or
legal claims beyond land protection. 355
Native Hawaiians have therefore been forced to rely on the
352. Hawaiian Native Claims Settlement Act, H.R. 15666, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974). Currently no law exists by which Hawaiians may sue the federal govern-
ment for damages. The court of claims is limited to hearing claims against the fed-
eral government when a "petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim
first accrues." 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (1970). Hence, native Hawaiians, like native Alas-
kans, would require special legislation passed through Congress. As is the case
with Alaska, the Hawaiian Organic Act left open the question of future land claim
settlements. Citing Robert Jones, "A History of the Alaskan Native Claims," April
20, 1973 at 31 (unpublished study for Congressional Reference Service, in Library of
Congress), reported in A Joint Resolution Establishing the Hawaiian Aboriginal
Claims Settlement Study Commission, and for Other Purposes, Hearings on S. 155
Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1976).
353. Pub. L. No. 96-565, Title III, § 303(c) (1980). Hawaiian Reparations, supra
note 266, at 108.
354. 1 Native Hawaiian Study Comm'n, supra note 247.
355. See Lopez-Reyes, supra note 276, at 3.
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Hawaiian state government to guarantee their rights. Contrary to
the plight of American Indians, whose greatest threats lie at the
state level,356 the state of Hawaii has evinced a willingness to im-
plement programs for the protection of native culture and lan-
guage (with less success in the area of land rights). The Hawaii
Constitution is the only state constitution recognizing aboriginal
rights357 and a language other than English as an official
language. 358
IV. Chicanos 359
[T]he worst violence has been the unrelenting discrimination
against the cultural heritage-the language and customs--of
the Mexican American, coupled with the economic exploita-
tion of the entire group. 360
Historical Background and the Fight Against
Discrimination
A generation before the Pilgrims landed in New England, the
first Spanish settlers immigrated to what is now the United
States.361 Intermarriage with the local Indian population produced
an amalgamation of the two cultures-European in language and
religion, but more Indian in family relations.362
In 1819, Mexico granted U.S. citizens permission to immigrate
to what is now the state of Texas-a move which culminated in
Texas' rebellion and independence from Mexico in 1836. Ten
years later, the United States declared war on Mexico. 363 The
356. As the courts have recognized, states present the greatest threat to tribes as
they seek to gain control over tribal resources and jurisdiction.
357. Haw. Const. art. XII, § 7.
358. Haw. Const. art. XV, § 4. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959).
359. See supra note 3.
360. Stephen Steinberg, The Ethnic Myth: Race, Ethnicity, and Class in America
24 (1981).
361. For almost 20 years before the establishment of Jamestown, Santa Fe had
been the capital of "Nuevo Santander," or New Mexico. For an overview of Chi-
cano history, see Rudolfo Acuna, Occupied America: The Chicanos' Struggle To-
ward Liberation (1972); Howard R. Lamar, The Far Southwest: A Territory History
(1966); Armando B. Rendon, Chicano Manifesto (1971); Robert Rosenbaum, Mexi-
can Resistance in the Southwest (1981); Mario Barrera, Race and Class in the
Southwest (1979).
362. Government officials and the courts (and Chicanos themselves) have vari-
ously characterized Chicanos as a "race" and a "culture." Although anthropologists
estimate Chicanos to possess approximately 80% Indian blood, they have never
been classified as Indian-testimony to the distinguishing nature of Chicano
culture.
363. Randon, supra note 361, at 21-23; Samuel Eliot, Henry Steele Commanger,
& William E. Leuchtenburg, 1 A Concise History of the American Republic, to
1877, 237-43 (1983).
[Vol. 5:267
1987] CULTURAL RIGHTS: A CONFLICT OF VALUES 329
United States easily won the war, conquering a region composed of
California, New Mexico, and parts of Colorado, Arizona, and Ne-
vada.364 In the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 36 5 Mexico ceded
about one half its total land mass to the United States, an area the
size of Germany and France combined. In Articles VIII and IX of
the treaty, the United States guaranteed the property366 and reli-
gious 367 rights of the approximately 80,000 inhabitants living in the
364. Steinberg, supra note 360. Of the total Spanish speaking population, those
of Mexican origin total 6.3 million and comprise 16% of the population of Califor-
nia, 18% in Texas, 40% in New Mexico, 19% in Arizona, and 13% in Colorado. Din-
nerstein & Reimers, supra note 77, at 94. As revealed by the 1980 census, people of
Hispanic origins are expected to surpass the Black population and become the larg-
est minority before the end of the century. N.Y. Times, May 26, 1982, § III, 4, col. 3.
In many areas of the nation, Hispanics will form the majority population. Los An-
geles, with a current population of more than one million Hispanics, is the largest
Mexican ancestry population in the world after Mexico City. Id.
365. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, T.S. 207, 9 Stat. 922. See also William Malloy,
Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements 1107-1120
(1910).
366. In the said territories, property of every kind, now belonging to Mexi-
cans not established there, shall be inviolably respected. The present
owners, the heirs of these, and all Mexicans who may hereafter ac-
quire said property by contract, shall enjoy with respect to it guaran-
ties equally ample as if the same belonged to citizens of the United
States.
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, T.S. 207, 9 Stat. 922, Article VIII; Malloy, supra at
1112.
The United States suppressed the tenth article of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hi-
dalgo (which dealt with the land rights of Mexican citizens). In a Statement of Pro-
tocol signed after the Treaty, the United States emphasized that it:
did not in any way intend to annul the grants of lands made by Mexico
in the ceded territories. These grants . . . preserve the legal value
which they may possess and the grantees may cause their legitimate
(titles) to be acknowledged before the American tribunals.
Conformable to the law of the United States, legitimate titles to
every description of property, personal and real, existing in the ceded
territories, or those which were legitimate titles under the Mexican
law of California and New Mexico up to the 13th of May, 1846, and in
Texas up to the 2nd of March, 1836.
Anthony Dworkin & Rosalind Dworkin, The Minority Rights Report 170 (1976).
367. Article IX guaranteed to Mexican citizens choosing to remain in the ceded
lands "the enjoyment of all the rights of citizens of the United States according to
the principles of the Constitution; and in the meantime shall be maintained and
protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty and property, and secured in the
free exercise of their religion without restriction." Malloy, supra note 365, at 1112.
In 1969, a class action suit was brought on behalf of Mexican-Americans and
the poor against the state and city boards of education for the reapportionment of
the boards of education and for the teaching of all subjects in both English and
Spanish in public schools. The suit argued that Articles VIII and IX and the Proto-
col of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo had guaranteed the teaching of Spanish.
The court ruled that the plaintiffs had failed to define a proper class and that the
plaintiffs' reliance on the Treaty was misplaced. Tijerina v. Henry, 48 F.R.D. 274
(D.N.M. 1969), dismissed, 398 U.S. 922 (1970) (but see dissenting opinion by Justice
Douglas). Numerous authors, however, have contended that the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo guaranteed the cultural autonomy of Chicanos. "In the compe-
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newly acquired area.368
Articles VIII and IX notwithstanding, the Chicanos were
soon dispossessed of their lands369 and subjected to varying de-
grees of discrimination, bigotry, harassment, and, in many in-
stances, violence.370 Chicanos experienced the least discrimination
in New Mexico. In many local communities of New Mexico, they
continued their long-standing involvement in political affairs. Un-
til the 1920s, Spanish and English were recognized as co-official
languages of this state, with all state documents printed in Span-
ish. The United States, however, did not admit either New Mexico
or Arizona to statehood until the Anglos had attained a majority.
In Colorado and Arizona, the Mexican community was tolerated
although it remained separate from the white community. In
Texas and California, toleration turned to discrimination, bigotry,
and repression. Chicanos fought back, sprinkling the history of
the west with bloody protests and rebellions.371
Beginning in the 1940's and increasing dramatically in the
1960's and 1970's, Chicanos switched their battles from the streets
tition for land and for control over other resources, the guarantees of cultural au-
tonomy and property rights of the Spanish-speaking inhabitants contained in the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo were forgotten." Derrick Bell, Race, Racism and
American Law 78 (1973). "Lynn Perigo in The American Southwest, summarizes
the guarantees of Articles VIII and IX, writing, 'In other words, beside the right
and duties of American citizenship, they [the Mexicans] would have some special
privileges derived from their previous customs in language, law, and religion.'"
Acuna, supra note 361, at 176. See also Lance Liebman, Ethnic Relations in
America 111 (1982).
368. Article VIII of the Treaty provided a one-year grace period for those wish-
ing to return to Mexico. (Most elected to stay.) These same articles were incorpo-
rated five years later in the Gadsden Treaty which provided for the United States'
purchase of some 45,532 square miles (falling mainly within the present states of
Arizona and New Mexico) of disputed boundary lands resulting from the use of
faulty maps under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Gadsden Treaty, T.S. No. 208,
10 Stat. 1031. See P.N. Garber, The Gadsden Treaty (1923); Malloy, supra note 365,
at 1121-25.
369. See, e.g., Associacion de Raclamantes v. United Mexican States, 735 F.2d
1517 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (opinion dismissing claims for compensation). See also Rosen-
baum, supra note 361, who argues that the dispossession of Mexican lands in the
southwest was a primary cause of the violence and hostilities between Anglos and
Mexicans in the late 1800s and early 1900s.
370. See, e.g., Randon, supra note 361, at 71; Rosenbaum, supra note 361; James
Stuart Olson, The Ethnic Dimensions in American History 313-27 (1981); A Docu-
mentary History of the Mexican Americans (Wayne Moquin ed. 1971).
371. See Rosenbaum, supra note 361, for an account of these hostilities. Serious
discrimination continued into the 20th century. In June 1943, mobs roamed the
Mexican community of Los Angeles, savagely beating and stabbing Mexicans and
some Blacks. The police never intervened except to take part in the rampage
which lasted for a week. See Stanley Coben, The Failure of the Melting Pot, in The
Great Fear: Race in the Mind of America 144, 153 (Gary Nash & Richard Weiss eds.
1970).
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to the courtrooms like the Blacks who preceded them. Blacks had
at their disposal significant legislation including the thirteenth,
fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments and the 1866 Civil Rights
Act372-passed specifically for emancipation from slavery and for
protection against discrimination.3 7 3 Later the Civil Rights Act of
1957,374 1960,375 and 1964,376 the Voting Rights Act of 1965,377 and
amendments of 1970,378 1975,379 and 1982,380 the Fair Housing Act
of 1968,381 and Title VIII of the higher education amendments of
1972382 were passed by Congress to ensure fair treatment for all
minorities.
In the early days of Chicano legal activism it was unclear
which of these laws, especially those passed in the 1800s, were ap-
plicable to Chicanos. There were two major obstacles to the suc-
cessful use of these avenues of legal redress. First, there was the
manner in which the courts variously characterized Chicanos-as a
racial group, white38 3 or non-white, 38 4 or as a separate identifiable
group385-and how the particular designation would dictate the
372. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
373. See Bell, supra note 367, for a discussion of the Blacks' use of the legal sys-
tem to overcome discrimination.
374. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1964, 1971, 1975(d) (1970)).
375. Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1971, 1974 note, 1975 (1960)).
376. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975, 2000 (1964)).
377. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 446 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974(e) (1982).
378. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314-19
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982)).
379. Voting Rights Act Amendment of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400-406
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982)).
380. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131-35
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982)).
381. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3606 (1970)).
382. Title VIII of the Education Amendment Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86
Stat. 371 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1651 (1972), §§ 1651-1656 (Supp. 1973)).
383. Mendez v. Westminster School District, 64 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Cal. 1946),
aff'd, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947); Ross v. Eckels, Civil No. 10444 (S.D. Tex. May 24,
1971).
384. It was not until 1930 that the Bureau of the Census first officially recog-
nized Hispanics as a distinct group. They, however, were listed as non-white along
with Negro, Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, and all others. Fifteenth Census of
the United States: 1930, Population Vol. II, at 32, 58-59 (1933). The 1960 census ret-
roactively revised the 1930 census, classifying Mexican under white. 2 U.S. Sum-
mary: Characteristics of Populations 35 (1980).
385. See, e.g., Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Ind. School Dist., 330 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D.
Tex. 1971); Tasby v. Estes, 517 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 939
(1975); Keyes v. School Dist., 455 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 404 U.S.
1036 (1972); Alvarado v. El Paso School Dist., 593 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1979); United
Law and Inequality
statutes and doctrines available to them. A review of court cases
since 1940 reveals that the courts have variously defined Chicanos
in both racial and "ancestry" or "national origin" terms.386 Sec-
ond, Chicanos had not by and large been subject to "official" dis-
crimination. Mindful of relations with Mexico, few southwestern
states had passed outright de jure discriminatory laws. De facto
segregation, inferior schooling,38 7 and discrimination in the admin-
istration of justice38 8 and employment,389 were nonetheless a fact
of life in a number of southwestern states.
Chicanos sought first to improve the quality of their chil-
dren's education. The first Chicano desegregation case came
twenty-four years before the Brown 390 ruling. In Independent
School District v. Salvatierra,391 a Texas appellate court ruled that
the section of the 1876 Texas constitution mandating separate
schools for white and Black children 392 did not authorize segrega-
tion of Mexican Americans. Seven years before Brown, in West-
minster School District of Orange County v. Mendez,3 93 the
California Supreme Court found the state guilty of violating the
due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment by "enforcing the segregation of school children of Mexican
descent against their will and contrary to the laws of Califor-
nia."394 The court did not rule that segregation of Chicanos was
States v. Texas, 680 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1982); Soria v. Oxnard School Dist., 386 F.
Supp. 539 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
386. See supra notes 383-85 and accompanying text.
387. See Jorge C. Rangel & Carlos M. Alcala, Project Report: De Jure Segrega-
tion of Chicanos in Texas Schools, 7 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 307 (1972); U.S. Com-
mission on Civil Rights, Toward Quality Education for Mexican Americans, Report
VI: Mexican American Education Study (February 1974).
388. See Lorenzo Arizedondo & Donato Tapia, El Chicano Y the Constitution:
The Legacy of Hernandez v. Texas: Grand Jury Discrimination, 6 U.S.F.L. Rev. 129
(1971); U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Mexican Americans and the Administration
of Justice in the Southwest (March 1970); The Mexican American and the Law
(Carlos Cortes ed. 1974).
389. See generally Mexican American Leg. Def. and Educ. Fund, The Forgotten
Minority (1971).
390. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 298 (1954).
391. 33 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 580 (1931). The
ruling struck down only the practice of segregating Chicano children, but sanc-
tioned separate schools where language barriers precluded a uniform curriculum.
The ruling therefore had little effect and it was another 18 years before a federal
district court order, Delgado v. Bastrop Indep. School Dist., Civ. No. 388 (W.D. Tex.,
June 15, 1948), forced the state to repudiate the segregation of Mexican-American
children as official state policy. See discussion of cases in Rangel & Alcala, supra
note 387, at 311-12.
392. Tex. Const. art. 7, § 7 (1876).
393. 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947).
394. Id. at 781. As the court noted, California was not legally barred from pass-
ing legislation to segregate Mexican-Americans. The legislature had passed, how-
ever, only laws segregating Indians and Orientals. Id. at 780.
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unconstitutional per se, only that California had not legislated a
segregationist policy for Chicanos. 395
In the Mexican-American desegregation cases preceding
Brown, Chicanos were successful because state laws provided only
for the segregation of Blacks and whites and Chicanos were char-
acterized as "white." In Brown the Court ruled that "racial dis-
crimination in public education is unconstitutional. '"396 To apply
the Brown decision to Chicanos, courts would either have had to
characterize Chicanos as a separate race or to extend the equal
protection clause to include culturally distinct minorities.397
Due to this confusion-whether to regard Chicanos as a race,
white or non-white, or as a separate class based on culture and an-
cestry-it was another sixteen years before the Brown ruling was
specifically applied to Chicanos. Citing the distinctive physical,
cultural, linguistic, religious, and Spanish-surname characteristics
of Mexican-Americans, the federal district court in Cisneros v.
Corpus Christi Independent School District398 ruled that "Mexi-
can-American students were an identifiable, ethnic-minority class
sufficient to bring them within the protection of Brown.' 39 9 Other
successful school desegregation decisions followed.400
Discriminatory treatment of Chicanos in the administration
395. "Therefore, conceding for the argument that California could legally enact a
law authorizing the segregation as practiced, the fact stands out unchallengeable
that California has not done so .... Id. at 781.
396. 349 U.S. 298, 299 (1954) (emphasis added). Racial discrimination was sub-
jected to the "strictest scrutiny," the most stringent test possible, with burdens
placed on the defendants to disprove discriminatory actions. See, e.g., Hunter v. Er-
ickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLauglin v. Flor-
ida, 397 U.S. 184 (1964); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
397. In Hernandez v. Brown, 347 U.S. 475 (1953), the Court appeared to regard
Mexican-Americans as a separate group based on ancestry. In deciding the case,
the Court considered the segregation of Chicanos in school as evidence of their
existence as an identifiable minority group in regard to jury selection. Id. at 481.
For further discussion of the case see infra notes 402-403 and accompanying text.
398. 324 F. Supp. 599, 604 (S.D. Tex. 1970), modified, 467 F.2d. 142 (5th Cir.
1972), aff'd, 330 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D. Tex. 1971) cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973).
Chapa v. Odem Indep. School Dist., Civil No. 66-C-92 (S.D. Tex. July 29, 1967) was
the first post-Brown finding of de jure segregation of Chicanos.
399. Cisneros, 324 F. Supp. at 606 (S.D. Tex. 1970). The court first reasoned that
Brown meant public education should be available to all students despite their "be-
ing of a particular race, color, national origin, or some readily identifiable, ethnic-
minority group, or class .... Id. at 604.
The court pointed to the distinctive language, religion, and culture of Mexican-
Americans, and appeared to regard Mexican-Americans as a cultural rather than
racial minority. Id. at 606-07 n.30.
400. See, e.g., United States v. Austin Ind. School Dist., Civil No. A-70-CA-80
(W.D. Tex. June 28, 1971); Tasby v. Estes, 517 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 939 (1975); Alvarado v. El Paso School Dist., 593 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Texas, 680 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1982); Soria v. Oxnard School Dist.
386 F. Supp. 539 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
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of justice was also rampant in many parts of the southwest. Chica-
nos were tried by juries lacking minority representation, were sub-
jected to excessive force by law enforcement personnel, received
stiffer sentences than other groups, and suffered inadequate police
protection. 401 In Hernandez v. Texas,402 the Supreme Court cate-
gorically rejected the argument that the fourteenth amendment
applied only to "Whites and Negroes" and overturned the murder
conviction of a Mexican-American on the grounds that persons of
similar ancestry had been systematically excluded from service as
jury commissioners. 40 3 The Court stopped short, however, of spe-
cifically referring to Mexican-Americans as a separate identifiable
class. Finally, in a similar case,40 4 the Supreme Court emphasized
that it was no longer open to dispute that Mexican-Americans
were a clearly identifiable class,405 and overturned the conviction
of a Mexican-American defendant on the grounds of discrimina-
tion in the grand jury selection.
Confusion concerning the proper characterization of Chica-
nos-as a race, national origin, or separate class-is most evident
in employment discrimination cases. Also of importance to Chi-
cano employment rights is the relationship between language and
national origin discrimination. Employment discrimination suits
can be based on sections 1981 and 1982 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act
and/or Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Sections 1981406 and
401. See Mexican Americans and the Administration of Justice in the South-
west, supra note 388.
402. 347 U.S. 475 (1953). Hernandez was the first Mexican-American case heard
by the Supreme Court.
403. Id. at 478. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1885), the Supreme
Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment was not confined to citizens, but ap-
plied to all "without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality."
See also Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 242 (1895); United States v.
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 695 (1898); Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
404. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). As the Supreme Court stated in
Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 400, 413 (1944), the fourteenth amendment forbids any
discrimination against a race in the selection of a grand jury, but does not entitle
defendants to a proportional representation of their race on a jury. As the Court
reaffirmed in Cassell v. State of Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950), "[a]n accused is entitled
to . . . a jury in the selection of which there has been neither inclusion nor exclu-
sion because of race." Id. at 287. See also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
But see Alvarado v. Alaska, 486 P.2d 891 (Alaska 1971).
405. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 (1977).
406. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every state and territory to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is en-
joyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exaction of every kind and no other.
(emphasis added).
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1982407 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act guarantee that all citizens shall
have the same rights as are "enjoyed by white citizens." The suc-
cess of Chicanos in suing under sections 1981 and 1982 of the 1866
Civil Rights Act has been mixed.408 Some courts have held that
the 1866 Act must be construed as applying only to racial
groups.409 In several of these decisions, the judges have ruled that
Hispanics are white410 and therefore not covered by the Act.
Other courts have considered Chicanos to constitute a racial
group 411 and hence to be protected by the terms of the Act. A
third group of decisions has held that the line between race and
national origin is difficult to determine and that the Act applies to
identifiable or national origin groups as well as racial groups.41
2
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion or national ori-
gin.413 Whereas the courts have held firmly that they will not al-
407. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976) provides: "All citizens of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens
thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal prop-
erty." (emphasis added).
408. In 1968, the Court held that section 1982 prohibited private racial discrimi-
nation with regards to the actions listed in the statute. Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409 (1968). Seven years later, the Court extended the Jones reasoning to
section 1981, thereby providing a remedy against racial discrimination in private
employment. Johnson v. R. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975). Both of these de-
cisions considerably strengthened the protections available to racial minorities
against discrimination, primarily in the area of business relations and the adminis-
tration of justice. One commentator points out that sections 1981 and 1982 are
broader in coverage and relief, provide longer statutes of limitations, and less strin-
gent exhaustion of remedies than Title II and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Patricia Servati, Mexican-Americans: Are They Protected by the Civil Rights
Act of 1866? 20 Santa Clara L. Rev. 889 n.10 (1980).
409. The Supreme Court in dicta has characterized the scope of section 1981 and
1982 protections in terms of "racial" equality. See, e.g., Johnson v. R. Express
Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427
U.S. 273, 287; Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791 (1966).
410. See, e.g., Vera v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 448 F. Supp. 610 (M.D. Pa. 1978);
Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corp., 68 F.R.D. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
411. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Stanford Applied Eng'g Inc., 597 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir.
1979).
For a discussion of Chicanos as properly fitting the intent of the 1866 Civil
Rights Act, see Gary A. Greenfield & Don Kates, Jr., Mexican Americans, Racial
Discrimination, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 63 Calif. L. Rev. 662 (1975) and
Servati, supra note 408.
412. See, e.g., Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968, 970-72 (10th Cir.
1979); Budinsky v. Corning Glass Works, 425 F. Supp. 786, 788 (W.D. Pa. 1977). For
a discussion and listing of cases following these three approaches, see Ortiz v. Bank
of America, 547 F. Supp. 550, 559-565 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
413. In Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973) the Court held that an em-
ployer's refusal to hire an applicant because of her lack of United States citizenship
did not fall within the prohibitions of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act against
employment discrimination on the basis of national origin, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-
2(a)(1)(1970). "National origin," according to the Court, "refers to the country
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low employment discrimination on the basis of national origin or
ancestry,4 14 they have been less firm in protecting against discrimi-
nation on the basis of language.
The courts have created two tests to assist in a determination
of national origin discrimination. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,415
the Supreme Court formulated the "disparate impact" test. Previ-
ously, it had been necessary to prove discriminatory intent. Under
the Griggs test, a plaintiff needed only to show that certain prac-
tices had an adverse impact upon a protected class.4 16 The em-
ployer's primary defense lies in proving that the practice in
question is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) or is job
related.
The second test is referred to as the "immutable/mutable
characteristics" rule.417 Immutable characteristics are accidents of
birth that cannot be altered such as race, sex, and national origin.
Mutable characteristics are considered alterable characteristics,
such as hair length (as opposed to sex) and citizenship (as opposed
to national origin). 418
The courts' application of disparate impact and immutable/
mutable characteristics tests in employment based language dis-
crimination cases attests to the legal system's high regard for Eng-
lish as the unofficial language of the United States and the courts'
inability or refusal to equate language discrimination with national
origin discrimination.419 In general, the courts have found discrim-
ination on the basis of language only in the most blatant instances.
where a person was born, or, more broadly, the country from which his or her an-
cestors came." Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 88. See also Guerra v. Manchester Terminal
Corp., 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974).
414. See, e.g., Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974).
415. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
416. 401 U.S. at 427. See United States v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 6 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 939 (D. Ariz. 1973) (required high school diploma require-
ment and general aptitude test suspended because of unjustified discriminatory im-
pact on Mexican-Americans and Indians).
417. This test was first defined by the courts in Willingham v. Macon Telegraph
Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975). See John Wm. Aniol, Language Dis-
crimination Under Title VII: The Silent Right of National Origin Discrimination,
15 J. Marshall L. Rev. 667 (1982); Manuel del Valle, Hispanic Language Rights and
Due Process, N.Y.L.J., July 30, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
418. Stephen Cutler argues in A Trait-Based Approach to National Origin
Claims Under Title VII, 94 Yale L.J. 1164 (1985), that the courts' current manner of
interpreting national origin discrimination cases allows employers to reject less as-
similated members of a particular national origin and hire the more assimilated
member and not be guilty of discrimination. As the author aptly points out, this is
discrimination on the basis of national origin and is a subtle method of requiring
assimilation still protected against a finding of discrimination.
419. New Rider v. Board of Educ., 480 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1097 (1973).
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For example, the courts have ruled that an employer does not
have the right to require employees to speak English during work
breaks.420 In most other cases, the courts have ruled in favor of
the employer, finding the English-only rule to be in line with
"business requirements." In Vasquez v. McAllen Bag & Supply
Co.,421 the Fifth Circuit denied the appeal of a Spanish-speaking
truck driver charging national origin discrimination on the basis of
language. Vasquez was denied re-hiring after the company insti-
tuted an English-speaking requirement. The court ruled that the
defendant had to prove both discriminatory impact and intent.
Although 85% of the region's inhabitants were of Mexican-Ameri-
can origin and 60% spoke only Spanish, the court ruled that the
English requirement was in line with the requirements of the
business.4 22
In Garcia v. Gloor,423 a federal appellate court upheld the
dismissal of a Spanish-speaking employee for answering another
Spanish-speaking employee in Spanish on company time. As in
the Vasquez case, Mexican-Americans constituted 75% of the local
population.424 Although an expert witness testified that the Span-
ish language "is the most important aspect of ethnic identification
for Mexican-Americans, and it is to them what skin color is to
others," 42 5 the court refused to find that language was in essence
an immutable characteristic. "National origin," the court wrote,
"must not be confused with ethnic or sociocultural traits .... "426
The courts' predisposition toward finding language discrimi-
nation legal is further evidenced in Soberal-Perez v. Heckler.427
Spanish-speaking plaintiffs charged that they had been denied so-
cial security benefits because the Secretary of Welfare failed to
provide notices and instructions in Spanish. The court, again refus-
ing to equate language with national origin, ruled that while His-
420. EEOC Dec. 71-446, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1127 (Nov. 5, 1970).
421. 660 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1981).
422. Id. at 671. In Hernandez v. Erlenbusch, 368 F. Supp. 752 (D. Ore. 1973), the
federal district court ruled that a tavern's English-only policy had violated the civil
rights of the Mexican-American patrons under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982. "[I]t is
obvious that [the policy against the speaking of foreign languages at the bar]
amounts to patent racial discrimination against Mexican-Americans who constitute
about one-fourth of the tavern's trade .... Id. at 755. For a discussion of "Eng-
lish Literacy as a Condition of Business Activity," see Arnold Leibowitz, English
Literacy: Legal Sanction for Discrimination, 45 Notre Dame Law. 7, 38-41 (1969).
423. 609 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1980), withdrawn and aff'd, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir.
1980).
424. 618 F.2d at 267.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 269.
427. 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1983).
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panics were a suspect class, non-English speaking individuals were
not.428 "Language, by itself, does not identify members of a sus-
pect class."429 Furthermore, the court stated, the Secretary's use of
English was rational given "the role of English in our national
affairs."43 0
The language cases, perhaps more than any others, illustrate
the proclivity of the legal system to operate from an assimilationist
model. English is viewed as the norm. Non-English speakers are
therefore an aberration. As long as the courts view language as a
mutable characteristic and refuse to recognize it as an element of
national origin, it will be extremely difficult to prove illegal dis-
crimination on the basis of language. From the perspective of
most Chicanos, the preceding rulings indicate a profound misun-
derstanding of the importance of language within Hispanic culture.
As discussed in the next section, bilingual/bicultural education is a
central component of the Chicanos' sense of cultural protection.
Cultural Protection
Cultural groups, including most Chicanos, define freedom
from discrimination not only as equality of individual treatment
but as equality of treatment for their heritage and culture. As the
opening quotation of this section asserted, "[t]he worst violence
has been the unrelenting discrimination against the cultural heri-
tage-the language and customs-of the Mexican American
"431
Two fundamental elements of pluralistically-structured socie-
ties are 1) apportioned electoral power among groups and 2) lan-
guage and educational rights. For several decades, Chicanos have
been striving within the confines of the United States juridical sys-
tem to achieve these two goals.
428. Id. at 41.
429. Id. (citing Frontera v. Sindell, 522 F. 2d 1215, 1219-20 (6th Cir. 1975) and
Carmana v. Scheffield, 475 F. 2d 738, 739 (9th Cir. 1973)).
430. Id. at 42. In Frontera v. Sindell, 522 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir. 1975), an Hispanic
carpenter charged that he had failed to pass the city test for a carpentry position
because the test was administered in English. Balancing the plaintiff's rights with
that of the city's, the court ruled that Frontera's rights were not violated.
A similar problem exists regarding the administration of justice. The availabil-
ity of court interpreters varies from state to state. California, for example, has
translators on call. Rhode Island requires a court order to obtain the services of a
translator. William 0. Beeman, Lack of Bilingual Policy, Unenforced Laws
Threaten 'Melting Pot', L.A. Daily J., October 15, 1984, at 4, col. 3. See also Leibo-
witz, Notre Dame Lawyer, supra note 422, at 41.
431. Steinberg, supra note 360, at 24.
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Political Representation
Political representation is a strongly valued right within
United States society. How to define and ensure equal political
representation, however, has generated considerable disagreement.
Political representation involves two aspects: access to the ballot
and apportionment. There is, in addition, a question of govern-
mental responsibility not only to allow, but also to ensure individ-
ual and group access to the ballot and political representation.
Minority challenges to voting requirements began in the
1920s and increased dramatically following the passage of the Vot-
ing Rights Act of 1965432 and the amendments of 1970,4 3 3 1975434
and 1982.435 Bit by bit, the courts have found to be unconstitu-
tional such discriminatory voting obstacles as grandfather
clauses,436 all white primary elections,437 poll taxes,438 racial
designation of candidate on ballots,439 certain registration proce-
dures,440 and literacy tests.
432. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437-446 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974(e) (1982)). The Supreme Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of the contested sections of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). For a discussion of "English Literacy
as a Condition of Voting" prior to 1969, see Leibowitz, Notre Dame Lawyer, supra
note 422, at 25-38.
433. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314-19
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982)).
434. Voting Rights Act Amendment of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400-06
(codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982)).
435. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131-35,
(codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982)).
436. See, e.g., Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1914) (Oklahoma's grandfa-
ther clause amendment to the constitution held unconstitutional because it violated
the 15th Amendment); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1914).
437. See, e.g., Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1924) (outlawing a Texas statute
forbidding the participation of Blacks in primary elections). See also Nixon v. Con-
don, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (exclusion of Ne-
groes from voting in Texas Democratic Primary violated 15th amendment); Terry
v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (Blacks could not be deprived of the right to vote on
account of race or color).
438. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (Virginia
poll tax violated Equal Protection Clause).
439. See, e.g., Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964) (Louisiana's compulsory
designation of candidate's race on ballot violated equal protection); Hamm v. Vir-
ginia Bd. of Elections, 230 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Va. 1964) (Virginia provisions requir-
ing racially segregated lists for poll tax, registration and residence certificates
unconstitutional).
440. See, e.g., Beare v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 1100 (S.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd sub non.
Beare v. Briscoe, 498 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1974); Garza v. Smith, 320 F. Supp. 131
(W.D. Tex. 1970)(provisions requiring voter-registration between October 1 and
January 31 denied equal protection); Alabama v. United States, 371 U.S. 37 (1962);
Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965) (requiring registrant to give reason-
able interpretation of any clause of state or federal constitution held
unconstitutional).
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For a number of years, the courts upheld the validity of Eng-
lish literacy tests, finding that they had a proper relationship to
the states' interests in promoting "intelligent use of the ballot."4 4'
Although they ruled literacy tests on their face were "neutral on
race, creed, color, and sex" and therefore non-discriminatory,4 42
the tests would be unconstitutional if applied discriminatorily. 443
Faced with the reality that literacy tests were being used to
disenfranchise minorities, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act
of 1965.444 The Act empowered the Attorney General to suspend
"any voting test or device used by a state or political subdivision in
which less than fifty percent of the voting age population was reg-
istered on November 1, 1964, or in which less than fifty percent of
the voting age population voted in the 1964 presidential elec-
tion."445 The Voting Rights Amendment of 1970446 extended the
441. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959)
(state interest in encouraging non-English speaking people to learn the English lan-
guage has also been argued). See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 662-664
(1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
As Garcia points out, the state interest in maintaining a single language system
of English may be at odds with the Court's ruling in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923). See Franco Garcia, Jr., Language Barriers to Voting: Literacy Tests and
the Bilingual Ballot, 6 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 83, 99 (1974). In Meyer, the Court
emphasized that certain fundamental rights are guaranteed to all individuals re-
gardless of what language they speak:
The protection of the constitution extends to all, to those who speak.
other languages as well as to those born with English on their tongue.
Perhaps it would be highly advantageous if all had ready understand-
ing of our ordinary speech, but this cannot be coerced by methods
which conflict with the Constitution-a desirable end cannot be pro-
moted by prohibited means.
262 U.S. at 401 (1923). See also Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections,
360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959).
442. Garcia, supra note 441, at 86.
443. See, e.g., Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 150 (1965) (test requiring
registrant to interpret any clause of Louisiana or the U.S. Constitutions chosen by
registrar without objective standards discriminated against Negroes).
444. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437-446 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971-
1974(e) (1982)).
445. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437-446 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971-1974(e) (1982)). The Act also provided that no per-
son who had successfully completed the sixth primary grade in a United States
school in which the predominant language was other than English could be disqual-
ified from voting under any literacy test. This section was designed to overcome
the problem of the large number of disenfranchised Puerto Rican voters in New
York. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1965). See also Cardona v. Power,
384 U.S. 672 (1966) (case remanded for reconsideration since § 4(e) enacted after
original suit). In Puerto Rican Org. for Political Action v. Kusper, 350 F. Supp. 606
(N.D. Ill. 1972), the court ordered the city of Chicago to provide bilingual assistance
f6r Spanish speaking voters.
446. Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 201, 84 Stat. 315, upheld in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
112 (1970).
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ban on the use of literacy tests to the entire country.447
The issue was settled; states could not prohibit ballot access.
The question still remained as to the government's responsibility
to ensure access through positive means. 448 In 1970, the California
Supreme Court heard a case that illustrated the difficulty in defin-
ing the extent of the government's responsibility to ensure access
to the ballot. In Castro v. State,449 the court ruled that the provi-
sion of the state constitution and election code requiring voters to
be able to read the Constitution in English violated the equal pro-
tection clause for citizens literate only in Spanish.450 Noting the
existence of twenty-eight Spanish language newspapers and
magazines in California, the court reasoned that Spanish-speaking
citizens could adequately inform themselves of election issues.45 1
While the court ruled the literacy test unconstitutional,452 it did
not find that California had a responsibility to institute a bilingual
electoral system.4 53
447. The Voting Rights Act: Unfulfilled Goals, A Report of the United States
Commission on Civil Rights, (September 1981).
448. "And so our equal protection question is whether intelligent use of the bal-
lot should not be as much presumed where one is versatile in the Spanish language
as it is where English is the medium." Cardona v. Power, 384 U.S. 672, 676 (1965)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
449. 466 P.2d 244, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20, 2 Cal.3d 223 (1970).
450. Exclusion of all who cannot read English is obviously necessary to ac-
complish the goal of creating an electorate which can read all materi-
als of political significance printed in English. While that may be a
desirable state policy it is hardly so compelling that it justifies denying
the vote to a group of United States citizens who already face similar
problems of discrimination and exclusion in other areas and need a
political voice if they are to have any realistic hope of ameliorating the
conditions in which they live.
466 P.2d at 256, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 32, 2 Cal. 3d at 240. In summary, the court noted
that it "[wiould indeed be ironic that petitioners, who are the heirs of a great and
gracious culture, identified with the birth of California and contributing in no small
measure to its growth, should be disenfranchised in their ancestral land, despite
their capacity to cast an informed vote." 466 P.2d at 259, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 35, 2 Cal.
3d at 243.
451. 466 P. 2d at 254-55, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 30-31, 2 Cal. 3d at 238-239.
452. 466 P.2d at 258, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 34, 2 Cal. 3d at 242. But see Socialist Work-
ers Party v. Rockefeller, 314 F. Supp. 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 400 U.S. 806 (1970)
(Court declined to rule the literacy requirement unconstitutional since Voting
Rights Act of 1965 already made it impermissible); Mexican-Am. Fed'n-Washing-
ton State v. Naff, 299 F. Supp. 587 (E.D. Wash. 1969) (district court held literacy/
fluency requirement a valid exercise of state power), vacated sub nom.; Jimenez v.
Naff, 400 U.S. 986 (1971). For a criticism of Naff, see Note, Constitutional Law-
Voting Rights-State English Literacy Requirements Upheld, 45 Wash. L. Rev. 401
(1970).
453. 466 P.2d at 244, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 20, 2 Cal. 3d at 223. In Texas, a state law
prohibiting assistance of illiterates in marking and preparing ballots, yet allowing
assistance to the physically handicapped, was found to violate the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Garza v. Smith, 320 F. Supp. 131 (W.D. Tex.
1970).
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In 1975, in extending the 1965 Voting Rights Act, Congress
found, "[tihat, through the use of various practices and procedures,
citizens of language minorities have been effectively excluded
from participation in the electoral process."454 To overcome this
discrimination, Congress determined that remedial measures were
needed, i.e., bilingual voting information and ballots.455 The 1982
extension of the Voting Rights Act mandated the continued use of
bilingual ballots for certain areas of the country until 1992.456
The 1975 and 1982 voting rights amendments can be viewed
as expanding the government's traditional role of protecting
against discrimination in voting access to that of promoting minor-
454. Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 203(a), 89 Stat. 402 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973aa-la (1982)).
455. According to the terms of the Act, bilingual information had to be provided
if "more than 5 percent of the citizens of voting age of such State or political subdi-
vision are members of a single language minority . . ." and "the illiteracy rate of
such persons as a group is higher than the national illiteracy rate .. " Pub. L. No.
94-73, § 203(b), 89 Stat. 403 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-lb (1982)). If
the minority language is unwritten, the law mandates oral assistance to voters.
Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 203c, 89 Stat. 403 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-le
(1982)). According to section e, the term "language minorities" means American
Indians, Asian American, Alaskan Natives, or people of Spanish heritage.
456. Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 4, 96 Stat. 134 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1973aa-lb (1982)). The Act changed the standards for determining the necessity
for bilingual ballots from a minority population measure to a measure of the
number of people who actually have difficulty with English. The effect of the new
requirements, for example, decreased the need for Spanish language ballot material
in California from 38 to 10 counties. See Congress Unlikely to Change Law Requir-
ing Bilingual Ballots, Materials, L.A. Daily J., Nov. 23, 1984, at 3, col. 4.
The provision of bilingual ballots in areas with large foreign language popula-
tions has prompted a grassroots attempt to have that section of the law repealed.
In November 1984, Californians passed Proposition 38 by a margin of 71% to 29%.
See L.A. Daily J., Nov. 23, 1984, at 3, col. 4. The first section of the proposition
stated that the people of California "do hereby find and declare" that the "United
States Government should foster similarities that unite our people, the most impor-
tant of which is the use of the English language." Id. Of an advisory nature only,
the proposition required the California Governor to send a letter to the U.S. Attor-
ney General and all congressional members stating the voters' concern. The propo-
sition was initiated by U.S. English, an organization founded in 1983 by former
Senator S.I. Hayakawa. The organization successfully won the abolishment of local
bilingual ballots in San Francisco in 1983. See L.A. Daily J., Oct. 23, 1984, at 1, col.
2.
Senator Hayakawa also introduced a constitutional amendment in 1981 making
English the nation's official language. See N.Y. Times, April 16, 1981, at 6, col. 1. In
1982, the Senate adopted 78-21 an amendment declaring congressional opinion to be
that English is the official language of the United States. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 18,
1982, at Al, col. 2.
In 1980, Dade County, Florida, a county in which 42% of the inhabitants speak
Spanish, passed an ordinance prohibiting the use of any language other than Eng-
lish on official business. South Bend Tribune, Oct. 7, 1984, at 5, col. 1. This mandate
extends to civil marriages which must be performed in English. Couples who wish
to be married in Spanish or Creole (spoken by the large Haitian population) must
bring their own interpreters. Chi. Trib., Aug. 2, 1985, § 1, at 4, col. 1.
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ity access. Similar progress, however, has not occurred in the area
of political apportionment.
Majorities have frequently used gerrymandered districts457
and multi-member districts to decrease minority voting strength
whether the minority is a racial or ethnic group or an opposing
political party. It was not until 1962 in Baker v. Carr458 that the
Supreme Court discarded the political question doctrine 45 9 in state
legislative apportionment cases.460 As the Court did not specify
the definition of and standards for determining equal representa-
tion, courts following Baker had two options: to apportion repre-
sentation on the basis of each individual vote or to allocate
electoral strength among groups.
Citing precedent in Reynolds v. Sims,461 the Court stated that
the fundamental principle of representative government "is one of
equal representation for equal numbers of people, without regard
to race, sex, economic status, or place of residence within a
State." 462 Later, in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey,463 the
Court underscored its determination to steer clear of group de-
mands for representation. The reapportionment plan under attack
by petitioners divided a Hasidic Jewish community between two
districts, thereby reducing their previous voting strength. The
Court did not acknowledge the cultural identity and group de-
mands of the Hasidic petitioners but regarded them solely as mem-
bers of the white majority. Working from this view, the Court
457. Gerrymandered districts-concentrating minority voters in one district or
diluting minority voters throughout several districts-have long been used as a
means to preclude minorities from exercising their proportional voting strength.
See infra notes 458-64 and accompanying text.
458. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The Court did not rule on the merits of the case but
remanded the case to the lower court.
459. Under the political doctrine question the Court has held that certain issues,
e.g., areas under the exclusive authority of the executive (foreign affairs) or the
legislative branch, cannot be resolved by the judicary. See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green,
328 U.S. 549 (1946); South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950); Radford v. Gary, 145 F.
Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 991 (1957).
460. Four years previously in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), the
Supreme Court had held that the validity of a districting plan in Tuskegee, Ala-
bama could be challenged. "When a legislature thus singles out a readily isolated
segment of a racial minority for special discriminatory treatment, it violates the fif-
teenth amendment." Id. at 346.
Gomillion foreshadowed Baker in its finding that voting, as a fundamental
right, was subject to the strictest scrutiny, rather than to the limited judicial scru-
tiny previously employed as as a standard of review for most state legislation. See,
e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). In Reynolds v. Sims, the Supreme
Court stated that "[ainy alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must
be carefully and meticulously scrutinized." 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
461. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
462. Id. at 560-61 (citing Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964)).
463. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
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found that the apportionment plan fell within the guidelines of the
1965 Voting Rights Act.464
The courts have dealt with the question of multi-member dis-
tricts in a similar manner. Multi-member districts do not violate
the equal protection clause per se 465 unless operated "to minimize
or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of
the voting population."466 To prove that a district is "operated" to
dilute voting strength, challengers must prove discriminatory in-
tent, not simply the effect of diluted minority voting power.4 67
In one of the few instances where the Supreme Court has
found discriminatory intent, Chicanos successfully proved that the
multi-member districts in Dallas County, Texas, were designed to
reduce Chicano voting strength.4 68 The district court found that
"[t]he continued and continuing discriminations against Mexican-
Americans . . . effectively [remove them] from the political
processes . ."."469. The Court affirmed the district court's institu-
tion of single member districts "to bring the community into the
full stream of political life . ,"470
The Supreme Court's rulings in the preceding apportionment
cases indicate a steadfast attachment to the traditional orientation
of individualism.471 Relying on doctrines associated with race-
neutral procedural fairness, the Court has consistently found dis-
tricting plans that discriminate against minorities on the basis of
one-person one-vote to be unconstitutional, thereby rectifying mi-
nority underrepresentation.472 The courts, however, have stopped
464. Id. at 148.
465. See, e.g., Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966); Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S.
120 (1967); Mann v. Davis, 245 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. Va. 1965); Burnette v. Davis, 382
U.S. 42 (1965); Harrison v. Schaeffer, 383 U.S. 269 (1966).
466. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965).
467. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149-53 (1971). Justice Douglas forcefully
implied in his dissent that a test of intent rather than effect does not adequately
protect voting rights under the fifteenth amendment. See id. at 171-81 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part).
468. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
469. Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 733 (W.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
470. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1972); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755,
769 (1973). This issue has become increasingly important to American politics. See,
e.g., Indians in West Turning to Voting Rights Tool That Aided Blacks in South, N.
Y. Times, June 27, 1986, at 112, col. 6; Los Angeles Council Wrestles with Redistrict-
ing, N. Y. Times, July 24, 1986, at A10, col. 1.
471. See Samuel I. Rosenberg, Reapportionment and Minority Politics, 6 Colum.
Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 107 (1974); Note, Group Representation and Race-Conscious Ap-
portionment: The Roles of States and the Federal Courts, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1847
(1978); United Jewish Organization v. Carey and the Need to Recognize Aggregate
Voting Rights, 87 Yale L. J. 571 (1978) [hereinafter United Jewish Organization].
472. Under this formula, minorities have successfully challenged numerous dis-
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short of employing any doctrines which would ensure racial or
ethnic representation. 473 "Effective participation does not mean
the right to have members of one's race, sex, or group elected to
political office."474 Furthermore, the courts have not declared that
minorities have a constitutional right to a minimal or proportional
level of representation.47 5
Language Toleration and Promotion
To destroy a language is to destroy a culture.476 The United
States has historically fluctuated regarding language promotion
and toleration.477 In the early years, German, French and Span-
tricting plans designed to dilute their voting strength. See e.g., Swann v. Adams,
385 U.S. 440 (1967); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969); Gaffney v. Cum-
mings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973) (The Supreme Court eventually reversed the district
court because a prima facie case was not made out).
473. "The decisive factor in every case is whether a minority group is allowed
'effective participation in the political process.'" Seamon v. Upham, 536 F. Supp.
931, 946 (E.D. Tex. 1982), vacated, 456 U.S. 37 (1982) (emphasis in original) (citing
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1921), citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 533).
474. Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358, 1374 n. 22 (5th Cir. 1981).
475. See United Jewish Organization, supra note 471 at 588-94, which argues
that the fifteenth amendment provides the basis for such a right.
476. The linguist George Steiner has written:
Language is both the container and the shaping spirit of the ways in
which we experience the world. Every single language embodies and
gives expression to a particular way of organizing, perceiving, under-
standing reality.... [T]he mental picture of the world which makes up
that complex living framework of social existence which we call a cul-
ture varies immensely .... And it is of this variety that language is
the pre-eminent medium and preservere.
George Steiner, The Tongues of Men, 2 The Listener 534, 536 April 28, 1977; Al-
cock, Taylor & Welton, supra note 46, at 82. See also Benjamin Whorf, Language,
Thought, and Reality (John Carrol, ed. 1956). Paul Kroskrity describes the impor-
tance of the Tewa language to the maintenance of the culture. An important Tewa
saying is: Na:-im-bi hi:;o na:-im-bi wowa:ci na-mu-"Our language is our history."
Or, in the singular, "My language is our history." "These sayings reflect a strong
belief that the Tewa language and its use reflect the history of the Arizona Tewa
speech community and, at the individual level, that a person's speech reflects his or
her biography." Paul Kroskrity, Ethnolinguistics and American Indian Education:
Native American Languages and Cultures as a Means of Teaching, unpublished pa-
per, available on file with Law and Inequality at 16-17 (1985).
477. According to the 1980 census, 26 million people, nearly 11% of the popula-
tion, speak a language other than English at home. More than twelve and a half
million people speak Spanish, making the United States the seventh largest Span-
ish speaking country in the world. Arlen J. Large, War of Words: Proliferation of
Spanish in U.S. Inspires Action Against Bilingualism, Wall St. J., July 22, 1985, at
1, col. 1.
As Kloss points out in The American Bilingual Tradition, language rights may
be either promotion-oriented (state authorities promote a minority language by
sanctioning and encouraging its use in public institutions, e.g., legislative, adminis-
trative and educational) or toleration or tolerance-oriented (state authorities do not
actively interfere with minority efforts to use language in the private domain).
Kloss argues that the United States possesses a far richer and more tolerant history
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ish were frequently tolerated and occasionally promoted. During
the War of Independence, the Continental Congress printed Ger-
man translations of many of its proclamations.478 Pennsylvania
employed a German State Printer.479 Louisiana, home to French
Acadians, was a fully bilingual state under its 1845 constitution.48 0
In New Mexico, Spanish remained the language of official use well
into the twentieth century.48 '
In many instances, recognizing that the adoption of English
was an effective tool of assimilation,48 2 the government instituted
measures prohibiting the use of native languages, especially among
such groups as American Indians, Puerto Ricans, and Chicanos.48 3
The early 1900s were a particularly intolerant era in United States,
exacerbated by the outbreak of World War 1.484 During the mid to
late 1800s a number of minority communities ran their own pri-
vate schools with the language of instruction in the mother tongue
of the community. In the late 1800s groups such as the American
of bilingualism than is generally known. Kloss, supra note 39, at 2-3. For a discus-
sion of the United States' orientation toward English language uses, see Leibowitz,
supra note 422.
478. Kloss, supra note 39, at 26. In 1862, Congress voted to have the Report on
Agriculture for 1861 printed in German. The resolution, however, was reversed the
following day. Id. at 31.
479. Id. at 144. In 1776, the First Constitutional Convention of Pennsylvania de-
cided to publish its records in German as well as English. Id. at 143.
480. Id. at 114. In Louisiana, the school law of 1847 dealt with the relationship
between French and English schools. There was no question of whether French
Schools would be permitted. Id. at 121.
481. A school law passed in 1884 in New Mexico stated: "Each county shall be
and constitute a school district in which shall be taught.., reading, writing ... in
either English or Spanish or both, as the directors may determine." Arnold Leibo-
witz, Educational Policy and Political Acceptance: The Imposition of English as the
Language of Instruction in American Schools 51-52 (1971).
482. Joshua Fishman's study, Language Loyalty in the United States 42 (1966),
indicates an almost complete breakdown among immigrant groups in the transmis-
sion of non-English languages between the second and third generations.
483. Students, until well into the 1960s, were punished under Texas law for
speaking Spanish on the playground. See United States v. Texas, 506 F. Supp. 405,
412 (E.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd 680 F. 2d 356 (5th Cir. 1982). See also Leibowitz, supra
note 481, at 44-62. Indian children, many of whom were literally kidnapped and
sent to boarding schools far from home, were forbidden and severely punished for
speaking their native languages. Id. at 63-80. It was not until Puerto Rico was
granted the authority to elect its own governor in 1947 that the island was able to
reinstitute Spanish as the language of instruction in the schools. See Raymond
Carr, Puerto Rico: A Colonial Experiment 284 (1984). See also Leibowitz, supra
note 481, at 81-104.
484. The Governor of Iowa issued a proclamation prohibiting public use of all
languages except English. Findlay, Ohio went a step further, levying fines of $25
for using German in the town's streets. Kloss, supra note 39, at 52. On October 6,
1917, a federal law went into effect forbidding all non-English press from publish-
ing articles about the war and foreign policy without first submitting their English
translation to the nearest post office. Id. at 60-61. See also Leibowitz, supra note
481, at 6-21.
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Protective Society lobbied for laws forbidding foreign language in-
struction in public schools.485 In Nebraska, such a statute was
used to convict a public school teacher for teaching German to a
child of ten.
48 6
In reviewing the statute, the Supreme Court acknowledged
that the "desire of the legislature to foster a homogeneous people
with American ideals prepared readily to understand current dis-
cussions of civic matters is easy to appreciate." 48 7 The statute, how-
ever, interfered with the constitutional rights of the teacher to
teach and the parents to provide for their children's education.
Furthermore, the Court admonished:
The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who
speak other languages as well as to those born with English on
the tongue. Perhaps it would be highly advantageous if all had
ready understanding of our ordinary speech, but this cannot be
coerced by methods which conflict with the Constitution - - a
desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means.48 8
Today Hispanic parents, as well as other parents of non-Eng-
lish speaking children, seek educational programs that will provide
their children with equal and quality education without promoting
their total assimilation. Specifically, these parents request compre-
hensive bilingual-bicultural educational programs that provide in-
struction in both English and the child's native tongue as well as
teach respect for the cultural heritage and history of the minority
student.48 9
485. See Gary Nash & Richard Weiss, The Great Fear (1970); Leonard Dinner-
stein & David Reimers, Ethnic Americans 61-62 (1975).
486. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
487. Id. at 402. In upholding the conviction, the Nebraska Supreme Court stated
that the "legislature had seen the baneful effects of permitting foreigners who had
taken residence in this country, to rear and educate their children in the language
of their native land." Meyer v. Nebraska, 107 Neb. 657, 661, 187 N.W. 100, 104
(1922), rev'd, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). To allow this, the court wrote, was "inimical to
our own safety .... It was to educate them so that they must always think in that
language, and, as a consequence, naturally inculcate in them the ideas and senti-
ments foreign to the best interests of this country." Meyer, 107 Neb. 657, 662, 187
N.W. 100, 102 (1922).
The Nebraska Supreme Court echoed the views of Rousseau who wrote in his
1772 thesis, On Considerations on the Government of Poland 176 (1953), "It is edu-
cation that must give souls a national formation, and direct their opinions and
tastes in such a way that they will be patriotic by inclination, by passion, by
necessity."
488. 262 U.S. at 401. In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944), the
Court described Meyer as having protected "children's rights to receive teaching in
languages other than the nation's common tongue .... "
489. Scholars have written a number of informative law review articles on vari-
ous aspects of the bilingual education dilemma. See Jonathan D. Haft, Assuring
Equal Educational Opportunity for Language-Minority Students: Bilingual Educa-
tion and the Equal Educational Opportunity Act of 1974, 18 Colum. J.L. & Soc.
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The right to bilingual education rests on case law, federal
guidelines, and statutory law including: Lau v. Nichols,490 Title VI
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act491; and the Equal Educational Oppor-
tunity Act.492 In Lau v. Nichols, non-English speaking Chinese
students in San Francisco argued that the public school's failure to
educate non-English speaking students in a language they could
understand constituted discrimination in violation of Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Based on the Court's interpretation of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, and the then-Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW) Department guidelines issued pursuant to Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act,493 Justice Douglas wrote, "there is no equality of
Probs. 209 (1983); Peter Roos, Bilingual Education: The Hispanic Response to Une-
qual Educational Opportunity, 42 Law & Contemp. Probs. 111 (1978); Anthony J.
Plastino, The Legal Status of Bilingual Education in America's Public Schools:
Testing Ground for a Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation of Equal Protec-
tion, 17 Duq. L. Rev. 473 (1978-1979); Joaquin G. Avila, Equal Educational Opportu-
nities For Language Minority Children, 55 U. Colo. L. Rev. 559 (1984); Leibowitz,
supra note 422, at 41-50.
Educators and administrators in the Southwest recognized as early as 1946 that
English language deficiencies were a primary obstacle to the educational achieve-
ment of Mexican-American students. U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, A Better
Chance to Learn: Bilingual-Bicultural Education 14-17 (1975).
490. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
491. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1982) which states that:
"No person in the United States shall, on the grounds of race, color, or national ori-
gin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assist-
ance."
Courts initially relied on Title VI as the primary basis of the right to bilingual
education. See Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974); Rios
v. Read, 480 F. Supp. 14 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Cintron v. Brentwood Union Free School
Dist., 455 F. Supp. 57 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). A reliance on Title VI was replaced in later
cases with a reliance on the EEOA. See United States v. Texas, 680 F.2d 356 (5th
Cir. 1982); Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981); Guadalupe Org. v.
Tempe Elem. School Dist., 587 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1978).
In addition, some ten states have passed legislation making bilingual education
mandatory for limited English proficient students in their states. Another sixteen
states provide some measure of state-funded bilingual education programs. Avila,
supra note 489, at 559.
492. The EEOA, which was passed in response to Lau, guarantees:
No state shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on
account of his or her race, color, sex or national origin, by-
(f) the failure by an educational agency to take appropriate action to
overcome language barriers that impede equal participation by its stu-
dents in its instructional programs.
Equal Educational Opportunity Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f)
(1976).
493. In addition to examining the specific language of Title VI, the Court relied
on the guidelines and regulations enacted by the former Department of HEW (now
the Department of Health and Human Services) to enforce the Act:
Where inability to speak and understand the English language ex-
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treatment merely by providing students with the same facilities,
textbooks, teachers, and curriculum; for students who do not un-
derstand English are effectively foreclosed from any meaningful
education." 494 Remaining silent on the constitutional issue, the
Court also declined to specify a single remedy: "Teaching English
to the students of Chinese ancestry who do not speak the language
is one choice. Giving instructions to this group in Chinese is an-
other. There may be others." 495
Lau, although proceeding on statutory grounds, represented a
considerable extension of the equal educational doctrine enunci-
ated in Brown v. Board of Education.496 Whereas Brown empha-
sized the inequality of physical separation on the basis of race,
497
Lau recognized the inequality of different treatment stemming
from cultural variables such as language.498
The Lau decision left numerous issues unclear, including: the
basis on which the right to bilingual education rested; the stan-
dards by which to judge the appropriateness of local bilingual pro-
grams, i.e., what is meant by "appropriate action";499 the exact
responsibility of local educational agencies to remedy the language
problem of English deficient students (EDS); how an "English de-
ficient student" is defined; and the number of students required to
establish a bilingual education program.5 00
cludes national origin-minority group children from effective partici-
pation in the educational program offered by a school district, the
district must take affirmative steps to rectify the language deficiency
in order to open its instructional program to these students.
Lau, 414 U.S. at 568 (citing 35 Fed. Reg. 11,595 (1970)).
494. Id. at 566. The Bilingual Education Act of 1974, section 703(a)(1)(A)-(B), 20
U.S.C. §§ 880b-1(a)(1)(A)-(B) (1976), defines children with a limited ability to speak
and understand English as: "(a) individuals who were not born in the United States
or whose native language is language other than English, and (b) individuals who
come from environments where a language other than English is dominant..., and
by reason thereof, have difficulty speaking and understanding the English
language."
495. 414 U.S. at 565.
496. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
497. Id. at 493.
498. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 568.
499. The EEOA is currently the primary source for bilingual rights litigation.
Section 1703(f), combined with Section 1706, allows private suits against local edu-
cational agencies for failure to take "appropriate action to overcome language barri-
ers" experienced by students. "Appropriate action" is not defined, nor does the
legislative history offer guidance, thereby allowing courts wide latitude in deter-
mining the "appropriateness" of each program. See Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d
989 (5th Cir. 1981); Guadalupe Org. v. Tempe Elem. School Dist., 587 F.2d 1022 (9th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Texas, 506 F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd, 680 F.2d
356 (5th Cir. 1982).
500. Most state laws have established twenty as the number of students required
before a statutory obligation arises. Roos, supra note 489, at 123. As a number of
authors have pointed out, the legislative history and wording of the several acts
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Schools currently use two basic types of bilingual educa-
tion.501 The first, commonly called "English as a Second Lan-
guage" (ESL) program, places students in regular classroom study
during part of the day, with the remainder of the day spent in spe-
cial English classes. The emphasis in ESL programs is on cor-
recting a child's deficiency in English and is obviously
assimilationist in design. No attempt is made to impart knowledge
of, or respect for, the child's cultural heritage. The second pro-
gram, known as "bilingual-bicultural" education, is far more com-
prehensive. Students receive special English language instruction
and are taught in both English and in their native tongue in all
subject areas. A further component of the program is instruction
on their native history and culture.
The courts have generally split in their findings as to
whether the ESL program properly satisfies the statutory require-
ments for bilingual education. 502 In Serna v. Portales Municipal
Schools,503 the Tenth Circuit, noting the psychological trauma5 04
would suggest that every child is entitled to special language assistance if he or she
can show a language "impediment" resulting in "[in]effective" or "[un]equal" par-
ticipation in the school district's educational program. See, e.g., Roos, supra note
489, at 119. Title VI, for example, states, "[n]o person... shall, on the ground of...
national origin . . . be subjected to discrimination." Roos, supra note 489, at 122
(citing language from 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1976)). See Aspira of New York, Inc. v.
Bd. of Educ., 394 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Otera v. Mesa County Valley School
Dist. No. 51, 408 F. Supp. 162 (D. Colo. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 568 F.2d
1312 (10th Cir. 1977).
501. Estimates indicate that approximately 3.6 million students are rated as LEP
(limited English proficiency), 80% of whom are Hispanics. Of the total, only 1.3
million students, speaking 80 different languages, are currently enrolled in bilin-
gual education programs. Ezra Bowen, For Learning or Ethnic Pride? Time, July
8, 1985, at 80. In 1984, $139 million was distributed to 581 school districts. Edward
Fiske, One Language or Two? N. Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1985, § 12, at 1.
Funds for pilot projects in bilingual education were first provided in 1968 when
Title VII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 was passed. Bi-
lingual Education Act, Pub. L. No. 90-247, § 701-702, 81 Stat. 816 (1968) (current ver-
sion at 20 U.S.C. § 3221 (West Supp. 1986)) [hereinafter Bilingual Education Act].
502. As Roos argues in his article, despite the findings of several courts that Eng-
lish as Second Language (ESL) programs are adequate to fit the "appropriate ac-
tion" standard, a strong case can be made that the legislative history of various
federal and state laws mandates a bilingual-bicultural program. Roos, supra note
489, at 125-28.
503. 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974). See also Aspira of New York, Inc. v. Bd. of
Educ., 394 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
504. Expert witnesses explained what effect the Portales school system
had on Spanish surnamed students. Dr. Zintz testified that when
Spanish surnamed children come to school and find that their lan-
guage and culture are totally rejected and that only English is accepta-
ble, feelings of inadequacy and lowered self esteem develop. Henry
Pascual, Director of the Communicative Arts Division of the New
Mexico Department of Education, stated that a child who goes to a
school where he finds no evidence of his language and culture and eth-
nic group represented becomes withdrawn and nonparticipating. The
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borne by non-English speaking students who are taught in English,
ordered the school district to institute a bilingual-bicultural pro-
gram. In two cases decided in 1978, Rios v. Read 505 and Cintron v.
Brentwood Union Free School Dist. 506, the courts interpreted the
Equal Opportunities Act of 1974, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, and Lau as requiring the school district to establish a bilin-
gual-bicultural program for its ESL students.507
Success has not been universal. In Guadalupe Org., Inc. v.
Tempe Elementary School Dist. ,508 Mexican-Americans and Yaqui
Indians argued that the district's ESL program did not meet the
standards required by the EEOA. The plaintiffs asked for the im-
plementation of a full scale bilingual education program which in-
cluded the historical contribution of the minority children's
ancestors. The court denied the request, ruling that the remedial
English program was sufficient to meet the criteria of "appropriate
action" as required by the EEOA.509
The Tenth Circuit in Keyes v. School District No. 1 Denver,
Colo.,510 overturned a lower court mandate to implement a com-
prehensive bilingual-bicultural education program. The Keyes
case, although primarily a desegregation case, also illustrates the
dilemma that can arise when minority issues are thought of solely
in terms of overcoming racial discrimination. Hispanics had inter-
vened in Keyes to protect bilingual education programs. The peti-
child often lacks a positive mental attitude. Maria Gutierrez Spencer,
a longtime teacher in New Mexico, testified that until a child devel-
oped a good self image not even teaching English as a second language
would be successful.
Serna, 499 F.2d at 1150.
505. 73 F.R.D. 589 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). In ruling on plaintiffs' preliminary motion,
the court rejected the argument that any affirmative action satisfied the Court's
ruling in Lau: "An inadequate program is as harmful to a child who does not speak
English as no program at all." Id. at 595. In later deciding the case, the court em-
phasized that "[t]he school district is not obligated to offer a program of indefinite
duration for instruction in Spanish art and culture .... The purpose of (bilingual
education) is not to establish a bilingual society." Rios v. Read, 480 F. Supp. 14, 23
(E.D.N.Y. 1978). See also, Herbert Teitelbaum & Richard Hiller, Bilingual Educa-
tion: The Legal Mandate, 47 Harv. Educ. Rev. 138, 149-50 (1977).
506. 455 F. Supp. 57 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
507. See also Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1009-10 (5th Cir. 1981), where
the court developed a three-prong analysis to determine whether the school's pro-
gram violated section 1703(f) of the Equal Employment Opportunities Act.
508. 587 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1978).
509. Id. at 1026-27; "There exists no constitutional duty imposed by the Equal
Protection Clause to provide bilingual-bicultural education such as the appellants
request. The decision of the appellees to offer the educational program attacked by
appellants bears a rational relationship to legitimate state interests." A similar rul-
ing was reached in United States v. Texas, 506 F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd,
680 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1982).
510. 521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976).
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tion requested the court not sacrifice bilingual education programs
for the sake of a desegregation order that would scatter their chil-
dren among schools, thereby negating the need for such programs.
The district court had agreed. The Tenth Circuit reversed this
part of the district court's order, concluding: "Bilingual education
... is not a substitute for desegregation. Although bilingual in-
struction may be required to prevent the isolation of minority stu-
dents in a predominantly Anglo school system such instruction
must be subordinate to a plan of school desegregation."511
Bilingual education has been a highly controversial subject,
becoming even more so in recent years. Although, as discussed
above, victories have been won in several districts, an analysis of
recent rulings suggests no future progress. In San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriquez,5 12 the Supreme Court refused to find a
fundamental right to education,5 13 thereby foreclosing strict scru-
tiny analysis in cases claiming a right to bilingual education. A
federal district court has also refused to find that bilingual educa-
tion is constitutionally mandated by the equal protection clause.514
In addition, the Bakke ruling requiring a showing of discrimina-
tory intent, as opposed to effect, has emasculated the usefulness of
Title VI as a basis for suit in most bilingual education cases. 515 Fi-
511. Id. at 480. Desegregation need not conflict with bilingual education pro-
grams if properly designed. In Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass.
1975), aff'd, 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976), and U.S. v.
Board of Educ. of Waterbury, 560 F.2d 1103 (2nd Cir. 1977), the courts ordered the
schools to assign Hispanic students in such a way as to meet the state mandated
bilingual program.
512. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
513. Thus, the key to discovering whether education is "fundamental" is
not to be found in comparisons of the relative societal significance of
education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found by
weighing whether education is as important as the right to travel.
Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to educa-
tion explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, (citations
omitted). Education, of course, was not among the rights afforded ex-
plicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any
basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.
Id. at 33-35.
514. In Martin Luther King Junior Elementary School Children v. Mich. Bd. of
Educ., 451 F. Supp. 1324 (E.D. Mich. 1978), the court ruled that there is no constitu-
tional right to special educational programs to overcome unsatisfactory academic
performances based on cultural, social, or economic background.
515. California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 350-55 (1978) (Brennan, J., con-
curring and dissenting). In Bakke, the Court adopted the stricter standard of prov-
ing discriminatory intent under Title VI. Title VI has proven to be of limited use in
bilingual education cases. In Lau, the petitioners were required only to show evi-
dence of discriminatory effect. Lau, 414 U.S. at 568. Cf. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S.
55 (1980). See Note, Supplemental Language Instruction for Students with Limited
English-Speaking Ability: The Relationship Between the Right and the Remedy, 61
Wash. U.L.Q. 415 (1983).
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nally, the willingness of courts to find ESL programs sufficient to
fulfill the mandate of bilingual education is unacceptable to those
minorities who want their children to learn the positive value and
beauty of their own native language and heritage while also be-
coming proficient in English.
As in all minority issues, the executive branch's record in ac-
tively litigating cases, and supporting funding for key programs, is
a prime indicator of the nation's commitment to minority rights.5 16
President Reagan voiced his support for the assimilationist model
early in his administration, stating, "it is absolutely wrong and
against [the] American concept to preserve native language and
culture in school programs."517 Secretary of Education William
Bennett echoed this view: "As fellow citizens, we need a common
language .... In the United States that language is English."5' 8
Secretary Bennett also announced his intention to use his depart-
ment's regulatory powers to assist local schools in pursuing flexi-
ble instruction systems and to request Congress to allow increased
funding for teaching methods emphasizing English.5 19
As the preceding analysis indicates, Chicanos have met with
varied success in obtaining recognition and protection of their cul-
tural rights. The courts have maintained the traditional Lockean
view of government as a social contract among individuals. Polit-
ical representation is based on one person-one vote. Districts are
drawn to ensure racial neutrality not group representation.
Regarding language toleration and promotion, it is clear that
English is the unofficial language of the United States. Protection
against discrimination on the basis of language in the workplace
barely exists. Language is not considered an integral aspect of na-
tional origin and thereby protected. It is further clear that the
government no longer supports bilingual-bicultural programs, but
is promoting the adoption of the assimilationist-oriented ESL pro-
grams. Only in the area of bilingual ballot requirements is there
evidence of the government recognizing and promoting language
rights. These measures, however, are clearly demarked as reme-
516. Bilingual education funding has decreased from an approximate high of
$175 million in 1982 to $139 million in 1984. In 1982 the Department of Education
estimated that "'only about a third' of the estimated 2.4 million limited English
proficient children in the nation [were] being served." Fiske, supra note 501, at 45.
517. Washington Post, March 4, 1981, at 5 (cited in Richard Ruiz, Ethnic Group
Interests and the Social Good: Law and Language in Education, 1 Ethnicity, Law
and the Social Good 56 (Winston Van Horne & Thomas Toneson, ed. 1983) [herein-
after Ruiz]).
518. A Failed Path, Time, Oct. 7, 1985, at 55.
519. Id.
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dial and of limited applicability, to be phased out in a timely
fashion.
Conclusion
This article has focused on three general issues: the legal
right to the protection of culture; the most successful constitu-
tional bases for protecting cultural rights; and the main societal
and legal obstacles within American society and jurisprudence to a
greater protection of culture. As a vehicle for examining and un-
derstanding these issues, this article has examined the success of
three nonimmigrant groups, the American Indian, the native Ha-
waiian, and the Chicano, in obtaining a recognition and protection
of their cultural rights.
The protection of cultural rights is an issue rarely acknowl-
edged, much less squarely dealt with by the United States legal
system. The courts have never defined culture and in several in-
stances have offered conflicting conclusions as to the relevance of
religion520 or language to culture.521 More importantly, the courts
have not interpreted the Constitution to include a protection of
cultural rights, as they have a protection of privacy.5 22
Despite the courts' refusal to directly sanction cultural pro-
tection, minorities have achieved some victories by relying on
traditional constitutional guarantees of religion, equal protection,
and the right of parents to educate and raise their children. Of the
three, the most successful have been the freedom of religion and
the right of parents to educate and raise their children.523
520. See supra notes 169-235 and accompanying text.
521. In Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), for example, the Supreme Court
clearly stated that children could not be discriminated against in education on the
basis of language. Language would appear to be a central element of culture. In
Martin Luther King Junior Elementary School Children v. Michigan Board of Edu-
cation, 451 F. Supp. 1324, 1327 (E.D. Mich. 1978) however, the court stated: "No law
or clause of the Constitution of the United States, explicitly secures the right of
plaintiffs to special education services to overcome unsatisfactory academic per-
formance based on cultural, social, or economic background."
522. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
In Sequoyah v. T. V.A., the court stated that: "Though cultural history and tra-
ditions are vitally important to any group of people, these are not interests pro-
tected by the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment." Sequoyah v. T.V.A.
620 F.2d 1159, 1165 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
In only two cases, Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979) and Peyote Way
Church of God, Inc. v. Smith, 556 F. Supp. 632 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), modified, 742 F.2d
193 (5th Cir. 1984), did the court clearly state that the federal government pos-
sessed an obligation to protect Indian culture.
523. As the Court emphasized in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972), the
history and culture of Western civilization "reflect a strong tradition of parental
concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the
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In attaining recognition and protection of their cultural
rights, American Indian tribes have been the most successful of
the three groups. The courts and the federal government have ac-
knowledged the importance of tribal cultures in the Frank,524
Woody,525 and Martinez526 cases as well as the Indian Religious
Freedom 527 and Indian Child Welfare Acts.52s When viewed in to-
tality, however, it is clear that the federal government's willing-
ness to acknowledge tribal cultural rights stems more from the
tribes' political status and jurisdictional rights than from either a
moral recognition or constitutional basis. Tribes have proven most
successful in protecting a cultural right or practice when they can
prove jurisdictional control as in the case of domestic relations.
Cultural questions, with no jurisdictional basis, are far more tenu-
ous as is indicated by the Indian religious land cases.
Given the courts' inadequate understanding, or lack of treat-
ment of culture, it is not surprising that the courts have frequently
shown a serious misunderstanding of Indian cultures. The courts
accept the centrality of traditional religious practices, if the prac-
tices resemble some feature of Christianity. When the issue at
stake involves the use of sacred lands, the courts have uniformly
used the most stringent freedom of exercise test to preclude the
exercise of tribal rights.
The status and cultural rights of native Hawaiians are best
characterized as evolving. Native Hawaiians have only recently
demanded a definition and protection of their rights. The state of
Hawaii has gone to considerable lengths, compared to other states,
in recognizing and protecting the cultural rights of its indigenous
inhabitants. Language, traditional law, and preservation of tradi-
tional practices is mandated by state law. The practical means to
support this mandate are derived from the lands and revenues set
aside for native use.
The federal government's commitment to the protection of
Hawaiian culture remains unclear considering its inaction on a Ha-
waiian reparations bill. The passage of such a bill would not only
acknowledge the moral and legal debt owed to native Hawaiians,
but would indirectly affirm and further the cultural and political
rights of native Hawaiians. Reparation funds would considerably
parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an
enduring American tradition."
524. Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
525. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813 (1964).
526. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
527. 25 U.S.C. § 1966 (1982).
528. Pub. L. No. 45-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1982)).
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strengthen the native Hawaiians' existing means to promote pro-
grams and fight legal battles to protect their lands, identity and
cultural heritage.
Chicanos have fared the worst of all three groups in the pro-
tection of their culture. Backlash against Hispanic immigration is
no doubt the most important societal factor working against Chica-
nos. In addition to the previously described obstacles, Chicanos
face an added burden of possessing no official legal status as is pos-
sessed by Indian tribes and native Hawaiians, no matter how
undefined.
A more subtle, yet critical factor militating against the courts'
willingness to extend cultural protection to any group, especially
Chicanos, is the legal system's emphasis on the eradication of ra-
cial discrimination. This emphasis on race becomes a complicating
factor due to the tendency of courts either to confuse, or to use in-
terchangeably the terms race and ancestry or national origin.529
The confusion of race with national origin is important because of
the nation's concern with eradicating racial discrimination. Cul-
ture is closely tied to the notion of national origin or ancestry.
Race is not necessarily linked with culture. Racial characteristics
may disappear long before cultural practices. If the courts con-
tinue to confuse race and ancestry, it will be very difficult to pro-
mote a system of positive rights based on national origin designed
to enhance and maintain cultural heritages.
Of related difficulty and of fundamental importance is the
manner in which the courts have chosen to define and apply the
term "equal protection." The guarantees of equal protection ac-
crue to the individual, not groups.530 Furthermore, the courts
have defined equal protection as equality of opportunity, not
529. In Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1942), for example, the
Supreme Court stated that "[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their
ancestry are by their very nature odious .... For that reason, legislative classifica-
tion or discrimination based on race alone has often been held to be a denial of
equal protection."
In Oregon v. Mitchell, the majority of the Supreme Court Justices discussed
the literacy test ban as a protection against racial discrimination. Chief Justice
Burger, Justices Black, Brennan, Stewart, and Blackmun validated the literacy test
ban on the grounds of protecting against racial discrimination. See 400 U.S. 112 at
131-34, 216-17, 231-36, 282, 284 (1970). Only Justice Douglas states the ban to be ille-
gal because of its use against minority groups. Id. at 144-47. Literacy tests were not
only used to disenfranchise southern Blacks, but were also employed in the South-
west and West to disenfranchise Spanish and other non-English speakers.
530. There is one case in which the courts have accorded the rights under the
1866 Civil Rights Act as accruing to groups. In Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
593 F.2d 968, 970 (10th Cir. 1979), the court pointed out that the protections af-
forded in the 1866 Act are measured in terms of groups: "The measure is group to
group, and plaintiff has alleged that the 'group' to which he belongs-those he de-
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equality of outcome. To ensure that individuals are guaranteed
equality of access to a right requires protections against the inter-
ference of one's rights to exercise that right. Equal protection de-
fined as equality of outcome involves the establishment of
programs to ensure that individuals and groups have the capacity
to exercise their rights.
The former approach to equal protection 53 1 virtually pre-
cludes a system whereby cultural minorities are guaranteed an
equal share (i.e., equality of results or outcome) through the be-
stowal of positive benefits.532 In the final analysis, programs such
as bilingual education, bilingual ballots, and affirmative action do
not deviate from a traditional orientation to equal protection.
These programs are of a remedial,533 transitory nature,534 designed
scribes as of Mexican American descent-is to be measured against the Anglos as
the standard." See Fiss, supra note 72.
531. Among the most widely discussed works that wrestle with the concept of
rights, equality, and the proper procedures for ensuring a just society are: John
Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971); Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously
(1977); and Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974). Professors Rawls and
Dworkin support programs such as affirmative action as a proper procedure for
achieving equality of opportunity. Professor Nozick argues for what he terms a
"minimal state," a state which remains clear of attempting to ensure equality of op-
portunity. While these two positions are viewed as competing schools of thought,
neither recognizes nor discusses the necessity for conceptualizing rights as belong-
ing to groups as opposed to individuals. See Vernon Van Dyke's criticism of Rawls
in Justice as Fairness: For Groups? 69 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 607 (1975).
532. The Supreme Court in the University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978), specifically excluded native groups from the application of the court's analy-
sis. Id. at 304, n.42. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held in Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), that legislative bodies could legally use racial and
ethnic criteria to design "a narrowly tailored" program "to accomplish the objective
of remedying the present effects of past discrimination." Id. at 480. The Court dis-
tinguished the holding in Fullilove from Bakke by pointing out that unlike Fulli-
love, no governmental body had found the existence of illegal discrimination. In
Bakke there had been "no determination by the legislature or a responsible admin-
istrative agency that the University engaged in a discriminatory practice requiring
remedial efforts." 438 U.S. at 305 (1978) (Powell, J.).
This orientation was implicit in the Hasidic representation case, United Jewish
Org. of Williamsburgh, Inc., v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), and directly stated in
Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358, 1368, n.22 (5th Cir. 1981).
533. Language deficiency was originally conceived as closely associated with pov-
erty. Title VII as originally written in 1967 specified that a child had to possess a
non-English primary language and be from a family with an annual income of
$3000 to qualify for bilingual programs. Ruiz, supra note 517, at 54.
534. According to Ruiz, The Massachusetts Transitional Bilingual Education Act
of 1972 clearly states that "[t]he General Court believes that a compensatory pro-
gram of transitional bilingual education can meet the needs of [limited English-
speaking] children and facilitate their integration into the regular public school cur-
riculum." Id. at 55. Wisconsin's Bilingual-Bicultural Education Act (1975), listed in
the Wisconsin code as a subchapter under a section on handicapped children, states:
"It is the policy of this state that a limited-English speaking pupil participate in a
bilingual-bicultural education program only until such time as the pupil is able to
perform ordinary classwork in English." Id.
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to ensure that all individuals despite their membership in a cul-
tural group have an equal chance of access to the benefits of the
polity. They remain assimilationist,535 not pluralistic in design.
Few people, outside of the minorities themselves, perceive bilin-
gual education as a method to preserve a rich language heritage
while learning the dominant language.
The United States prides itself on its deeply held values of
freedom and equality. A large number of people define freedom as
the right to maintain their culture and ask that their cultures be
given equal treatment and respect with others. United States soci-
ety has made great strides in extending true equality to all individ-
uals. Can it not now consider the extension of equality to all
groups--especially those non-immigrant groups with a strong
moral and legal claim to the land and its riches?
Perhaps an even more subtle yet important question is what
makes the United States society so fearful of cultural diversity?
We are no longer a nation searching for an identity and striving to
develop. Cultures are the window through which a people views,
interprets, and understands the complexities of the world. Each
culture brings with it the accumulated years of wisdom, values,
and understanding of a people. To destroy a culture is to destroy
the "social gene pool," thus limiting humanity's ability to adapt to
the environment.
535. As Ruiz so aptly observed: "[Aldding a foreign language to English is associ-
ated with erudition, social and economic status and, perhaps, even patriotism... ;
but maintaining a non-English language implies disadvantage, poverty, low
achievement and disloyalty .... Ruiz, supra note 517, at 55 (emphasis in original).
As Gerald Johnson has written, "no polyglot empire of the world has dared to
be as ruthless in imposing a single language upon its whole population as was the
liberal republic 'dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.'" Ger-
ald Johnson, Our English Heritage 118-19 (1949).
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